

## CIDRN PROJECT FINAL REPORT

### PROJECT DIRECTOR:

Dr. Dr. Tang Lixia

Associate Professor

Center of International Development Research

Department of Development Studies, College of  
Humanities and Development Studies, China Agricultural  
University, Beijing, 100193

### PROJECT TITLE:

Public Goods or Business Opportunities

----Ethnographic Studies on China Agricultural Technology

Demonstration Centers in Africa

### PROJECT DATE:

January 2014~June 2016

Report Date: July 2, 2016

“Public Goods or Business Opportunities  
----Ethnographic Studies on China Agricultural Technology  
Demonstration Centers in Africa”

Dr. Dr. Tang Lixia

Associate Professor, Center of International Development Research,  
Department of Development Studies, College of Humanities and  
Development Studies, China Agricultural University, Beijing, 100193

**I. PROJECT INTRODUCTION**

Project Title:

“Public Goods or Business Opportunities----Ethnographic Studies on China  
Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centers in Africa”

Planned Start Date:

January 2014

Planned Completion Date:

June 2016

**II. PROGRESS**

**1. Literature Review**

The academic articles on China’s engagement in Africa and international development, the policy documents about China Africa cooperation and media reports on China in Africa, especially about ATDC have been collected, reviewed and analyzed. Especially the working reports from all ATDC have been collected via working conference organized by China Ministry of Agriculture.

**2. Field work**

Several field works have been organized in last year.

**Qingdao, China**

In February 2014, research team visited China-Africa Cotton Company to learn their motivation, history, interaction with China and African government, future arrangement and other key issues. China-Africa Cotton Company is constructing ATDC in Malawi and also has branches in 6 African countries including Malawi and Zimbabwe

### **Zimbabwe**

In April and May 2014, research team visited Zimbabwe to field work. Chinese ATDC, Wanjin agricultural company, Tianze tobacco company, China-Africa cotton were visited. Chinese embassy, Zimbabwe Ministry of Agriculture and other key informants were interviewed.

### **Ethiopia**

In September 2014, research team visited ATDC in Ethiopia and also interviewed agricultural experts dispatched by China Ministry of Agriculture under China-FAO cooperation framework.

### **Malawi**

In October 2014, October 2015, February 2016, research team visited Malawi for field work. Malawi ATDC, China-Africa cotton, China aid stadium projects, China aid boreholes projected have been visited and key informants were interviewed.

### **Beijing, China**

In 2014, key informants from the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Commerce and Zhongjimeinuo agricultural machinery company who has constructed Zimbabwe ATDC were interviewed.

### **Fujian, China**

In 2016, research team visited the Fujian Agricultural and Forest University which is operating ATDC in Rwanda. The research team interviewed with the key informants from ATDC about their approaches on technology transferring and business managing.

### **3. Conference/Seminar/Workshop**

September 2014, the second CIDRN Annual Conference, Beijing  
Presentation: Public Goods or Business Opportunities: Evidence from Zimbabwe

November 2014, China Agricultural Technology Transfer in Africa, Beijing  
Presentation: China Agricultural Technology transfer: Experience from China's Aid project and Investment

January, 2015, Emerging Economies and Development Partnership for the Post-2015 Era, Xiamen, Fujian  
Presentation: China's Agricultural Aid in Africa: Modalities and Challenge

February, 2015, Luncheon Event, Department of International Development Studies, LSE, London, UK  
Presentation: One Institution, Two Roles and Three Mountains---The Logic of a China Agricultural Demonstration Center in Zimbabwe

March, 2015, What Works: Promising Practices in International Development, MOOC course, University of Oslo and Stanford.  
<https://www.futurelearn.com/courses/what-works>

Presentation: The Impact of China's Agricultural Investments in Africa

April, 2015, Public event, Department of Geography, Cambridge University, UK  
Presentation: China's Agricultural Aid in Africa: Modalities and Challenge

August, 2015, Public event, DIE, Bonn, Germany  
Presentation: China's Agricultural Aid to Africa: Modalities and Challenge

October 20<sup>th</sup>, Conference on Governance, Aid and Development: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, University of Oslo, Norway,  
Presentation: Future of the Development and Governance Agendas: China's role.

October, 2015, Workshop on China-Africa Agricultural Cooperation and its Impacts on Poverty Reduction in Africa, Beijing, China  
Presentation: China Africa Cotton-Impact on livelihoods

December, 2015, Agricultural Technology Transfer and Promotion: Knowledge Sharing and Exchange, Beijing, China  
Presentation: China Agricultural Technology transfer: Modalities and Challenges

May, 2016, Workshop on International Development Cooperation and China, Shanghai, China  
Presentation: Modalities and Practice on Western Aid

June, 2015, Development Assistance on People's Livelihood: International Experience and China's Countermeasure  
Presentation: China Agricultural Technology transfer: Modalities and Challenges

#### **4. Policy dialogue**

April, 2015, China Embassy in Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe  
Dialogue with all officials from China Embassy  
Presentation on China Agricultural Engagements in Zimbabwe and Policy

## Recommendation

July, 2015, Department of Development Studies, COHD, CAU  
Dialogue with officials from Division of Foreign Aid, Ministry of Commerce  
Subject: How to improve operation and management of China ATDC in Africa

October, 2015, China Embassy in Malawi, Lilongwe, Malawi  
Dialogue with all officials from China Embassy  
Presentation on China Agricultural Engagements in Africa and Policy recommendation

February, 2016, China Embassy in Malawi, Lilongwe, Malawi  
Presentation on Comparative Analysis on China and Traditional Donors

April, 2016, Department of Development Studies, COHD, CAU  
Dialogue with officials from Division of Foreign Aid, Ministry of Commerce  
Subject: How to improve operation and management of China Agricultural Aid in Africa

## III. OUTPUTS

### Journal Article

XIULI XU, XIAOYUN LI, GUBO QI , LIXIA TANG and LANGTON MUKWEREZA  
Science, Technology, and the Politics of Knowledge: The Case f China's  
Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centers in Africa, World Development,  
2016

### Working paper in English

- Mixed Start and Uncertainties in a Future: Case Studies of Chinese Agricultural Investment in Zimbabwe
- One Institution, Two Roles, Three Mountains: Blurring the Lines Between Aid and Business in the Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre in Zimbabwe
- The Evolution of China's Agricultural Aid to Africa and Its Domestic Roots
- A Dynamic Shift in China's Aid and Investments in Malawi

### Working Paper in Chinese

- Blurring Boundary: An Exceptional Strategy for Sustainability
- Demonstration of Development: the Modalities of China Agricultural Aid to Africa
- Modalities and Practice of Western Aid

### IDT papers in Chinese

Heterogeneity of Western Aid ---Field work from Malawi  
Homogenization of Western Aid—Field work from Malawi  
Why International aid can not promote agricultural development in Malawi

### **Policy Briefing**

Proposals on Development of China's Foreign Aid (Chinese and English)  
How to Improve International Agricultural Training in China (Chinese)

## **IV. MAIN FINDINGS**

### **1. Chinese ATDCs**

China's growing role in agricultural development in Africa has attracted considerable global attention. While the geopolitical motivations behind China's aid have been discussed, the reasons why China changed modalities of agricultural aid over time have been ignored. In our research we found that China's development modalities rooted in China's domestic development.

The Chinese domestic practice of commercialization of research achievements, domestic market-oriented reform of the agricultural technology extension system and successful commercial reform of former aid farms in some African countries in 1990s have led the China government to adopt a 'government-led, enterprise-based market operation' model to implement aid projects overseas. Through the agricultural technology demonstration Centre model, the Chinese aim to promote the recipient country to increase grain yield, improve access to agricultural technology and enhance food security. The Chinese assistance through ATDCs aims to establish a platform for enterprises to develop in Africa, accelerating agriculture's process of going global, and promoting sustainability of development aid projects. Chinese Agriculture Technology Demonstration Centres are thus designed to be aid programs operated by companies.

In Zimbabwe, this design requires Chinese staff to perform dual roles as aid workers and business people. They are required to seek out potential business opportunities, enlarge the scale of farmland, and expand the domain of their activities. At the same time they have to organize demonstrations, exhibitions and trainings. Imbalances of their inputs on aid and business lead to blurred identities as aid workers and business people. These identities lean more one way or the other depending on the workers' own age, position and educational background. These mixed roles create blurred expectations among Chinese actors, and misunderstandings among local Zimbabwean partners. Different actors engage with ATDC's operations and bring different pressures to the model and to the Chinese staff running it. The Chinese staff struggles to meet the expectations from these actors. In practice, Chinese staff and local partners try to overcome these challenges despite limited capacity and support,

but the inherent design of the ATDC model remains a barrier to fully achieving the goal of a financially sustainable Centre contributing to increased food security.

The blurred lines between aid and business have been embedded into China's aid projects. This model contrasts with OECD aid models. The difference comes from China's domestic development experience and continuous review of development aid. This article does not provide evidence to prove that Chinese aid provided through ATDCs is a more effective delivery mode than that used by traditional western donors. However, China's contributions to international aid and development through the ATDC's provides new insights into a field where the perfect aid arrangement remains elusive. China's aid approach is unique and will inevitably undergo modifications through numerous reviews it continues to be subjected to. Chinese engagement worldwide has been anchored on its espoused principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign countries as well as non-conditionality of aid; the case of the country's aid to Zimbabwe through the agricultural demonstration Centre has presented new paradigms on micro-project operation, interaction and cooperation with locals.

## **2. Chinese agricultural Investment**

For Zimbabwe, agriculture is basic industry, it provides job opportunities for many locals, the export of agricultural products helps the country to earn foreign exchange, and the processing of agricultural products also offers many job opportunities for urban people besides providing vital raw materials for industry. In other words, agriculture development has a strong relationship with other industries and can be considered to be the economic lifeline of the country.

The three Chinese investments reviewed in Zimbabwe were conceived under a framework of win-win cooperation with the Chinese providing capital equipment and funding input requirements for farmers for fuller exploitation of Zimbabwe's agricultural land. The cooperation was actively courted by the Government of Zimbabwe and has since been warmly embraced by farmers and industry. Representatives of the three companies have easy access to government and regulatory officials but do not operate under any privileged conditions.

The Indigenization Law in its current form is of concern to foreign investors, including Chinese, though special consideration is given to them bearing in mind their nature (government companies) and how they were invited.

The relationship between Zimbabwe and China has matured from friendship and solidarity, to partnerships and win-win arrangements. Tianze has been operational in the country longest and has been making profits for most of its trading years and will most probably stay for years to come. It is not the case with Wanjin and CAC and the two companies have been making losses since they commenced operations. Whilst all three Chinese companies maintain that they invested in Zimbabwe's agricultural

sector for the long haul, two companies have confronted what they had not foreseen which may not guarantee their long-term stay if their economic fortunes do not improve.

### 3. Chinese Aid Modality

The modalities of China's agricultural assistance to Africa have been constantly adjusted and changed. What has never changed is the original intention of achieving development of African countries, which share similar development stages and history with China, by bestowing China's development experience. Some scholars believe that China's agricultural development policy and technical system based on smallholders will bring opportunities for agricultural development in Africa (Li et al. 2013; Fan et al. 2010), and some African countries also believe that China's experience is conducive to their development. Kenya's Vice President said: China has a big population but less arable land. China can feed its people. Then, in Africa we have large tracts of land and less population, but we suffer from food deficiency.... Now that means we have to learn a lesson from China. Ethiopia is now copying China's experience in economic development zones and learning from the comprehensive poverty alleviation programs in rural China. So far, however, none of the African countries learning from China's experience have made the same development achievements as China. It is naïve to believe that replicating some of China's development policies will enable poor countries to develop as China. China's success is rooted in its unique social, cultural and political environment and no country can replicate this (Ravallion, 2009). The former President of Madagascar argued that Africa can learn from China but cannot copy China's experience due to different country profiles (Tao 2009). The Chinese government should also be cautious to avoid universalising its unique development experience and exhibiting a superiority complex when China shares this experience with other developing countries (Li X, 2014).

The Chinese government's ability to mobilise; its history of agricultural production technology; its technology promotion system with strong support from government subsidies; as well as its complete industrial system based on agricultural inputs are important prerequisites for the fast extension of new Chinese agricultural technologies. In most African countries it is not easy to find these systems. Although a final judgment cannot be given on whether Chinese agricultural technology can be recognised, accepted and adopted by African smallholders, some Chinese institutions have begun to promote Chinese farming technology extension and adoption in some villages. It is doubtful whether local farmers would adopt such technology without Chinese interventions. China's aid modality of attaching sole importance to the dissemination of technology without considering social and cultural factors for technology extension has also restricted the diffusion of Chinese technology, to some extent. From the 1960s to 1980s, China attempted to promote extension and adoption of agricultural technology in Africa, only to find it was a failure. The ATDC model has gained broad international attention and high expectations from African countries, but thus far it is difficult to find evidence for successful technology transfer



to Africa.

#### 4. Changing role of China Engagement in Africa

Our study has, in particular, highlighted the changing nature of the involvement of Chinese firms in countries like Malawi. Rather surprisingly, Chinese firms are not involved in the future management and maintenance of the projects they undertake. Indeed, in this respect, the Chinese have been steadfast in maintaining that it is up to the recipient government to decide on who they allocated contracts to for such purposes – e.g. running a hotel or a conference centre. We also find that even after the completion of projects funded by the Chinese government, many private sector actors from China have chosen to make investments of their own in Malawi. On other occasions, companies have used their experience with implementing a government contract in one country to start a new venture in a neighbouring country. Thus, for many of these firms (except small companies), it is not the profit-seeking incentive that is the main incentive for being involved in China's development assistance strategy but rather the reputation-seeking incentive. Experience in implementing a major project in a new country helps these firms establish important contacts and networks, which are important for most Chinese actors as they weigh in the possibility of investing in these new local contexts.

Our study finds evidence on the ground in Africa that the conventional development assistance model is rapidly changing and the Chinese government has had to adapt to newer circumstances and more complex demands for more long-term oriented help from local actors. In the absence of a development agency that can coordinate requests for aid and monitor the implementation of various projects, private companies are offering various forms of assistance to the Chinese government – including feasibility studies before projects are officially sanctioned. Indeed, many Chinese companies are now increasingly aware of their role as providers of knowledge and expertise, which in turn is providing the new contours to new forms of public-private partnership. At the same time, many of the companies we have studied also recognize the importance of providing a broad range of benefits to increase worker loyalty and help improve local livelihoods

## Appendix 1 Science, Technology, and the Politics of Knowledge: The Case of China's Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centers in Africa

Xu Xiuli, Li Xiaoyun, Qi Gubo, Tang Lixia, Langton Mukwereza

### Abstract:

Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre (ATDC) has been considered as an alternative model to pursue sustainability of Chinese foreign aid to African countries in the new era. This paper attempts to examine the ATDC scheme, particularly focus on the knowledge construction at macro level of design and the knowledge encounter at micro level of daily operation based on the case studies in Tanzania, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. Our study finds multiple facets of the ATDC, i.e., the cleavage between the macro-level of policy design and micro level of implementation realities; the interplay between knowledge and politics, and appearance of possible alternative development pathways stimulated by ATDCs in African countries. The paper argues that even though the ATDC is a technology-centered scheme, it is inevitably a social and political process in implementation, resulting in the discontinuity of the policy results. With a whole set of ideas and imaginaries being delivered, frustrated, and negotiated, the ATDC creates a very different vision to the established CG system, or the western bilateral aid programs. As an embodiment of a "traveling technocratic rationality", the ATDCs are important sites for negotiations over knowledge and politics, and the meanings of aid, investment, and development, as part of the wider playing out of China's engagement in Africa.

(full article see separate PDF edition )

## Appendix 2: **Mixed Start and Uncertainties in a Future: Case Studies of Chinese Agricultural Investment in Zimbabwe<sup>1</sup>**

Tang Lixia, Zhao Wenjie, Langton Mukwereza, Li Xiaoyun

**Abstract:** Chinese agricultural investments in Africa have grown significantly in the past two decades, but there remains very little empirical research on the nature of these investments. This paper aims to address this knowledge gap by looking at three different types of Chinese investor in Zimbabwe's agricultural sector: a National State Owned Enterprise (SOE), a Provincial SOE and a private company. Collectively, their experiences not only challenge the pervasive view that Chinese companies are progressing at unstoppable rates in African markets, but also raise deeper questions about the importance of company structures, financial stability and the environments in which they operate.

**Key words:** outward investment, agricultural outward investment, China-Africa cooperation

### **1. Introduction**

Along with its rapid economic growth over the last four decades, China's outward foreign investment has expanded significantly. This process began in the 1980s with the implementation of a 'going global' strategy (走出去战略) and was greatly accelerated after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2002. From an annual average of below US\$3bn before 2005, China's outward foreign investment flows grew to US\$20bn in 2006, and more than US\$50bn in 2008. By 2010 flows reached US\$60bn amid declining levels of global FDI, making China one of the world's top ten exporters of direct investment in the post-crisis years (Daniel et al. 2012). Between 2012 and 2013, China's official Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) increased by a further 15 percent from US\$88bn to US\$101bn (UNCTAD 2014), a development that has attracted mixed reactions worldwide.

Based on the Chinese FDI data of 2012, the top five economic sectors of outward investment are tenancy and business services (US\$26.7bn annually), mining (US\$13.5bn), wholesale and retail (US\$13.0bn), financial services (US\$10.1bn) and manufacturing (US\$8.7bn). Agriculture was only of peripheral importance among the sectors that China invests in; however, the share of that sector in the country's overseas investment portfolio has been rising, from 0.86 percent in 2005 to 1.66 percent in 2012 (Information Office of the State Council, the People's Republic of China 2013).

---

<sup>1</sup> This research was co-funded by the China and Brazil in African Agriculture (CBAA) project, China International Development Research Network (CIDRN) research funding and the Beijing Youth Elite Programme

With regards to Africa in particular, the continent only makes up 4 percent of Chinese FDI stock (MOFCOM 2014); however, this has increased steadily in recent years, and from the African perspective China is now the continent's third largest investor as well as the continent's largest trade partner (UNCTAD 2013; MOFCOM 2011). Various actors are at the forefront of these investments, each with different drivers and pull-factors that lead them to Africa. While some might be focused specifically around big cities in Africa with a view to sell in local markets, other investments may serve niche markets such as the supply of food materials to Chinese restaurants and companies (Cook 2015). These are often broadly categorised as private sector actors, State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and hybrid mixtures of the two.

In the agricultural sector there were 141 enterprises registered with the Chinese Ministry of Commerce that had invested in Africa in 2012. Among them were 46 SOEs (non-listed enterprises), 54 privately owned enterprises (non-listed enterprises), seven listed companies, three joint state-private enterprises and 31 other enterprises that could not be classified into any of the listed categories (MOFCOM 2014).

Indeed, agriculture has remained the most important livelihood activity for most African countries, estimated to be employing 75 percent of the continent's population (Basara 2014). Within this context, the need for more Chinese engagement with African agriculture has been a recurring theme at successive Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) conferences since their inception (Gabas and Tang 2014; Bräutigam and Tang 2009). The three main targets for Chinese agricultural investments in Africa are farming, fishing operations and agro-processing. Separately, there is also an increasing amount of trade in farm tools and agrochemicals (Spring 2009).

Having established a strong relationship with Zimbabwe during its independence struggle, it is no coincidence that the country has become an important economic partner of China's as the 'Going Global' strategy looks towards Africa. Since 2011, Zimbabwe has become one of the top three African destinations for Chinese investment, with China's non-financial direct investments in Zimbabwe increasing from US\$460m in 2011 to US\$602m in 2013. Trade between the two countries has also increased in the past few years with Zimbabwe's imports from China increasing by 18.1 percent from 2011 to 2013 (US\$371.4m to US\$438.7m) (Embassy of China in Zimbabwe 2014). Over the same period, however, Zimbabwe's exports to China decreased from US\$186.2m in 2011 to US\$30.9m in 2013 (ITC of Zimbabwe). In agricultural sectors eight Chinese companies have invested in Zimbabwe between January to March 2013 and April to May 2014.

In this context, our study will seek to better understand these investments by looking in depth at the different types of Chinese companies involved and how they engage in Zimbabwe's agricultural sector. This will be followed by a presentation of some of the more significant cultural, institutional and environmental challenges that each of these investors face in pursuing their various interests. The paper will then conclude by asking whether there are any discernable connections that can be made between

the nature of the company and the outcome of their engagements. Throughout this paper our analysis will move beyond the simplistic discourses of 'land grabs', 'neo-colonialism' or 'neo-imperialism' that have often come to represent discussions of China-Africa relations (Bräutigam 2011).

## **2. Literature review**

In the twenty-first century, China's increased economic engagements with Africa have come to be of great interest within academia and the media, in Western countries initially (Bräutigam 2011; Alden 2005), and increasingly in Africa and China too (Manji and Marks 2007; Gaye 2006; Shi 1989). Present in many of these narratives, however, is the assumption that China's growing presence in Africa means that its business interests are moving from strength to strength. Some argue that this is at the expense of local interests, others that this success is mutually beneficial. Regardless, this macro-view of Chinese business engagements often overlooks the day to day challenges that many of these companies face.

The most repeated narrative is that China's agricultural engagement in Africa is a form of neo-colonialism (Large 2008; Zafar 2007; Tull 2006). Other narratives suggest that China's investments in Africa are aimed at buying energy, food and raw materials, and securing political support from state leaders (Taylor 2010). In this framing, African countries are viewed as little more than a 'resource' for China, and just as the Europeans did during colonialism, they are also exploiting Africa as a market to sell their goods (Zhao 2014).

Other major concerns raised on Chinese investments include the neglect of local labour rights and the undermining of employment opportunities. For instance, low agricultural wages in Africa are certainly part of the attraction for the Chinese to invest in African agriculture (Kevin et al. 2014) and there have been reports of some Chinese entrepreneurs discriminating against local workers and keeping wages low and such practices have made local workers resent Chinese businesses (Zhao 2014).

Furthermore, Chinese investments are also accused of bringing unwelcome competition. For example, in Zambia, Chinese companies have invested in more than 20 farms and their products are now a major feature on the Zambian domestic market (Bräutigam and Tang 2009; Xinhua 2006). These criticisms come despite the fact that Chinese investments may also positively influence local employment opportunities.

What is particular about Chinese investments in agriculture, however, is the claim that they have resulted in 'land grabs' across the continent (Alden 2013; Spring 2009). This argument is often based on a premise concerning China's own internal agricultural pressures. This involves the very real concern that urbanisation in China has resulted in the shrinking of the country's farmland. The expanding population and higher life expectancy have also resulted in even less cultivated land being able to meet the growing demands (Lu 2015). However, in seeking to answer how China

will meet its food security needs in the near future, this has led to the acceptance of a narrative that China will buy up African farmland (Alden 2005). This claim has been repeatedly exposed as false, as there are still relatively few occurrences of Chinese companies acquiring land leases, let alone any sizeable ones (Smaller et al. 2012; Bräutigam and Tang 2009).

As Guo Chatelard (2014) argues, many critiques focus on what China wants to get from Africa, with few reporting on the real activities of Chinese investments in Africa. Further studies by Bräutigam and Zhang (2013) concluded similarly that that numerous media reports on the subject of Chinese agricultural investments are unreliable and lack evidence, and that the overwhelming focus on China's policies is unhelpful. Furthermore, in many cases, Chinese companies are being invited by African states to boost FDI, which is foreseen to benefit both China and Africa. This is happening at a time when many developed countries have decreased their investments and aid in Africa, arguably making China's FDI all the more important (Chen et al. 2014).

In sum, the most common critiques of Chinese investment in Africa that appear in the current literature have three major deficiencies that can lead to unconvincing conclusions. First, most critiques just focus on what China can get from Africa, but neglect the benefit to Africa itself. The positive function of Chinese investments and economic activities is minimised and the negatives are accentuated. Second, the methodology of many papers and reports is dubious; some depend on news reports and other second-hand information sources without first-hand investigation and confirmation. Third, irrespective of whether commentators have argued in favour or against Chinese business engagements in Africa, most have ignored the challenges and difficulties that arise at the micro level. Instead, conclusions have often been based on a hypothesis of perceived success

It this last point in particular that the following paper will seek to address. For this we draw on firsthand information collected from three Chinese companies in Zimbabwe. The fieldwork was undertaken in 2014, focusing on two SOEs and one privately owned company. During our investigations, we conducted interviews with a cross section of stakeholders which included government officials, company leaders, middle-level managers, workers and farmers. Structured and semi-structured interview guides were developed and tested before being used to collect data.

The three companies interviewed were all agricultural enterprises and their lines of business can be categorised into two groups: the first are engaged in cash crops such as tobacco and cotton and the other works with food crops such as maize and wheat. Wanjin Company is one of the three companies and is a joint venture between a Chinese state-owned company and local holders of large commercial farms. Tianze Tobacco Company is a branch of a Chinese state-owned tobacco company and China Africa Cotton Company (CAC) is a privately owned company. Table 1 below gives an overview of these companies, and it is to their structures and engagements in Zimbabwe that we now turn.

**Table 1 : Basic information on the selected three Chinese companies**

	<b>Wanjin</b>	<b>Tianze Tobacco</b>	<b>China Africa Cotton</b>
Enterprise property	Provincial SOE	Central SOE	Private
Capital source	Bank loan	Self-raised fund	China-Africa Development Fund and self-raised fund
Business model	Farm production	Contract farming	Contract farming
Main products	Soybean, maize, wheat	Tobacco	Cotton
Product marketing	Local market	China	Local market and
Year of commencement of	2010	2004	2013

Source: Key informant interviews

### **3. Information on the three companies**

#### **3.1 Wanjin Company**

Wanjin Company was founded in 2010 by Anhui Farming, a provincial state-owned company, operating with the support of Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Defense (MoD). The MoD offered information on large-scale commercial farms for potential cooperation agreements and then facilitated the contracts between them and the farmers. Following a major land reform programme in Zimbabwe from 2000, the majority of new commercial farms have, for a host of reasons, failed to fully utilise their allocated land. Lack of capital has been cited as a major constraint, with one farmer lamenting: ‘We have no money to invest on our farm and most of [the] commercial farms have accumulated big debts with the banks.’ Another of the local farmers told the researchers that some commercial farms had been abandoned and agricultural infrastructure and equipment had been either vandalised or stolen.

The MoD, through government-to-government bilateral arrangements, approached Anhui Farming to set up a joint farming scheme to resuscitate production on underutilised commercial farms in a prime farming area around Chinhoyi town in northern Zimbabwe. At present, the company has established joint farming schemes with four local farms. The farmers offer their land to Wanjin Company and receive rent, while also working for the company as managers. Each farm ranges in size from 700-800ha and the total area under the scheme is about 3,000ha. The main crops grown are maize and soybean in summer and wheat under irrigation in winter.

The general manager of Wanjin Company, Mr. He, said that,

In the beginning the owners of farms did not know us and neither did they trust us. We had to depend on the MoD to develop linkages with other farms. Now we have developed our business with them for three years. Our cooperating partners are benefiting from our investment and more and more owners come to talk with me voluntarily. They are keen on our investment. About ten local farmers have approached us and we found eight of them have high potential.

The common features of these farms are:

- 1) They were transferred to locals from white farmers as part of the land reform programme.
- 2) Only a small part of land has been cultivated and the local owners lack enough capital to carry out further agricultural production.

For example, in one farm of 800ha of arable land the owner could only cultivate 43ha of maize, 18ha of soybean, 1ha of potato, 21ha of tobacco and 11ha of bamboo. The total cultivated land is therefore about 94ha, or only 11.75 percent utilisation.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, the farm's irrigation system had been destroyed and they have accumulated a debt of about US\$180,000. The owner confirmed that he can no longer borrow money from the local bank to support his farming operations and he fears that the government could repossess the farm.

Under the joint-venture cooperation programme, Wanjin Company provides all of the agricultural machinery and equipment required as well as working capital. Wanjin Company is then entitled to 50 percent of net profits made on the harvest. The investment in fixed assets for the resuscitation of a farm is quite high, though. According to the information provided by one of the Chinese managers at one such farm, an investment of at least US\$2m is required for each farm for tractors, a pumping station, a combine harvester, tractor-drawn trailers, ploughs, an irrigation system, warehouse repair and land development. Furthermore, the working capital for annual input requirements is about US\$60,000. In the first two years the typical farm was forecast to make no profits, and at best break even. In 2013, however, one of the farms turned over from deficit to profit and about US\$120,000 was disbursed to the owner.

Another problem faced in these joint farming agreements is that almost all of the commercial farms are carrying over heavy debts with the banks. The Wanjin Company has agreed to repay this debt to the bank and such payments constitute a significant component of the farming turnover. 'Without input from Chinese, it would be very difficult to continue farming,' a holder of one branch farm told the researchers. 'Around this farm a lot of commercial farms have been left fallow.'

---

<sup>2</sup> The utilisation percentage could be even lower if the potential for irrigation in winter is factored in.



The Wanjin Company has set up a headquarters + branch farms model to manage the farms. The headquarters consists of the Board, general manager and six departments which are Product, Finance, Marketing, Security, Audit and Human Resources. The administrative positions are shared by Chinese and Zimbabweans but the Chinese dominate at the management level. The headquarters also manages a branch farm directly to save staff costs. The other three branch farms are managed separately by one Chinese manager and a Zimbabwean deputy manager. The headquarters approves the annual agricultural plan and budget, allocates the financial resources needed, sets down the target yield for each branch farm, purchases required agricultural inputs and undertakes sales for all crops. As an incentive, when the branch farm attains the targeted yield within the budget set by the headquarters, they are entitled to an additional bonus. At the time of conducting the fieldwork this incentive scheme appeared to be working, as the four farms were competing amongst themselves to increase yields and profits.

Table 2: The administrative set-up of Wanjin Company

	Chinese	Zimbabwean
Board of Directors	1 Chairman of the Board 1 Director	1 Deputy Chairman of Board 1 Director 1 Secretary
General Manager	1 General Manger 1 Deputy General Manager	1 Deputy General Manger
Department of Finance, Production and Marketing	1 Manager for each Department	1 Deputy Manager for each Department
Department of Human Resources, Audit and Security	1 Deputy Manager for each Department	1 Manger for each Department
Branch Farm	1 Manager for each Branch Farm	3-5 Deputy Manager for each Branch Farm

Source: Key informant interviews

The Wanjin Company now has 14 Chinese working staff and all of them are at the administrative and managerial levels. The company has hired many locals as general hands, including six administrative staff at its headquarters. At the time of conducting the field survey, the company had on its establishment 12 deputy farm managers, three security managers and 195 formal contract workers that included security guards, drivers and agricultural machinery repairers. All the employees were full-time staff. The company was paying its employees agreed salaries at the end of each month and paying school fees for the children of its employees. In addition, the Company is conforming to statutory requirements regarding workmen

compensation and social security.<sup>3</sup> The company also offers free housing to its employees and provides safe (treated) water and electricity for domestic use. Furthermore, the Company each year hires a number of casual workers during the busy season for such operations as planting, weeding and harvesting. In the summer of the 2013/2014 season, the company hired about 370 casual workers. Casual workers are paid at least the minimum wage stipulated by the government and are paid at a higher rate for overtime work and work done over the holidays. Wanjin provides lunch to all its workers, including casuals. The salaries for all types of local employees are higher than what local non-Wanjin farmers pay on average, and meet the legal minimum requirements.

The main crops grown by Wanjin Company are maize, wheat and soybean; all for the local market. One branch of farms has 50 ha of tobacco.

Some criticisms of Chinese agricultural investment in Africa suggest that ventures are intended to export food crops back home to meet the increasing needs of China's domestic market. The Wanjin Company shared with the researchers records of crops that were sold to local food companies including National Foods, a major food-manufacturing company. National Foods contacts Wanjin in April each year to negotiate a purchasing contract for summer crops, and the price has been 20 percent higher than on the local market due to the premium placed on quality and convenience with large volumes and guaranteed supply. All the crops produced by Wanjin Company are sold within Zimbabwe.

### **3.2 Tianze Company**

In China, the cigarette market is dominated by the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration, which is responsible for all aspects of the industry's 'staff, finance, properties, products, supply, distribution, and domestic and foreign trade' (Gov.cn 2005). These operations are carried out through the China National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC), an SEO that is estimated to contribute roughly 7 percent of the state's revenue each year (He et al. 2013) making it one of China's most important companies. Internationally it is also the largest company of its kind, largely due to the fact that China makes up roughly one third of the world's smoking population (WHO undated). In 2013 CNTC was reported to have manufactured 2.5 trillion cigarettes whereas its next largest competitor, Philip Morris, manufactured only 880 billion, and its revenue in 2012 was estimated at US\$170bn (Martin 2014).

Zimbabwe's worldwide reputation for high quality tobacco first attracted CNTC to trade as a buyer on its auction floors, and in 2005 the company established a subsidiary branch called Tianze. Tianze purchases tobacco in two ways. First, it has

---

<sup>3</sup> The two payments are made monthly for each employee to the National Social Security Authority through which the worker (or surviving relatives) can claim compensation in case of injury or death at work, or on retirement.

contract farming agreements with local farmers and provides them with all the inputs and equipment required. Second, it purchases from other tobacco companies or buyers, such as Northern Tobacco, the Mashonaland Tobacco Company (MTC) and Midriver. Tianze has thus become the largest customer of Zimbabwe's tobacco. The size of the crop marketed in 2014 was 109,000t and Tianze accounted for 62,626t (57.5 percent). Of this, 15,000t were acquired through its contract farming agreements and the rest was bought indirectly through other companies and independent farmers at auction floors.

Tianze has five departments; the management of tobacco production is overseen by a production manager, some contract farming managers and five area managers. There are 11 Chinese managers in the company, seven sent by the China National Tobacco Company and four hired in Zimbabwe. There are 87 contract employees from Zimbabwe and five of them are senior managers in different departments being paid industry-competitive salaries. In each department there are two to three local employees in charge of administrative affairs. Tianze also provides these local administrative staff with special incentives such as a free trip to China. From February to August, the company hired an additional 100 short term workers. The workers' average salary is slightly lower than what some of the more established companies are offering but not lower than that set for the industry. All staff have medical insurance cover as well as accident insurance and endowment insurance. The company pays a total of US\$20,000 per month in insurance cover for its workers.

As a sign of its confidence in Zimbabwe's tobacco sector, Tianze in the 2013/14 season invested several tens of millions of dollars on the contract farming scheme. As the general manager of Tianze Company, Mr. Zhang, said,

Before Tianze was founded, the price of tobacco was controlled by western companies and as western countries imposed sanction on Zimbabwe, farmers gave up growing the crop. Tianze broke the monopoly through offering higher prices and more re-started growing tobacco after that.

The impact of Tianze on the local tobacco market was confirmed by the CEO of MTC, who have operational partnerships with Tianze: 'We worked with China, but we had no Chinese investment. China is the biggest purchaser of tobacco in Zimbabwe, if there is now more competition and confidence in the industry, farmers can get better prices.'

Tianze currently has 378 contract farming agreements, 255 of which are active. The total area contracted by the company in the 2013/14 season was 8,467ha. Among the active farmers, 161 of them got input support from Tianze for a total area of 6,974ha. The remaining 94 farmers cultivated a total of 1,493ha without input support. The minimum area per contracted farmer set by that company is 10ha and the larger the area per farmer the more preferable it is for the company. Among the contract farmers the highest area is 300ha of tobacco. Tianze only starts to provide the inputs after monitoring the performance of a prospective client for a season.

The input package includes seed, fertilisers, pesticides, fuel (diesel or petrol), coal and payment for electricity. These inputs are provided by suppliers to farmers and procedures have been put in place to ensure that the inputs are not abused. Loans are repaid with tobacco harvest at fixed values and the company terminates support for farmers in default. Support may be resumed if farmers can clear their debts through tobacco deliveries with input support sought from elsewhere. The total cost of inputs per hectare is estimated to be US\$10,000, and the yield is 3-3.5t/ha. The average price for contract farmers was US\$3.36/kg, contrasting with US\$2.84/kg for the auction crop. At the close of tobacco sales in 2014, the average price for both the contract and auction crops was US\$3.21/kg. In China, however, per hectare input costs are only about US\$4,000, and in 2014 a CNTC delegation that visited Zimbabwe implored Zimbabwean officials to explore ways of reducing costs.

As a result of these high input costs, many farmers cannot grow tobacco without external financial support. One farmer who highlighted this issue was Mr. Stockil, a white commercial farmer who farms 56ha of tobacco and 8ha of maize. Since joining Tianze, all of the inputs for his tobacco crop in the 2013/14 season were provided by the company. They provided tractors, chemicals, coal, fuel and many other materials for Mr. Stockil, with a total value of support worth US\$323,000. This was provided as an interest-free loan to be repaid by selling the tobacco produced to Tianze. Mr. Stockil's total yield of tobacco in 2014 was 212,800kg on 56ha, while the price given by Tianze is US\$3.73/kg. This was significant, as Mr. Stockil had said himself that 'without Tianze tobacco, only 20 hectares can be managed.' In order to operate this farm, he had hired 150 workers, among them 50 permanent and 100 casual workers, and each casual worker was being paid the stipulated minimum farm wage. In his case, it was thus due to the continued demand for Zimbabwe's premium tobacco from China and the subsequent investment from Tianze that more employment opportunities were created.

Another case was that of a local farmer called Mrs. Muzvidzwa. She grew 15ha of tobacco in the 2013/14 season. Before signing a contract with Tianze, she was contracted by TSF, a local, long-established merchant that also owns one of the tobacco auction floors. She says that she moved to working with Tianze because of the better service:

I can visit the headquarters of Tianze and talk with Chinese managers, I can also get technical assistance from the company, such as on agronomy and curing, and these technologies are useful. Without the help of the company, I can't grow tobacco.

Mrs. Muzvidzwa reiterated that she will continue signing contracts with the company, and planting more tobacco.

Our research suggested that many farmers with large tobacco operations preferred to be supported by Tianze due to the cheaper and timelier input support, as well as the higher purchasing prices. Tianze also claimed that they do not charge interest on the input loan package, unlike their competitors who often charge 12 percent in

interest.

### **3.3 China-Africa Cotton Company**

China-Africa Cotton Company (CAC) was founded in 2008 as a joint venture between Qingdao Ruichang Cotton Industrial Co., Ltd. (青岛瑞昌棉业有限公司), Qingdao Huifu Textile Co., Ltd. (青岛汇富纺织有限公司) and the China-Africa Development (CAD) Fund (CAC undated). CAC started operations in Zimbabwe towards the end of 2013 for the 2013/14 summer and had 29,120 contract farmers registered with it at the time of research (out of the 200,000 among all companies). The company expects to increase these numbers further in the following seasons. The company commanded the second largest share of business among all registered cotton merchants, coming after Cotton Company of Zimbabwe (Cottco) and ahead of Cargill, who have both been operating in Zimbabwe for over 15 years. The average area of planted cotton among contract farmers registered with the company is 1.8ha, slightly less than the industry average of 2ha. All registered cotton companies have to comply with regulations that were developed and agreed by the industry with the concurrence of the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development (MoAMID) and farmer associations. The guidelines have now been put into law through a Statutory Instrument (SI) that was passed by the government. Under the regulations, each cotton merchant has to supply farmers with inputs and each is prohibited from buying a cotton crop that was grown with inputs provided by other companies. A statutory body called the Agricultural Marketing Authority enforces the SI.

At the beginning of each season, cotton companies agree on a minimum input package to be provided to farmers. The minimum package per hectare set for the 2013/14 season was two 50kg bags of basal cotton fertiliser, a 50kg bag of top dressing fertiliser, a 15kg bag of seed, 1.5l of synthetic pyrethroids, 1kg of Carbaryl 85 WP and 100g of Aphicide. The provision of chemicals is compulsory for all contracted farmers (for pest control) but farmers in areas where the soil still has significant inherent fertility opt to not take up fertilisers (especially in the Zambezi Valley and the Lowveld). In the 2013/14 planting season, all the inputs were sourced by the company which incurred a further cost of about US\$500,000 in transporting the inputs to farmers. Merchants were buying the crop from farmers at an average price of US\$0.50/kg, implying that CAC required at least US\$20m for the 40,000t it expected to purchase.

CAC (along with other Chinese companies) has had an advantage as it has access to cheaper sources of funds from the CAD Fund. The company mentioned this aspect as its major advantage and that it passed on the lower costs to farmers through charging lower interest rates on borrowed inputs. By comparison, local cotton companies have been borrowing money at 15-18 percent interest rates and have thus passed on these higher costs to farmers. Due to this access to lower cost finance, the input package per hectare for China Africa Cotton is about US\$115 compared to

US\$166 amongst its competitors.

The growing of cotton will remain a major livelihood activity among smallholder farmers, particularly those in low rainfall areas. As the crop is labour intensive and most cotton farmers have had to hire additional casual workers for picking the crop, it can be a valuable source of employment. Additionally, the crop is a cash crop that most smallholder farmers have experience in growing. In the past, farmers have managed to meet a host of household expenses from the proceeds of cotton sales. But low producer prices are forcing farmers to pay contract workers low wages and as a result most cotton farmers have lately been struggling to attract enough workers.

To obtain farmers' opinions on contract farming and CAC, the researchers interviewed five farmers in Karoi Region who were contracted by CAC. From their responses, the input package is by far the most important component of the contract farming arrangement.

As discussed earlier, the recommended input package agreed by the cotton industry is 2 bags of basal dressing and 1 bag of top dressing. Some merchants reduce this unilaterally to 1 bag of basal and ½ to 1 bag of top dressing, which could partly explain why farmers often change contractors from season to season – a development that delays the disbursement of inputs through long registration processes with merchants each year. Farmers commended CAC for providing an improved package (especially higher quality fertilisers) and supplying the first batch of inputs early. Farmers got 2 bags of basal fertiliser and 1 bag of top dressing from CAC; this represents a doubling of the basal fertiliser level from the previous industry-wide standard.

Contract farmers also received training and technical assistance from the cotton companies. Training is done by extension workers recruited locally and all companies use an industry-wide agreed curriculum. Field Days<sup>4</sup> are held at the homesteads of farmers who excel in each area. Such gatherings serve as additional training platforms for farmers as well as motivation.

Among the commercial crops suited to the Karoi area are cotton, maize, soybean and flue-cured tobacco. On the basis of returns tobacco gives the highest margin, followed by maize, soybean and then cotton. There is a high proportion of farmers who are members of the Apostolic religious sect. The sect encourages polygamy and prohibits its followers from growing and handling tobacco. The big families associated with polygamy are therefore a source of significant (family) labour which is crucial in successfully growing a cotton crop. Although margins were reported to be

---

<sup>4</sup> Field Day: this is a function hosted by the best farmer (usually for a village) for a given crop. Several Field Days can be held in a season at key stages of the crop but most emphasis is given to the one held when the crop is ready for harvesting. The host farmer shares with guests how the various management practices were undertaken. Some refreshments are usually served, with a commercial company funding the event.

higher with maize as compared to cotton, most farmers were deterred from committing high areas to maize due to the high cost of hybrid seeds and fertilisers associated with it. The use of hybrid maize seed (rather than selecting the *best* of the commercial crop as seed) is now almost universal and farmers are constrained by the high fertiliser rates (at 8 bags basal and 8 bags top dressing). Interest in soybeans has similarly remained subdued due to low yields, low producer prices and high labour demands for harvesting the crop.

The company operates through three departments at its headquarters: the Financial Department, Business Department (imports and exports) and Cotton Department (the most important department that administers the field operations for contracted farmers). In each department a Chinese manager works with two to three local support staff. In total there are ten local workers employed at the CAC headquarters. The largest local employee group more broadly is within the Cotton Department and includes regional managers and extension workers. As part of its Cotton Department, the company has nine regional managers, 50 extension officers and 25 supervisors who undertake audit duties. The nine operational areas for the company are in the main cotton growing areas: Checheche, Chiredzi, Rutenga, Kadoma, Gokwe, Sanyati, Chinhoyi/Karoi, Mzarabani and North-Eastern (for Mt Darwin/Dotito and Rushinga areas).

Field management staff up to regional managers are issued with all-terrain company vehicles that are fuelled and serviced by CAC. Each extension officer is issued with a motorbike and is allocated 60l of fuel per month which can cover their operational area. Extension officers periodically interact with peers in other cotton companies and ensure that standards agreed upon by the Cotton Growers Association (to which all cotton merchants are members) are uniformly applied.

The company also has two ginneries for processing the seed cotton and each has eight Chinese managers and a total of 300 local workers. Among the 300 workers, half of them are permanent contract workers and the rest are casuals.

Salaries under CAC are generally higher than with other companies but researchers were advised that they will be reviewed at the end of each season. CAC estimates that 3.5 percent of the salary budget is spent on commercial insurance which includes medical and accident cover. All the staff members are covered by the insurance scheme and the company spends about US\$300,000 for such coverage each year.

#### **4. Challenges and Uncertainty for Chinese companies**

Following Zimbabwe's land reform programme in 2000, Western countries imposed heavy sanctions on the country over alleged human-rights abuses and the breakdown in rule of law. To resuscitate the economy in the years that followed, the government of Zimbabwe embarked on a major campaign of wooing investors from alternative sources. The 'Look East' policy was a major initiative in this regard and most Chinese companies came to establish themselves in this period, especially

between 2003 and 2008. Effectively, just as the West began to ostracise Zimbabwe, China had just embarked on its 'Going Global' initiative.

In 2010, Zimbabwe passed the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act, which prohibited foreign investors from owning a majority stake in any business (up to 49 percent equity). The Law rattled foreign investors who feared their businesses would be expropriated. However, as China had been most forthcoming at the country's greatest time of need, Chinese companies were given special consideration from the Zimbabwean government and allowed to own majority stakes in certain businesses. This is especially important in the cases presented by Tianze and Wanjin in that they are both state entities and Chinese law prohibits them from forming joint companies with other entities, even abroad. Despite the assurances of special consideration regarding compliance with the Indigenization Act given to Chinese companies by the Government of Zimbabwe, the companies feel particularly vulnerable considering the level of investment in fixed assets they have made to date.

The following section discusses other specific challenges facing each of the three Chinese investments and the future prospects of each.

#### 4.1 Wanjin Company and the future

Wanjin has invested more than US\$5m in their joint farming ventures. The money was borrowed from a Chinese bank and has to be repaid with interest. There have been concerns within the company that Zimbabwean law may not allow them to repatriate some of their profits to service the loan. Recently the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe amended the regulations to allow repatriation of profits, but Wanjin would have to fulfil a number of requirements before being allowed to do so, a process that could be arduous and expensive.

The company has been in operation in Zimbabwe for just one year and has so far incurred losses from its business. From next year the company anticipates to make a modest profit but will still be servicing its loan. The Wanjin General Manager remarked, 'We are all afraid of policy changes in Zimbabwe; land reform displaced white people; we are not sure if it will also expel Chinese someday.' Wanjin feels its investment is particularly vulnerable as not much profit is being generated from its current line of business and heavy investment has been needed to restore its partner farms' infrastructure and purchase the necessary farming equipment.

A major concern raised by most key informants was the high cost of agricultural production in Zimbabwe. Average working capital needed for maize is about US\$1240/ha, for wheat US\$1850/ha and for soybean US\$887/ha. The yields of maize, wheat and soybean are 6t/ha, 5t/ha and 2t/ha respectively. In other words, the producer cost of maize is US\$0.21/kg, of wheat US\$0.37/kg and of soybean US\$0.40/kg. The production costs of these crops are actually much higher than they are in China which therefore makes them unappealing for Chinese buyers.



## 4.2 Tianze Tobacco Company and the future

Tianze tobacco has been operating in the country much longer and has been doing so at a profit. Tianze was invited following the precipitous decline in tobacco deliveries due to challenges with securing funding. Currently over 75 percent of the tobacco crop is produced under contract and the regulatory and marketing authority for that crop (Tobacco Industry and Marketing Board) has successfully established order in the industry. There have been no reports of substantial cases of contracts being breached by either the merchants or the farmers. Over 95 percent of the crop is exported.

Since Tianze handles all tobacco imports from Zimbabwe into mainland China, it still has significant influence over pricing. Amongst the merchants registered to buy tobacco in Zimbabwe, prices offered by Tianze have been among the highest. The support package offered to its contractors also appears to be the most comprehensive. In the season when the field survey was undertaken, Tianze also charged the lowest interest under contract arrangements. Furthermore, although Tianze raised some concerns on the level of default among its contracted growers, these levels remained manageable. In any case, it is always in the interest of their contracted farmers to clear arrears with the company, as tobacco merchants closely share databases of their registered growers.

Business prospects for Tianze will remain bright, on the back of firm demand for the premium crop from China and the host government's indebtedness to the company for quickly responding to its invitation to set up the investment. The government of Zimbabwe has however requested Tianze to set up a cigarette manufacturing factory in Zimbabwe in line with its policy of local beneficiation and discouraging the export of raw materials. However, respondents from the company said that they only required Zimbabwe's premium crop for blending with other tobacco leaves in China, which means Tianze may find it difficult to meet that request.

## 4.3 China Africa Cotton Company and the future

CAC faces some of the most formidable challenges of the three, the most serious being competition from other companies. There are at least seven other companies, among them Cottco, Cargill, Romsdal, Alliance Gineries, Olam, Grafax, Sino Zimbabwe, Jinmac and Sino-tex. Cottco, Cargill and CAC are the top three companies and between them command as much as 50 percent of the market. Competition among the companies has always been relentless. Despite the Zimbabwean government having developed fairly robust guidelines for regulating the industry, numerous cases of merchants and farmers flouting the rules over the past seasons have been reported. This is particularly manifest in cases of side-marketing, for which several merchants have already taken families to court as a disincentive. It is reported that merchants could have been losing as much as a third of the crop to side-marketing in 2012, a loss estimated at US\$19m (Sunday Mail 2013).

Another challenge faced by the company is the increasingly poor yield from the crop. This has ranged from 440kg/ha in 2009/10 to 770kg/ha in 2012/13 (MoAMID, various). Moreover, although the generating capacity of cotton in Zimbabwe currently stands at 700,000ha, the area of farmland allocated for cotton production has been fluctuating between seasons in response to viability. Lately, this has been characterised by a major decline as shown in Table 3 below.

Table 3: Trends in area planted to cotton in Zimbabwe, 2009-2013

Season	Oct. 2009	Nov. 2010	Dec. 2011	2012/13	2013/14
Area under cotton (ha)	261,191	379,689	432,709	239,335	201,678

Source: MoAMID (various)

Legislators have recently expressed concern over the challenges confronting the cotton industry, even alleging that farmers have been abandoning the crop due to imprudent government policies. For example, in the year 2015, the government asked all cotton companies to offer input packages worth at least US\$148 per hectare. Farmers would then be expected to pay this back in cotton, but the price and yield of cotton was so low that farmers would not have received a good income if they paid back the input packages. Legislators also argue that the country has missed out on some key technological advances, which has resulted in Zimbabwe's cotton crop being uncompetitive. Overall, more than 70 percent of Zimbabwe's crop is exported, and cotton companies have based their prices each year on the outlook from the world market – much to the chagrin of local farmers who insist local costs of production be used as the primary basis for price negotiation. As a result, farmers have been moving to other crops such as tobacco and maize.

These issues are clearly not restricted to CAC; even the more established cotton companies appear to be suffering. Due to historical advantages, Cottco has always occupied the pole position among the cotton companies. However, as a sign of the challenges faced across the cotton industry, it has also been making losses since 2009 when the country demonetised its local currency and replaced it with the US Dollar. In the year ending 31 March 2013, Cottco made a loss of US\$14.9m. Despite the company reporting a modest profit of US\$2m the following year, the company remains in a precarious state, as it continues to service significant debts estimated at US\$126m in March 2013 and US\$41m in March 2014 (News Day 2014). Furthermore, in the 2014 marketing year the company handled a crop of only 35,665t against its target of 110,000t, and by October 2014 Cottco had applied to the courts for judicial management (bankruptcy protection). This was intended to form a shield against claims on the company when what it owed far exceeded what was owed to it. It remains questionable if the company will be able to offer the expected level of support to farmers in the 2014/15 season.

Lastly, Cargill, a multinational US-registered company, claimed to suffer such consistent challenges that it closed its Zimbabwe business in 2014 citing a poor crop

and high levels of contract breach by its registered growers. The company was the third largest cotton merchant and accounted for 15 percent of the nation's crop. It was one of the first companies to compete with Cottco when it started operations in Zimbabwe in 1996, when the laws that established Cottco as the sole monopoly for the industry were repealed.

## **5. Conclusions**

In summary, what this study shows us is that we cannot necessarily conclude that company structures have played a huge role in terms of commercial success. Despite ongoing discussions of China's 'State Capitalist' model and the efficiency of private versus public sector enterprise, it would appear that all of these companies have had to balance their own commercial experiences from China with the challenging realities of Zimbabwe's political, social and market circumstances. While all three of these case studies have stable funding and all of them enjoyed the support that came from strong relations between the Chinese and Zimbabwean governments, each had very different outcomes.

The provincial SOE, Wanjin, appears to be suffering the most, and despite its status as an SOE and favourable concessions at the outset, still feels at risk of expropriation of the land it contracts. It brings with it experiences developed through its Anhui Farming operations in China, including inputs, technology, financial management and so forth. Yet it seems unable to overcome the prohibitive production costs and has struggled to help indebted farms return to full productivity. Depending on how much patient funding is available to the company, longer term investments may still turn a profit in the future, but for the time being there is a sense that the days of their current operations are numbered.

Conversely, Tianze has been hugely successful. The financial stability of being a subsidiary of one of China's most powerful SOEs has surely given it greater scope to invest substantially across Zimbabwe's abundant tobacco sector. However, this success is also buoyed by the fact that the Zimbabwean government was keen on this specific form of investment and therefore offered them a greater degree of political stability and support in the form of legal and economic concessions. Furthermore, China's strong demand for tobacco is perhaps the most important factor behind the company's success, as Tianze acts as an intermediary between all other tobacco producers and companies in Zimbabwe and one of the world's most lucrative tobacco markets.

Lastly, the private cotton company with funding from the CAD Fund is also facing significant challenges. With the local market leader, Cottco, filing for bankruptcy protection, and Cargill closing its operations in Zimbabwe, it is clear that times are bad in the industry. This is partly due to stiff competition, but more importantly, decreasing crop yields and a lack of inputs have spurred local farmers to shift their attention to other crops – which then reduces total outputs further. As with Wanjin it is unclear what the future holds: whether continued finance will prove to be a wise move while times are bad, or whether it is just pouring more money into a situation

that will ultimately prove unprofitable anyway. Again, though, what we see is a case of local dynamics playing out in ways that are beyond the control of company structures.

From the Zimbabwean perspective, these investments have all been very welcome, and there is clearly a commitment to ensure long-term engagements. Yet it seems that how the state addresses issues within its agricultural sector, and particularly the cotton market, will really be the most important deciding factor for the future of these Chinese companies. This will no doubt aim to balance the interests of farmers with those of companies, be they Zimbabwean, Chinese or from elsewhere.

Henceforth, although all three Chinese companies maintain that they invested in Zimbabwe's agricultural sector for the long haul, it is possible that the unforeseen challenges which have befallen Wanjin and CAC may seriously impede their long-term prospects. Together, these three case studies disprove the narrative of unstoppable Chinese business successes in Africa, and particularly within the agricultural sector. Rather, they present a reality that is a lot messier on the ground and together they take us a step closer to understanding the challenges and opportunities of Chinese companies in Africa.

## Reference

Alden, C., (2013) 'China and the Long March into African agriculture', *Cahiers Agricultures*, 22(1):16-21

Alden, C. (2005) 'China in Africa', *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 47(3):147-164

Basara, C. (2014) 'Kikwete: Agricultural Transformation Key to Economic Development', *Daily News Tanzania*, 25 October / [allafrica.com/stories/201410270565.html](http://allafrica.com/stories/201410270565.html) [accessed 16 November 2014]

Bautigam & Zhang, 2013, Green Dreams: Myth and Reality in China's Agricultural Investment in Africa, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 34, No. 9, pp 1676-1696

CAC (undated) *China into Africa: The Development of the Best Agricultural Enterprise in Africa* [中国走进非洲、发展非洲最优秀的农业企业], Beijing, China: China-Africa Cotton Development Ltd. / [www.ca-cotton.com/Index.asp?id=10](http://www.ca-cotton.com/Index.asp?id=10) [accessed 20 March 2015]

Chen, K.Z., Hsu, C. and Fan, S. (2014) 'Steadying the Ladder: China's Agricultural and Rural Development Engagement in Africa', *China Agricultural Economic Review*, 6(1):2-20

Cook, S. (forthcoming 2015) *Jumping into the Sea: Chinese Migrants' Engagement in Non-Traditional Agricultural Commodities in Ethiopia*. FAC Working Paper, Brighton,

UK: Future Agricultures Consortium

Bräutigam, D.A. (2011) *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press

Bräutigam, D.A. and Tang, X. (2009) 'China's Engagement in African Agriculture: Down to the Countryside', *The China Quarterly*, 199:686-706

Daniel et al. 2012 The Rise in Chinese Overseas Investment and What It Means for American Businesses, <http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/the-rise-in-chinese-overseas-investment-and-what-it-means-for-american-businesses/>, [accessed July 26<sup>th</sup>, 2015]

Embassy of China in Zimbabwe (2014) *The Relationship between China and Zimbabwe: Economic and Trade Cooperation*, Harare, Zimbabwe: Embassy of China / [www.chinaembassy.org.zw/chn/zjgx/jmhz](http://www.chinaembassy.org.zw/chn/zjgx/jmhz) [accessed 16 November 2014]

Gabas, J-J. and Tang, X. (2014) *Chinese Agricultural Cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Challenging Preconception*, Paris, France: Agricultural Research for Development

Gaye, A. (2006) *Chine-Afrique: Le dragon et l'autruche*, Paris, France: L'Harmattan

Gov.cn (2005) 'State Tobacco Monopoly Administration', *Gov.cn / english1.english.gov.cn/2005-10/03/content\_74295.htm* [accessed 19 March 2015]

Guo Chatelard, S. (2014) 'Chinese Agricultural Investments in Zambia', *GREAT Insights*, 3(4), April 2014

He P., Takeaki T. and Eiji Y. (2013) 'An Overview of the China National Tobacco Corporation and State Tobacco Monopoly Administration', *Environmental Health and Preventive Medicine*, 18(1):85-90

Large, D. (2008) 'Beyond 'Dragon in the Bush': The Study of China-Africa Relations', *African Affairs*, 107(426):45-61

Lu, J. (forthcoming 2015) *The Challenges of China's Food and Feed Economy*. FAC Working Paper, Brighton, UK: Future Agricultures Consortium

Manji, F. and Marks, S. (eds) (2007) *African Perspectives on China in Africa*, Oxford, UK: Fahamu Books & Pambazuka Press

Martin, A. (2014) 'The Chinese Government Is Getting Rich Selling Cigarettes', *BloombergView*, 11 December / [bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-12-11/the-chinese-government-is-getting-rich-selling-cigarettes](http://bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-12-11/the-chinese-government-is-getting-rich-selling-cigarettes) [accessed 19 March 2015]

MOFCOM (2014) *2013 Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment*, Beijing, China: China Statistics Press

MOFCOM (2011) *China Has Become the First Largest Trade Partner of Africa*, Beijing, China: Ministry of Commerce / [www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/i/jyj/k/201111/20111107835566.html](http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/i/jyj/k/201111/20111107835566.html) [accessed 16 November 2014]

Shi L. (1989) "Five Decades of China's Aid to Africa and the Development of China's South-South Cooperation Thinking", "Contemporary China's Foreign Economic Cooperation", China Social Sciences Press, 1989

Smaller, C., Qiu W. and Liu Y. (2012) *Farmland and Water: China Invests Abroad*, London, UK: International Institute for Sustainable Development / [iisd.org/publications/farmland-and-water-china-invests-abroad](http://iisd.org/publications/farmland-and-water-china-invests-abroad)

Spring, A. (2009) 'Chinese Development Aid and Agribusiness Entrepreneurs in Africa', *Proceedings of the 10th Annual Conference of International Academy of African Business and Development*, Kampala, Uganda: IAABD

Taylor, I. (2010) *China's New Role in Africa*, Boulder, USA: Lynne Rienner

Tull, D. (2006) 'China's Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance, and Consequences', *Journal of Modern Africa Studies*, 44(3):459-479

UNCTAD (2014) *World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs – An Action Plan*, Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNCTAD (2013) *World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains – Investment and Trade for Development*, Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

WHO (undated) *Tobacco in China*. Factsheet, Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization / [www.wpro.who.int/china/mediacentre/factsheets/tobacco/en/](http://www.wpro.who.int/china/mediacentre/factsheets/tobacco/en/) [accessed 19 March 2015]

Xinhua (2006) 'Zambia Welcomes Chinese Agricultural Know-How', *People's Daily Online*, 21 March / [english.people.com.cn/200603/21/eng20060321\\_252198.html](http://english.people.com.cn/200603/21/eng20060321_252198.html) [accessed 16 November 2014]

Zafar, A. (2007) 'The Growing Relationship between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: Macroeconomic, Trade, Investment, and Aid Links', *The World Bank Research Observer*, 22(1):103-130

Zhao S. (2014) 'A Neo-Colonialist Predator or Development Partner? China's Engagement and Rebalance in Africa', *Journal of Contemporary China*, 23(90):1033-1052

Zhou D. (2013) *China Business Yearbook*, Beijing, China: China Commerce and Trade Press



### Appendix 3: One Institution, Two Roles, Three Mountains: Blurring the Lines Between Aid and Business in the Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre in Zimbabwe<sup>5</sup>

Tang Lixia, Lu Yan, Zhao Wenjie, Langton Mukwereza, Li Xiaoyun

#### Abstract:

In recent year, tremendous attentions have been given to China's burgeoning agricultural engagements. Due to limited access to China's engagements, most discussions have focused on macro-level discourse analysis as well as political and economic analysis on its impacts. Little research of an anthropological nature has been undertaken at the micro-level operation of on-going projects, taking note of the nature of interactions between the donors and local counterpart staff within a given cultural setting. This article focuses on a Chinese-Zimbabwe agricultural technology demonstration centre in providing insights into the daily activities, interactions and cultural encounters with locals. Ethnographic methodologies are used to examine the Chinese and Africans' activities, ideas and dialogues at the demonstration centre to present how China's macro strategy to be implemented through presentation of empirical observations of the actual practices of staff and local partners in the ATDC in Zimbabwe

Key words: China aid to Africa, China Agricultural aid to Africa, Agricultural Technology Demonstration centre, Blurring lines,

*'Our Centre is a very complicated institution: We have to fulfill the aid tasks of trainings, technology demonstration, and receptions for the Chinese government; we need to fulfill the business tasks to make profit to sustain the Centre; and we also have to serve the Zimbabwe government. We are pressed under three mountains.'*—  
Chinese Agriculture Technology Demonstration Centre Director

#### Introduction

Chinese Agriculture Technology Demonstration Centres (ATDCs) are designed to be aid programs operated by companies. In Zimbabwe, this design requires Chinese staff to perform dual roles as aid workers and business people, leading to blurred identities and expectations among Chinese actors, and misunderstandings among local Zimbabwean partners. In practice, Chinese staff and local partners try to overcome these challenges despite limited capacity and support, but the inherent design of the ATDC model remains a barrier to fully achieving the goal of a financially sustainable Centre contributing to increased food security. This research aims to

---

<sup>5</sup> The research co-funded by CBAA project, CIDRN research funding and Beijing Youth Elite Programme



provide insight into this dilemma through empirical exploration of the ATDC in Zimbabwe, based on two months of fieldwork conducted over two trips in 2013-2014.

China's increasing engagements with Africa through aid, trade and investments is now a well-documented trend (Buckley, 2013). There has been a growing interest in understanding the implications of China's aid to African countries since 2005. This increase in scholarly interest derives largely from the concern that China's brand of aid mixed with other financial flows and market dynamics potentially negatively impact economic growth and development in Africa (Power, et al. 2012). Existing research focuses on the motivation of the Chinese government, but there is little research into what Chinese are actually doing on the ground. For examples, Alden (2007) summarized three divergent narratives describing China's engagements in Africa as follows: 1) China as colonizer and threat to Africa's development, especially in land and resource-related engagements such as agriculture; 2) economic competitor; and 3) development partner, emphasizing the value of China's development experience and opportunities for supporting African countries to follow a similar path. Chinese political-economic motivations behind aid include solidifying and promoting relations with African states, garnering business opportunities. However, it is unclear how these motivations are actually playing out on the ground through existing agriculture engagements. The objective of this research is to present how China's macro strategy to be implemented through presentation of empirical observations of the actual practices of staff and local partners in the ATDC in Zimbabwe.

Our research team consisted of two researchers from the China Agriculture University. We lived in the ATDC together with 8 Chinese staff for two months, implementing ethnographic-style participatory observation research methodology. We conducted unstructured interviews with all Chinese staff, some local workers including kitchen cleaners, security guards, tractor drivers, fixed agricultural workers and casual workers. We also went to Harare to interview Chinese embassy staff, Zimbabwe Ministry of Agriculture staff and other Chinese agriculture company managers. During our stay in ATDC, we also observed visits from an international aid delegation, a local farmer organization, local commercial farmers and politicians, and a delegation from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. We were involved in the preparation for and reception of these visitors, and also interviewed them. In addition, upon our return to China, we interviewed stakeholders in Beijing from the China Ministries of Agriculture and Commerce. All interviews were conducted in Mandarin Chinese or English, and no translators were employed.

### **Blurred Lines Between Aid and Business in the Model Of Chinese ATDCs**

ATDC is a new modality for Chinese agriculture aid to Africa. It was initiated in Beijing in 2006 at the third Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The

ATDCs aim to transfer Chinese agriculture technology and development experience to promote agricultural development and to resolve food security in Africa. The operational model of the ATDC is to employ Chinese companies and institutes, generally selected via a competitive tender system in China, to build and operate the Centres for at least three years under a Chinese grant. During this time the companies are encouraged to seek out ways for the Centres to earn income and become self-financing. They are also encouraged to investigate other business opportunities (Brautigam & Zhang, 2013). The host countries provide ATDC with a small farm area for piloting and demonstration of Chinese technologies. In practice, the companies and institutes manage the farms for modest profits to support the operational costs of the Centres before they find alternative business opportunities. These Centres have been highly sought after by African leaders. As an official from Ministry of Commerce in Beijing explained, *'After we pledged support to build ten demonstration Centres in Africa at the 2006 FOCAC summit, many African countries submitted requests for the Centres. As the requests to host these Centres were overwhelming, we increased the number of pledged Centres from the original 10 to 14, and it is apparent that African countries hope that China would build one such Centre in each country<sup>6</sup>*. Since its inception that figure has now jumped even higher with 25 such centres reported to have been built by 2013 (Tang, 2013).

At the diplomatic level, the ATDC is seen as an innovative modality to promote China-Africa agricultural cooperation targeting agricultural development in Africa through China's technology and equipments. The Chinese government hopes that the ATDC model can break the vicious cycle in traditional aid modalities of 'build-transfer-suspend-reinvest-retransfer-resuspend'. For this reason they have included companies as the operational body in the design of the ATDC model. The Centres have three requirements: first, they need to attract interest and demonstrate the new technology, second, they need to have a training component for local peasants, and third, they need to be sustainable (Brautigam & Tang, 2009).

Chinese policymakers acknowledge that using an agribusiness model to achieve development aid comes with risks and uncertainties, and integrating the non-profit and profit-making functions remains a challenge (Buckley, 2013). Indeed, the Chinese government has taken some measures to ensure the public services of ATDC are achieved, such as setting a minimum number of trainees to 120 persons per year. There are also monitoring and evaluation procedures, such as a requirement to submit monthly and annual reports to the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). In 2012, MOFCOM and MOA jointly evaluated the performance of ATDC, placing equal weight on the economic sustainability of operations as on contributions to local agricultural development. Further, MOFCOM and MOA jointly organized internal discussion workshops on how to keep a balance between public service and business activities in 2012 and 2013. All ATDCs in Africa

---

<sup>6</sup> Official interview by researcher in Beijing

were required to participate and present their experience and difficulties. The officials from different divisions and departments of MOFCOM and MOA, provincial government, China Development Bank, China EXIM Bank and China-Africa Development Fund were also invited to attend. The senior officials at the meeting emphasized both the public service and economic sustainability of ATDC's.

The ATDC model aims to make foreign aid interventions sustainable by linking with commercial opportunities for Chinese companies. Under this model, the Chinese companies are asked to use the three years of support from the Chinese government to explore operating in an economically sustainable commercial, and mutually beneficial way (Brautigam & Tang, 2013). This means that the Centre has dual functions and is required to play two roles: As a demonstration Centre, it needs to have demonstration and training components to promote local agricultural development; as a Company, it needs to ensure business profits to sustain operations.

These two functions seem contradictory from the outside, however they follow the internal Chinese logic developed in China's own development experience of employing State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to achieve State goals. Indeed the Centre adopted the Chinese management framework of 'one identical institution under two different names' (一个机构两块牌子), which is a special administration and management model employed successfully in China in separating Party from government work, and separating government from enterprise management functions. Under such a management structure, when an institution has two names for different identities, it uses its appropriate name to meet the work needs depending on the context.

### **Blurring the Lines Between Aid and Business on the Ground in Zimbabwe**

Zimbabwe-China relations date back to Zimbabwe's (then Rhodesia's) struggle for independence when the then main guerrilla movement Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) established links with the Chinese Communist Party. Through this linkage, China provided arms and other logistical support to the armed struggle. Zimbabwe adopted a 'Look East Policy' following its isolation by the West after embarking on a land reform programme in 1999, and held China as an 'all-weather-friend'. Reaffirming its friendship with Zimbabwe, China, at the request of Zimbabwe, has entered into a number of agricultural cooperation programmes, including: The provision of 4,910 tons of rice and 9,723 tons of wheat as emergency food aid in 2012; a donation of agricultural machinery comprising 10 farm trucks, 30 walking (two wheel) tractors, and 50 water pumps; a loan agreement with the Export-Import Bank of China; the training of key staff in the government of Zimbabwe's Ministry of Agriculture; and dispatching of Chinese agricultural experts on various missions (Langton, 2013). China's leadership sees Zimbabwe as among its

closest partners, as the country was among the first recipients of an ATDC. The Centre in Zimbabwe is one of 25 ATDCs in 24 countries across the African continent.

We arrived at the ATDC in Gwebi late in the evening after a 25-hour flight directly from Beijing, and a two-hour drive from Harare airport. We were greeted by a full welcoming banquet thrown by the ten Chinese staff. The dining room had a large Chinese round table filled with Chinese dishes cooked by the staff themselves, using vegetables they grew themselves or bought from the local market, and African beer and wine. Chatting away in Chinese with the staff, surrounded by Chinese furniture and food, it felt like we had come on a very long journey and never left China. This feeling continued when we went to our rooms and saw that everything there was Chinese too: the air conditioners, furniture, TV, and electrical outlets. They even provided us with Chinese soap, shampoo, mosquito repellent and toilet tissue! Before we went to Zimbabwe, we expected the living conditions to be rough, but it was like a nice Chinese hotel.

The next morning we woke to find a beautiful Chinese garden surrounding a half dozen modern-two story buildings. They were organized according to dormitory and living areas with kitchen and dining room; administrative uses with work offices, meeting rooms, training rooms, laboratories; and a harvest processing area, including a warehouse, storage area, shelter for a handful of large tractors, combines, harvesters, ploughs, seed sowers, pesticide sprayers, flue-cured tobacco baling machine, etc.

There was a beautiful swimming pool and a local style thatched roof barbeque rest area. The most astonishing to us was the huge garden with flowers and trees, and iron rod fencing allowing you to see through, with lights on the paths. In China, our agriculture Centres are just functional, not beautiful. This place impressed us with how clean and organized it was, with everything in place. In the front of administrative building, only Zimbabwe national flag fluttering in the wind next to the Chinese flag reminded us that we were actually in Zimbabwe.

A China agricultural machinery company gained the bid for constructing ATDC in Zimbabwe, and started infrastructure construction in 2009. In 2012, China and Zimbabwe held a ceremony to officially open the Centre following completion of construction. The company imported agricultural machines from China to run the demonstration Centre. Some of the machines were brought in simply for display, such as a flue-cured tobacco baling machine. Others are used for farming operations in the field.

The demonstration Centre was allocated an area of 74 hectares about 300 meters away from the office and residential complex for field operations. Every year, the farm is mainly used for potato, soybean and maize cultivation in the rainy season and for wheat and potatoes in winter. The company dispatched 10 Chinese working staff

to manage the Centre. The Zimbabwe Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development appointed a local management team for the demonstration Centre, and a separate office to support their work. The team includes the Director and Deputy Director of the Department of Agricultural Education and Training, Deputy Director of the Department of Agricultural Mechanisation and Engineering, and the Principal of Gwebi Agricultural College. 'To be specific,' explained one ATDC staff member, 'relying on the demonstration Centre, we registered an agricultural company, which shares the same working staff and management personnel with the Centre. The company uses the Centre's name when it performs the function of public services, and adopts the company's name when it conducts commercial operations.'

According to our field research, during its operation over the past year, the demonstration Centre has carried out the following public service activities: First, Pilot demonstration, including the experimental cultivation of nearly 20 kinds of local maize seeds in cooperation with local seed companies, the experimental cultivation of a dozen varieties of potatoes jointly with domestic potato research institutes, and the promotion of diced potato cultivation technology; second, agriculture exhibition and presentation, including presenting its agricultural machinery at various agricultural shows held in the country under the auspices of the Ministry of Agriculture; third, receiving visiting delegations, including students of Zimbabwe's agricultural colleges; fourth, organizing trainings. The Centre successively trained a group of farmers on agricultural machinery as well as a farmers' group whose membership was drawn from a local potato farmers association.

By contrast, the activities for the business operations include the following: First, sales of agricultural machinery. They have contracted several local middlemen and displayed some small machinery in the local businessmen's yards. They also contact with local farmer organizations to give them advice to use their solar irrigation and electricity systems. They also would like to participate into some trade fair to distribute introduction of their machinery. At present, their machinery business has not gain good performance. Second, sales of agricultural products of the farm, including maize, soybeans, wheat and potatoes. The agricultural production from the farm being an important source of income for them. Most part of their agricultural products was sell to local food companies and sometimes some local farmer also come to buy some potato for eating. Third, providing contract ploughing services to local commercial farmers, covering a total area of 20,000 mu. In Zimbabwe some local farmers have no large agricultural machinery, especially the tractors. They can not cultivate their land. So they invited center to plough and harvest their land with some payment.

In the Chinese's policy framework, the ATDC model of 'one institute with two roles' is seen as a solution to perceived problems of predominant OECD aid models as well as China's past aid projects in Africa (Buckley 2012). The aim is to avoid the unsustainability of purely government-financed public aid projects that so many

Chinese aid projects have encountered in Africa. At the same time, this model aims to avoid a focus on maximum-profits-capturing seen by pure free-market private enterprises. In China's domestic transition, this model has gained success, and has also shown promise abroad through initial pilots by Chinese state-owned enterprises at Koba farm in Guinea and in Mozambique (Brautigam & Tang, 2013). In practice, this model requires Chinese staff to perform dual roles as aid workers and business people. The model is leading to blurred identities and expectations among Chinese actors, and misunderstandings among local Zimbabwean partners.

In the ATDC aid model, the Chinese staff perform dual roles as aid workers and business people due to the two identities attached their single institute. In practice, the Chinese staff change their roles according to the situation they meet. As one ATDC staff explained, 'When we sell agricultural products and collect account receivables, we introduce ourselves as employees of the agriculture company; when we take part in activities such as exhibitions, or hold trainings, we introduce ourselves as from the demonstration Centre. In such a way, we'll not feel embarrassed (about our sometimes contradictory roles).' The performance of dual roles as aid workers and business people has blurred the worker's sense of identity, leading to conflicting working expectations among Chinese staff and misunderstandings among local Zimbabwean partners. In practice, Chinese staff and local partners try to overcome these challenges despite limited capacity and support, but the inherent design of the ATDC model remains a barrier to fully achieving the goal of a financially sustainable Centre contributing to increased food security.

### **Blurred roles of Chinese staff at ATDC**

China has not yet built up a professional development industry and systematic development education system as Haan (2011) presented that development studies as a subject has not emerged in (mainland) China until recently, with currently on-going efforts to build development studies with agricultural universities. There are no consistent systems for training development workers prior to deployment on ATDC and other aid postings. These aid workers are dispatched by companies and most of them have no experience in development aid. This was the case with the eight Chinese staff at the Centre. Before they came to Zimbabwe, two of them worked as managers on a Chinese state-farm, three others came directly from obtaining bachelors' degrees from an agricultural university, and the rest worked in various non-agricultural companies. Most of them had received high training in agriculture, especially in agricultural mechanization. However, none of the staff received any training on development aid before being recruited and deployed to Zimbabwe. Furthermore, only four of the eight staff were skilled in English, with three having no English knowledge at all. 'We attended training in agricultural economics, agricultural machinery, plant protection, accountancy, international

regulations and potato planting,’ explained an ATDC staff member. ‘Before we came here, one person who had spent for two months here introduced the Centre to us in one day.’ Beyond this basic orientation, the staff had to figure the rest of the job out on their own after they arrived.

Table 1: Personal and professional profiles of Chinese staff at the Centre in Zimbabwe

<b>Name</b>	<b>Sex</b>	<b>Educational background</b>	<b>Working experience in China</b>	<b>English skill</b>	<b>Working position in the Centre</b>	<b>Working position in the agricultural company</b>
G M Jiang		BSc in agricultural machinery	Retired Manager of a state-owned farm	No English speaking	Director General of the demonstration Centre	General manager of the agricultural company, Manager of the Project Department
M r. Yu		BSc in agricultural machinery	Retired vice Manager of a state-owned farm	Skilled	Deputy Director General,	Deputy General Manager,
M r. Liu		Senior school	The driver	Primary	Staff of the Training Department	Head of the Sales Dept.
M r. Ju		Senior school	Kitchen er in a company	No-English speaking	Head of the Integrated Management Department	Head of the Integrated Management Department
M iss Hao		secondary school; specialized in accountancy	Accountant	Non-English speaking	Financial Manager	Financial Manager
Xi ao Wang		BSc in horticulture	Bachelor student	Skilled	Staff of the Production Dept. and Training Dept.	Staff of the Project Dept., Production Dept.,

						Integrated Management Dept. and Financial Dept.
Xi ao Yang		BSc in agricultural machinery	Bachelor student	Skilled	Staff of the Training Dept. and the Integrated Management Dept.	Staff of the Sales Dept. and the Integrated Management Dept.
Xi ao Li		BSc in international trade	Bachelor student	Skilled	Staff of the Training Dept. and the Integrated Management Dept.	Staff of the Project Dept., the Integrated Management Dept. and the Sales Dept.

Source: Authors' field work

The complex working arrangements inherent to the ATDC model have caused mixed reactions to the Centre. Table 1 above illustrates the mixed professional backgrounds and blurred workload distribution of Chinese staff in ATDC. In interviews, the Chinese staff reflected on the challenges of their dual roles. 'Our Centre is a very complicated institution,' explained one staff member. 'We have to fulfill the aid tasks of trainings, technology demonstration, and receptions for the Chinese government; we need to fulfill the business tasks to make profit to sustain the Centre; and we also have to serve the Zimbabwe government. We are pressed under three mountains.'<sup>7</sup> Under the three mountains, the Chinese staff have to try to balance their inputs for vary functions of ATDC.

Due to the different positions of staff within in ATDC, as well as their different ages and motivations, they have diverse perceptions of their dual roles. The director attaches more importance to sustainability of ATDC and emphasizes his responsibility to seek business opportunities. 'The Chinese government only finances the initial three-years, but we have promised to maintain this Centre for decades. So we have to try our best to capture more business opportunities,' he explained. 'It is not easy to find them. What we do is to try to see profits from the farmland while cutting operational costs as much as possible. We are cooperating with Gwebi Agricultural college in trainings, and investing in developing their farm so that we can share some profits. We also try to sell our agricultural machinery and offer paid services, such as

---

<sup>7</sup> In revolutionary stage of China before 1949, the Chinese farmers always said they are pressed under three mountains : Imperialism, Capitalism and Feudalism



we rent our tractors and heavy plough to prepare land for cultivation to local commercial farms.’ During field work, the director always works towards this overall goal, as we can see from this snapshot of one week in his working diary, as observed in our fieldwork:

February 17: Delivered potatoes to a local potato chips manufacturing company in the morning, dealt with the Centre’s computer network failures and accounts with the telecommunications company at noon, and picked up a research group from the airport in the afternoon.

February 18: Made nameplates for the farm’s test sites in the office in the morning; guided farm workers to sort potatoes in the operating area; visited China Tobacco International Inc. to discuss cooperation in project declaration; then purchased the mower at a shopping centre and talked about relevant issues on prospects for investment in Zambia with a broker at the entrance of a large supermarket.

February 19: Sprayed lacquer on the nameplates made yesterday, cleared up the instrument room of the demonstration Centre, updated the company’s financial records in the afternoon, dealt with the employment information of temporary workers and calculated wages and social insurance, and farming payrolls; produced the training video.

February 20: Arranged farm for workers to sort potatoes, put the labels of test species at respective plots in the field during the morning; updated the company’s financial records around noon, purchased food and daily necessities for the Centre from the supermarket, summed up the potato test results and sent the information to the domestic market in the afternoon.

February 21: Arranged local workers to clean the park and sorted the presentation materials of the Centre on the morning; accompanied the Minister, Director General and Permanent Secretary of Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Agriculture on a joint inspection of the Centre with General Manager Jiang, served as an interpreter in the afternoon.

In his day to day work, the ATDC director drafts new project proposals, evaluates potential cooperative farms, negotiates with other agricultural companies, analyzes local machinery needs, etc. We can see that he places little emphasis on the public functions of ATDC. Indeed, the manager explained that the business side of the ATDC is his focus because that is his experience and he lacks the guidance on any other way to operate. ‘The Centre is a quite new modality for Chinese aid and nobody knows how best to manage it. Our company has no experience and we also cannot learn from other centres because we are all in same situation. We only know how to manage the farm and how to repair agricultural machinery. We were required to keep the Centre running and for that we can do what we can.’ The salary arrangements of ATDC also encourage the director to focus on business over aid because his salary is paid by the company which contracted to operate this centre directly and not by the Centre. ‘My bonus and subsistence,’ he explained, ‘depend directly on the profits of ATDC.’ The director and vice director both took the ATDC job after already retiring from a successful career. They see ATDC as a good opportunity to do something extra and interesting. As they see it, they can continue to earn their

retirement earnings in China, while also making some money through the business ventures in ATDC. The center can keep 30% of profits from its business activities as bonus for Chinese working staff. Therefore, they are focusing more on the business side of the ATDC's dual identity.

In contrast, the three young Chinese staff have rather different perceptions about their work at ATDC: They want to become professional aid workers. They explained that when they were hired, they were told that they would come to Zimbabwe to do a Chinese aid project. When they arrived, fresh out of university and with good English language skills, they were disappointed to find that there was a lot of criticism about the profit motives of ATDC. Furthermore, their strong English skills allow them to interact with international aid workers, and they described a sense of jealousy that this kind of profession doesn't exist in China. "I met some aid workers from US. They worked with farmers directly and they look very professional and know clearly what they are doing." These younger staff members cannot change the situation, and feel frustrated that they have to follow the company's arrangement. 'Surely we are aware that the Centre is a grant-aid project, but we are hired by a company,' explained one staff member. 'The company should place more importance on the mission of Centre and the aid tasks when it allocates tasks to us. I don't see the leaders considering the national mission and aid goals. Instead,' he continued 'I am stuck dealing with the minutiae of our daily lives and the farm operations. If I don't go to buy vegetables from local market, we have no food for lunch. This is our reality. It has no relationship with national strategy or the mission of ATDC.'

Sometimes, these young workers complain and resist the leaders' arrangements for the for-profit aspects of the project. One of them explained his complicated emotions as dual roles "I have no any special emotion to the company which we registered here. I always introduced I came from Chinese ATDC when I met others. When I sell potato or machinery I felt very uncomfortable. When I prepared for training course and hosted a delegation for ATDC I felt very relax and happy." Sometimes the resistance is quite subtle. For example, we observed passive resistance during the internal workshop to develop the annual work plans. When the directors explained the potential projects and working tasks to all participants, the young Chinese staff remained silent and did not take notes or express their opinions. These frustrations made them especially open and interested in talking with us as researchers—discussing together what the future of ATDC could be, and exploring whether there is a better model for operations. The dual roles of the ATDC design thus create tensions among the staff themselves, as they take on different roles according to their background, skills and interests. On the surface, they are a cooperative team with a common goal, but in practice, they may resist aspects of the dual role demanded of them.

In addition to the different motivations and expectations among Chinese staff, the dual-identity of ATDC creates confusion and conflicting expectations among others,

and has led to negative perception and feedback from both the Chinese government and local partners. The manager of ATDC explained that, 'In recent years, we receive so many criticisms from the Counselor's office and the Ministry. Some officials say the Centre is a white elephant. We are hurt by these comments. We have done a lot of training, but we do not know how to publicize our work because we are not professional trainers.' Lacking professional knowledge and skills on aid programmes, they do not endeavor to communicate with both local partners and the Chinese Counselor's office. For example, they have failed to submit required working reports to the Counselor's office's requirements and do not discuss budget or working-plans with local partners. One Chinese staff explained how his previous work experience in China left him ill-prepared for the tasks expected at the Centre. 'I was a farm head in China and I knew how to manage a farm. Here I have to work as training unit head and I have no any knowledge or experience, especially in Zimbabwe. And nobody can supervise me.' Without training in development aid, the staff has had to learn by doing. 'We have accumulated some experience,' explained the ATDC manager 'and we now have some basic knowledge about training. Hence we have hired a local farm manager to let our staff concentrate on training and piloting.' This ad-hoc, learning-by-doing approach to the aid duties of the ATDC has been a key reason for the misunderstandings from different Chinese actors and local partners.

### **Blurred expectations of different Chinese actors**

The official rhetoric surrounding the ATDC focuses primarily on its aid identity and this rhetoric is carried down to the country level, with Chinese officials in Zimbabwe. At the opening ceremony of ATDC, for example, the Chinese embassy representatives emphasized how the ATDC was a symbol of China and Zimbabwe's friendship under the FOCAC framework, and described how it would serve as an important platform for argo-technology sharing. The former Chinese counselor in Zimbabwe, Mr. Xinshun similarly explained at the cornerstone-laying ceremony that the Zimbabwe ATDC aimed to introduce China's agricultural technology and machinery to local farmers, to increase crop yields and to strengthen food security<sup>8</sup>.

In practice, the requirement for ATDCs to be sustainable entitles them to bear the function of promoting enterprises to go global. At the Seminar on the Sustainable Development of Demonstration Centres, held in Beijing in 2013 one government official explained that,

*It is risky to invest in overseas agriculture because the investment is high*

---

<sup>8</sup> [http://www.nxnet.cn/shouye/sygdwxw/200910/t20091023\\_683713.htm](http://www.nxnet.cn/shouye/sygdwxw/200910/t20091023_683713.htm)

*and the payback period is long. Therefore, the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Agriculture designed [the dual aid-business] mechanism [for the ATDCs]. In the project construction period and technical cooperation stage, the government provides a set amount of funds for project implementers to look for powerful experienced enterprises to jointly promote Chinese agricultural enterprises to go global. The demonstration center is the bridgehead and window for Chinese agricultural enterprises to go global, and thus provides an opportunity for the enterprises that are willing to go global.*

However, he also emphasized that the *demonstration centers must base these business ventures on solid technology.*

*Many domestic agricultural technologies [in China] have a history of a few decades or even more than one thousand years. These technologies are needed abroad. We need to push forward the promotion of these technologies and boost the development of demonstration centers on this basis. It is doubtful that the demonstration centers could develop well and achieve commercialized operation without solid technology. Some demonstration centers and construction units engage in agricultural trading, agricultural technology sales and even real estate development, but these can only be sideline business of demonstration centers*

Thus, under China's policy framework, although the demonstration center has the function to promote enterprises to go global, its core function is to demonstrate and promote China's agricultural technologies. During his visit to China's agricultural demonstration center in Zimbabwe, Former Minister of Commerce Chen Deming pointed out that: 'The central must appropriately develop breeding industry and introduce China's biogas technology or farmers' small-scale biogas digesters technology to Zimbabwe because this country has good weather conditions.' He continued, 'We are also considering introducing China's agricultural machinery maintenance technology here to support the maintenance of agricultural machinery in Zimbabwe.' Another senior official on this visit similarly emphasized that although the sustainability of the Centre's commercial operations was very important, the Chinese government never intended to build up ATDC as commercial farmland using grant aid resources.

Despite the official rhetoric placing equal emphasis on both the commercial and public service roles of the ATDC in theory, in practice in Zimbabwe, the economic and commercial counselor's office criticizes the Centre for shifting its priorities to business. 'They pay too much attention to business now, and invest few resources in aid work. We have reminded them several times, but they tend forget to organize training courses without our reminders.'

While Chinese government criticizes the ATDC for being too business oriented, Chinese businesses in Zimbabwe criticize it for being too limited in its business scope.

At the time of our research, eight Chinese agricultural companies had investments in Zimbabwe's agriculture sector. They had imported agricultural machinery from China, but faced challenges when these machines needed repair, as there were not any services available and spare parts had to be brought in from China at high cost. When ATDC was getting established, they saw that it was to be run by an agriculture machinery company, and thus expected that it would be able to provide spare parts and machine maintenance service. As the manager of one company explained, 'I heard from the embassy that the agricultural machinery company would construct and operate ATDC. I was very happy because we really need spare parts and maintenance service on our machines. I went to ATDC to say hello to the director. I hoped they could offer this service to us.' According to the bilateral agreements between China and Zimbabwe, however, the Centre is not permitted to repair agriculture machinery. The Centre did import some agricultural machines for its own purposes in developing and running the demonstration farm, however it does not have the means or authority within the agreement to import machine parts, sell them, or conduct maintenance services on external machines. When Chinese agriculture companies needed spare parts and came to ATDC to find them, the Centre was not able to meet their demands. 'When I saw that so many tractors and other machines were exhibited at the Centre,' recalled another agribusiness manager, 'I thought it should offer agriculture machine sale and maintenance services. But I found I was wrong; they cannot do this.'

Though the center is seeking local market for their agricultural machinery, at present the local farmers only presented their interests on the small and cheap machinery. The modern and large machinery displayed in the Centre is mainly for demonstration purposes and for its own agricultural production, the image they convey lead to misunderstanding by non-Chinese as well. For example, international aid workers visited the farm during our research. They saw the large machinery and also thought that it was for promoting the sale of Chinese agriculture machines. They interpreted ATDC as a 'big commercial farm' and assumed that its main purpose was to promote big Chinese agriculture investments. In their discussions with ATDC staff, they emphasized that these machines were suitable for commercial production and not for small scale farmers, and they expressed concern over the implications of these Chinese machines becoming available in Zimbabwe.

### **Blurred expectations from Zimbabwe partners**

The Zimbabwe partners also have different expectations for ATDC.

Top officials view ATDC as promoting close links with the Chinese government. As mentioned earlier, China is not establishing ATDCs in every African country. The ATDC has symbolic relevance showing close China-Africa relations in those countries that

are recipients. High officials involved in ATDC gain political capital through engaging with China, and developing close relationship with the Chinese government. They regard Chinese ATDC as an aid program, benefiting their agriculture sector and promoting food security following China's success domestically. For example, the Minister of MOA has visited China five times and is impressed by China's agricultural development performance. He expects great benefits from ATDC's goal of sharing Chinese agricultural technology with Zimbabweans. As he explained in an interview, The ATDC is very important and very unique and special. The Centre can exhibit agricultural machines, and farmers can visit and access to these machines, and they can learn to use them. I hope the Centre can be cultivated as Centre of trainers. The agricultural technicians, teachers and students in colleges and officials can come here to be trained and then they can continue to train farmers in different areas. For example, the Centre is piloting new cultivating methods of potato, and potato harvesting machines. I think this is quite good. Potato is transferred from food crop to cash crop in Zimbabwe because potato chips are now very popular. The traditional potato variety and technology cannot match current processing needs. I heard that there was one farmer who came from 300km away to see the potato planting and machines here. I am very glad to know this.

In addition to direct political prestige, high officials also expect to gain additional support from China via the ATDC platform. When the Chinese Minister of Commerce came to visit ATDC, the Zimbabwe Minister of Agriculture came one day prior to check preparations, and the next day he showed up two hours earlier than expected time for Chinese Minister's arrival to ensure he would arrive before the Chinese minister. Furthermore, the Minister required all division heads in the Zimbabwe Ministry of Agriculture to come to ATDC to welcome the Chinese minister. They took great efforts to present their hospitality and their support to ATDC and to promote China's continued engagements in Zimbabwe. 'We hope China can offer more support to our country,' explained the Minister in an interview. 'China could build up a special economic zone here, like in Ethiopia. Chinese agricultural companies can invest in this economic zone. We also hope China can help us to develop our dairy, meat cattle, poultry, pig and fresh-water fish.' He continued, 'We hope China can help us to extend value chain of agricultural products, such as food processing, seedling, leather and other subsidiary agricultural products processing. We also hope China can help us to improve rural infrastructure and telecom development.'

The Zimbabwe Ministry of Agriculture has appointed four officials to jointly deal with ATDC affair. They work with Chinese staff directly and have their own expectations for ATDC. They not only hope to gain more support from China, but also to promote ATDC as an international training centre available for use by other donors. They work to present their capacity to manage China's aid programmes well, proving their capacity to cooperate similarly with other donors. During our research, they were busy preparing for a visit by a western aid delegation. They discussed the visiting schedule and route carefully with the Chinese staff, introduced the different buildings and instruments, functions and activities of ATDC to delegation. When they found

that the Chinese staff were unable to present clearly in English, they stepped in and explained the workings of ATDC, and responded to questions and confusion from the delegation. 'The Centre owns a classroom, laboratory, pilot farm and agricultural machines,' explained the deputy division head to the delegation. 'Farmers can come here for training. Not only China can organize training programmes here but other donors can come to use it as well. The Centre can offer training materials, and international donors can pay for the farmers' expenditures including transportation and accommodation.' After the delegation left, he told researchers, 'You can see that the Centre is very attractive to international donors. They may be considering leaving and not continuing their aid programmes in our country. But then they come to visit the Centre and they are considering staying in Zimbabwe.'

Due to the positive expectations towards the ATDC, the local partners cooperate well with Chinese staff and also try their best to solve difficulties they have encountered. The Chinese staff reflected,

They have really helped us a lot. They help in contacting people; making arrangements for us to participate in local agricultural exhibitions where we have presented our agricultural machinery; contacting local seed companies and making arrangements for us to try out the varieties available locally. The Ministry of Agriculture also invited us to visit a local farm on our opening day so that we could learn how to conduct farm demonstrations; they also invited Gwebi Agricultural College to hold trainings jointly with us. Whenever we hold a training session, their officials are present and deliver opening and closing remarks.

Thus the personal and political benefits of interacting with the Chinese through ATDC has created a positive sense of collaboration on both sides.

Despite positive collaboration among the higher level officials, the dual roles of Chinese staff and inherent requirements of the ATDC model do lead to misunderstandings by local Zimbabwe partners. These stem from their personal motivations on involvement in ATDC administration as well as their personal perceptions of the model.

The ATDC Zimbabwean government partners see themselves as co-managers, but also as aid recipients, and they expect payment from the Chinese. In China, government officials involved in international aid programs offered by donors within China are paid by the Chinese government and are not allowed to get additional payment from that aid work. The Chinese thus expect that the Zimbabwe partners should be paid by the Zimbabwe government. Local partners do not understand this expectation from the Chinese side. They perceive that the Chinese government has provided Zimbabwe with a three-year technical cooperation assistance programme. They expect that Zimbabwe, as the host government, should have full discretion on how the funds are used. 'In the past six months, we did not work as one team' explained by a local partner who is from Zimbabwe MOA .

The Chinese government sent money, but we do not know how much was sent. We

need to know. I drive my car to the Centre for a joint job. Nobody pays for the fuel. All vehicles provided for the Centre are used by Chinese team only; we never use them. It is not fair driving my own car for work at the Centre with no reimbursement for fuel expenses. We are not special managers for the Centre; we simply spend some of our working time working for the Centre. The ministry does not pay us for work done at the Centre so the Centre should pay us instead.

Obviously, the local partners think that they are co-managers and they are entitled to some funding from the Chinese government. Chinese staff take the position that they came Zimbabwe to help and will not pay a partner for its contribution. With this logic, the Chinese director explained that the Zimbabwe government only provided scheduled consultations on an 'as-needed' basis. 'When we contact the government,' he explained 'they offer assistance. We share our plan with them and they may make suggestions. They need to pay [their own staff] for this involvement.' These misunderstandings have induced conflicts between local partners and Chinese staff. The local partners have thus reduced the frequency of their visits to the Centre.

The other blurred expectation of local partners stems from their perception of ATDC's core function. As mentioned earlier, they attach more importance to ATDC's public function. They don't understand the intention of the sustainability goal in the ATDC model, so they do not understand why Chinese staff focus so much on how to enlarge the farmland and seek more business opportunities. This leads to suspicions about of their 'real motivations' in Zimbabwe. As one official from Zimbabwe MOA explained, 'They should know clearly why they came to our country. They should have training plans. They cannot only focus on commercial production. If they came here for planting potato, maize and soybean, and only want to manage a thousand-hectare farm, they were totally wrong.' As explained earlier, the real motivation for the staff needing to expand the farm is the responsibility to develop economically sustainable operations to support the functioning of the Centre. As one Chinese staff explained, 'Presently we are encountering no financial problems, but the situation could change when funding from the Chinese government stops. We have to try to make profits to maintain Centre through exploring business opportunities. As mentioned at the start, the Centre needs about two million dollars per year to cover salaries, infrastructure servicing, training, vehicles and general maintenance however it currently only makes 180 thousand dollars. One option that was proposed by the Chinese staff, was that they could try to ensure their economic sustainability by enlarging their plot of land to produce more food for sale on the local market. At present they are working with 74ha of land, but they estimate that if it can be enlarged to at least 600 hectares then they will be able to maintain the Centre from those profits. However they have faced difficulties convincing their Zimbabwean counterparts to grant them the extra 526ha.

The Chinese staff have made efforts to improve the relationship and have adopted some informal means to do so. 'Treating them to dinner' and 'gifts' – two means to maintain a relationship – have played a positive role. When the former Director of



the Centre shared his work experience, he stressed the need to periodically invite the local counterpart staff to dinner to establish a friendship. 'We often invite the officials of the Ministry of Agriculture to drink tea or have dinner together,' explained Chinese director, 'and we visit them on New Year's Day and other holidays or give them some gifts. It is very useful.' Chocolates, corn meal and fertilizer are also well-received gifts. Chinese and Zimbabwean festivals are similarly good occasions for gift exchange, and Chinese restaurants have become the most important places for treating local partners to dinners.

In addition, the Centre also strives to maintain good relations with the officials through joint development of farms and contract farming. The Centre was once in a poor relationship with Gwebi Agricultural College, so it ploughed 100 hectares of land jointly with the college. 'We made little money from the 100 hectares of land. We did that to maintain a good relationship with Gwebi Agricultural College. After all, the Centre is on their property,' explained the Chinese director. 'We do not charge government officials for ploughing and harvesting work done on their fields. We develop farms jointly with officials. The purpose is to build a good relationship with them rather than to make money.' With these efforts, the local officials sometimes reciprocate and use their own initiatives to secure fuel to come for joint activities at the Centre; and rarely request reimbursements from the Centre. 'They are really kind,' explained one Chinese staff member. 'When we encounter troubles with visas, labour and other issues they always try their best to help us promptly. Last time when the Chinese government team came to evaluate our work, the Ministry of Agriculture give us a lot of good comments.'

Furthermore, the Centre has recruited 21 workers locally; among them eight tractor drivers, six security guards, four farm general hands and three gardeners. To relieve the Chinese staff of the pressures of managing fieldwork, in 2014 the Centre recruited a farm manager from the host country. During the peak farming season, the Centre generally hires an additional 100 workers for planting, weeding and harvesting. These interactions also reveal the complications spurred by the dual identity of the ATDC. In Zimbabwe, different salary scales are set for different sectors and salary scales in the government are among the highest, while those in the agricultural sector are the lowest. Local workers perceive the Centre as a government program, so assume they should receive higher 'official' salaries. According to our research, most local workers feel their salaries are too low because they understand they are working for a Chinese aid agency whose salary scale should be at least equal that of civil servants in Zimbabwe. At the time of commencing operations, the Chinese staff were unaware of the position regarding salary scales for different categories of workers, and they fixed the lowest salary 170 dollar/month based on the category for general farm hands. This was the then minimum wage in government. 'During the first three years of infrastructure construction,' explained a Chinese staff person, 'the Centre was a grant-aid project and we did pay local workers salary according to public sector wages. But now the situation has changed and it is

the company running the Centre, and all local workers have been hired by the company, not the Centre. So we have to change the nature of employees' contract and fix their salary at the level of agricultural workers.' Thus the 'one institute with two roles' model of ATDC leads to confusion among local farm workers, and creates dissatisfaction. According to our Chinese informants, because they are not satisfied with their income they do not work hard. They have reportedly even occasionally tried to compensate for their low wages by stealing potatoes, soybean and other farm goods.

## **Conclusion**

Through the agricultural technology demonstration Centre model, the Chinese aim to promote the recipient country to increase grain yield, improve access to agricultural technology and enhance food security. The Chinese assistance through ATDCs aims to establish a platform for enterprises to develop in Africa, accelerating agriculture's process of going global, and promoting sustainability of development aid projects. Chinese Agriculture Technology Demonstration Centres are thus designed to be aid programs operated by companies.

In Zimbabwe, this design requires Chinese staff to perform dual roles as aid workers and business people. They are required to seek out potential business opportunities, enlarge the scale of farmland, and expand the domain of their activities. At the same time they have to organize demonstrations, exhibitions and trainings. Imbalances of their inputs on aid and business lead to blurred identities as aid workers and business people. These identities lean more one way or the other depending on the workers' own age, position and educational background. These mixed roles create blurred expectations among Chinese actors, and misunderstandings among local Zimbabwean partners. Different actors engage with ATDC's operations and bring different pressures to the model and to the Chinese staff running it. The Chinese staff struggles to meet the expectations from these actors. In practice, Chinese staff and local partners try to overcome these challenges despite limited capacity and support, but the inherent design of the ATDC model remains a barrier to fully achieving the goal of a financially sustainable Centre contributing to increased food security.

The blurred lines between aid and business have been embedded into China's aid projects. This model contrasts with OECD aid models. The difference comes from China's domestic development experience and continuous review of development aid. This article does not provide evidence to prove that Chinese aid provided through ATDCs is a more effective delivery mode than that used by traditional western donors. However, China's contributions to international aid and development through the ATDC's provides new insights into a field where the perfect aid arrangement remains elusive. China's aid approach is unique and will inevitably undergo modifications through numerous reviews it continues to be subjected to. Chinese engagement worldwide has been anchored on its espoused

principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign countries as well as non-conditionality of aid; the case of the country's aid to Zimbabwe through the agricultural demonstration Centre has presented new paradigms on micro-project operation, interaction and cooperation with locals.

## Reference

A. de Haan. 2011. Will China Change International Development as We Know It? *Journal of International Development*. 23: 881-908

Alden, 2007, *China in Africa*, London: Zed Books

Bautigam & Zhang, 2013, Green Dreams: Myth and Reality in China's Agricultural Investment in Africa, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 34, No. 9, pp 1676-1696

Brautigam & Tang, 2009, China's Engagement in African Agriculture: "Down to the Countryside", *The China Quarterly*, 199, pp 686-706

Langton Mukwereza, 2013, Reviving Zimbabwe's Agriculture: The Role of China and Brazil, *IDS Bulletin* Volume 44 Number 4, pp116-126

Lila Buckley, Chinese Agriculture Development Cooperation in Africa: Narratives and Politics, *IDS Bulletin* Volume 44 Number 4, pp42-52

Power, P., Mohan, G. and Tan-Mullins, M. (2012) *China's Resource Diplomacy in Africa: Powering Development?* Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Xiaoyang [唐晓阳] 'The evolution and effects of Chinese agricultural aid to Africa' ['中国对非洲农业援助形式的演变及其效果'], *World Economics and Politics* [世界经济与政治], May 2013, Issue 5. Beijing: China, pp4-18

## Appendix 4: The Evolution of China's Agricultural Aid to Africa and Its Domestic Roots<sup>9</sup>

Tang Lixia, Li Xiaoyun, Qi Gubo

**Abstract:** China's growing role in agricultural development in Africa has attracted considerable global attention. While the geopolitical motivations behind China's aid have been discussed, the reasons why China changed modalities of agricultural aid over time have been ignored. This article reviews the relations between international and domestic narratives and understanding of China's development experience, and aims to explain the domestic roots of China's agricultural aid to Africa.

**Keywords:** China-Africa cooperation, Agricultural aid, modalities of aid, China development model

### 1. Introduction

China began agricultural aid programmes to Africa at the end of the 1950s. Ever since China offered 10,000t of food aid to Guinea in 1959, the African continent has become the priority area for China's aid. From the 1960s to 1980s, China launched 87 agricultural projects and 16 water conservancy projects in Africa (Tang 2013). African countries have gained half of China's total agricultural aid projects, including agricultural technology stations, extension stations and farms (Wang 2008). In the 1980s and 1990s, despite an aid budget cut, China visited Africa more frequently at high levels to offer new concessional loans and to write off debt of African countries (Li 2010). China's foreign aid programme has gradually evolved since the 1950s, almost coinciding with the evolution of Western foreign aid practices (Li et al. 2014). But before 2005, China's engagements in Africa did not attract international attention because China was labelled as a 'mid-level country' with a tiny impact on international politics (Li A. 2014). Recently, China's increasing engagements with Africa through aid, trade and investment have become a well-documented trend (Scoones et al. 2013). There has been a growing interest in understanding the implications of China's aid to Africa since 2005. This increase in scholarly interest derives largely from the concern that China's brand of aid, in tandem with other financial flows and market dynamics, is making impacts on economic growth and development in Africa (Power et al. 2012). Alden (2007, cited from Buckley, 2013) summarised three primary divergent narratives describing China's engagements in Africa as follows: China as coloniser threatening Africa's development, especially in land and resource-related engagements; economic competitor acting in self-interest; or development partner, emphasising the value of China's development experience

---

<sup>9</sup> This research is co-funded by the China and Brazil in African Agriculture (CBAA) project, China International Development Research Network (CIDRN) research Grants Series supported by DFID and Beijing Youth Elite Programme.

and opportunities for Africa. The scholarly interests in China's engagements with Africa also derive from differences between China and traditional Western donors. Rather than providing budget support to governments and conditioning aid on support for civil and political rights, the Chinese model has consistently emphasised the principles of 'win-win', 'mutual respect', 'friendship' and 'non-interference' (Banik 2013). Therefore, Scoones et al. (2013) argue that Chinese engagements are redefining the aid landscape, moving from a paradigm of development assistance to one of development cooperation mixed with investment.

The common feature of narratives and discourses on China's engagements in Africa is to recognise China as an emerging and rising power on the continent. The political and economic motivations of international aid are considered to be universal and similar in traditional Western and emerging donors. This article recognises the political-economic motivations behind China's aid as being to consolidate and promote relations with African states; to garner business opportunities and resources; and to join more deeply with global governance. However, these factors cannot explain why and how the modalities of China's agricultural aid to Africa have changed over time. Recently, numerous researchers have noticed the interrelation between China's domestic experience and foreign aid policy. Jiang (2008: 61) says that China's external behaviour cannot be understood without attention to China's domestic development. Li et al. (2014) directly contend that China's aid has been consistently developmental, reflecting both the country's own development path and, to a lesser extent, international development goals. This article aims to explain the domestic roots of China's agricultural aid to Africa by analysing internal linkages between China's domestic development actions and modalities of aid in different stages. The article is structured as follows. The second section reviews international and domestic narratives and understandings of China's development experience. In the third to sixth sections interrelations between China's agricultural aid modalities and own development experience in different historic stages will be discussed. Finally, the challenges for China's agricultural aid to Africa will be addressed.

## **2. Narratives of China's Development Experience**

With China's success in economic development and social transformation, global development architecture and academic society restart to discuss the implications of China's development experience for other developing countries. In 2004, the Foreign Policy Centre in London, a famous think tank in the UK, published a paper titled 'Beijing Consensus: Providing A New Model', pointing out that China had explored a development model suited to its national conditions which could be learned by developing countries pursuing their own economic growth and livelihood improvement. After that, a number of international media outlets and economists produced articles saying that, for instance, 'China's rise provides other countries with a strong alternative example to the Western development model', 'other countries can share the fruits of China's economic development', 'China is a good model for developing countries and provides a viable modern model' (Qin 2008) and the Chinese model has a very important reference value for developing countries (Zheng

Y 2009). In this context, at the Global Conference on Poverty Reduction held in Shanghai in May 2004, the World Bank president called upon all countries to share China's experience in poverty alleviation. At the World Economic Forum on Africa in 2006, the President of the African Development Bank repeated that Africa could learn from China's experience (Qin 2008).

African countries also began to turn their eyes on China and have implemented the strategy of 'looking east'. The governments of Zimbabwe and Kenya, for example, proposed to 'look east' in 2005 and 2007 respectively and believed that 'China's experience is more valuable', appealing to learn from China's economic development model (Zhang and Yang 2008). Tanzanian President Kikwete believed that 'China's current successful model of development is a sample pattern of Africa's take-off in future' (Guo et al. 2010). Zafar (2010) argued that under the South-South cooperation framework, Africa can learn from China's rural reform, port management, exchange rate management, foreign investment invitation, food security and conflict management to promote economic development in Africa. Davies (2005, cited from Guo, et al. 2010) a scholar in South Africa, pointed out, 'the industrial zone is the test area for a number of major Chinese industries, similar to the situation in China in the 1980s. China succeeded in attracting foreign investment with special economic zones. The same strategy, I think, has been implemented in Africa'. Nigeria has established several special economic zones, which played a good demonstration role in boosting the economic development of the country. Mauritius has established the first overseas Chinese Special Economic Zone jointly with China.

Some Chinese scholars have also argued that due to common historical experience and developmental challenges, China and Africa can share development experience. For example, Chen (2014) points out that China's rise has provided experience for Africa mainly because China and African countries are all developing countries from the 'Third World', while Lokongo (2013) argues that China and Africa face the same political, economic, technical, safety and social challenges, while China has overcome most of these and become a compelling major power. African countries have shown increasing enthusiasm for learning and sharing China's development experience and some of them have begun practicing the lessons of this experience.

At the same time, China's foreign strategy also pays increasing attention to its experience sharing and promotion. Over the past decade, to strengthen its soft power and increase its voice in the global governance system, China has supported and held a variety of high-level dialogues on development and relevant trainings, and many developing countries have also supported similar exchanges and workshops. There is no doubt that these activities have significantly enhanced the influence of China's development experience in the world (Li X. 2014). Therefore, some scholars have begun to study the relationship between China's foreign aid modalities and national development path. For instance, Tang (2013) believes that China changed its agricultural aid in Africa to commercial assistance based on its own experience, which is closely related to the Chinese market economic reform process.

When it was at the stage of planned economy, of course China mainly provided politics-oriented assistance regardless of cost; when the household contract system was widely implemented in China, however, a similar model was adopted in the development of reclamation area in Africa to encourage farmers' independent planting and operation. Thereafter, when China's agricultural production entered the stage of capitalisation and industrialised operation, corresponding changes also took place in the aid modalities. It was to copy China's domestic development experience in recipient countries that enterprises began to launch agricultural projects with concessional loans, combined technological trainings and market mechanisms. Wang (2012) said that due to China's successful experience in economic development driven by infrastructure construction, China is willing to increase support for infrastructure construction in Africa. Zhou (2010) said that China mainly provided assistance in the area of engineering construction where it has a comparative advantage at the beginning, but it is now turning to support the recipient countries in the construction of social and livelihood facilities as well as education and training bases. While summarising its development experience, China found that investment in education is the shortcut and the only way to development, so it increased the contents of education, training, knowledge dissemination and technology transfer in its foreign assistance. Demonstration and sharing of China's experiences has become an important driving force for China to increase support for Africa because the assistance can help local residents learn specific modern production methods and lifestyles and promote the social transformation (Tang 2013). China's growing agricultural aid, trade and investment activities in Africa help spread China's development experience in Africa (Fan et al. 2010).

### **3. 1960-1980: The Dazhai Model and China's Farms in Africa**

After the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, under the impact of the classic path of modernisation, China was eager to achieve national development through rapid industrialisation, aiming to gradually implement the agricultural cooperation, transform the traditional agriculture, increase agricultural productivity and provide capital for industrial development through agricultural primitive accumulation. Under such an arrangement, China's agricultural output index showed a continuous upward trend from 1952 to 1958. The agricultural GDP increased by 27.8 percent over the base period, and per capita share of grain also increased from 576kg in 1952 to 612kg in 1958 (MOA 1989). The rapid development of China's agriculture attracted wide attention from African countries that had just won national independence. In 1960, for example, one of Guinea's economic advisors said during his visit to China that agricultural cooperation is one of the most important aspects for China to support Guinea, hoping China would help Guinea's farmers improve production yield through cooperation in production (Zhang 2010). As for the 'Ujamaa' movement implemented in Tanzania, for another example, an article interpreting the connotation of 'Standard-Tanzania' said, '... In fact it is a combination of experiences of Israel's kibbutz, China's people's communes and Russia's collective farms' (Zhang and Cai 1981). The People's Commune is an excessive cooperation

model to arrange agricultural inputs and labour, to organise processing management and to allocate harvesting according to working points based on authoritative orders instead of the individual farmer's intentions. This model can promote the use of scarce resources in infrastructure construction required by agricultural development, such as irrigation systems and arable land reclamation. The model ignored individual motivations and assumed that all farmers would contribute their agency driven by collective mobilisations. The farmers' enthusiasm was harmed severely. Before long this model showed institutional obstacles to development. Coupled with natural disasters, in 1960 China's total grain output fell from 200m tons to 143m tons, and in the period from 1958 to 1965, China's agricultural output value dropped from 53.7b yuan to 41.5b yuan, a decrease of 22.7 percent (Wu 1999: 457). When the system remained unchanged, China tried to restore agricultural production, relying on agricultural technology. In 1958, China put forward eight techniques to increase agricultural output, calling this the Eight-Word Constitution on Agriculture; this focused on Land, Fertiliser, Water, Seeds, Close Planting, Plant Protection, Management, and Tools.<sup>10</sup> In the 1960s, the labour-intensive Dazhai agricultural model replacing capital investment was deemed as an alternative for agricultural development, and China began to restore agricultural production.

The Dazhai model soon affected China's agricultural aid to Africa. Dazhai experience 'is the best experience in the world and is of widespread international significance' (Chen Boda, quoted in Jiang 2013). In 1973, Premier Zhou Enlai made special arrangements for Mali's President Moussa Traore to visit a Dazhai. When Zhou Enlai met with the Prime Minister of Guinea in 1972, he suggested that the Prime Minister reform agricultural production with the Eight-Word Constitution and incorporated it into the technical personnel training for China's agricultural aid to Africa. Hua Guofeng said clearly that the agricultural technical personnel for China's agricultural aid to Africa must use the Eight-Word Constitution based on the local situation (Jiang 2013). Chinese agricultural technologies to improve seeds, manure, close planting techniques and small farm tools as well as the gravity irrigation technique were also extended to Africa. At the same time, the management model of mass mobilisation and self-management with public funding was applied to the organisation and management of agricultural production in Africa by relevant technical experts for agricultural aid to Africa. In 1973, Chinese agricultural experts assisted the local government to hold six mobilisation meetings attended by 2,000 people in Ruzizi Reclamation Zone of Zaire (Congo-Kinshasa), asked local farmers to sow with hand tools provided by China, and completed cotton planting of more than 7,000ha, with an increase of 2,077ha over 1972. In Burkina Faso, Togo, Rwanda and Senegal, the agricultural technical personnel for China's aid to Africa reclaimed land 'mainly

---

<sup>10</sup> The Eight-Word Constitution: 'Land (deep ploughing, soil improvement, soil survey and land use planning), fertiliser (rational fertilisation), water (development of water resources and rational use of water), seeds (promotion of improved seeds), close (rational close planting), protection (plant protection, pest control), management (field management) and tools (tools reform)'. These eight words constitute the basic experience of China's agricultural development.



relying on farmers, supplemented by public aid', which reduced the construction cost of farmland. In Burkina Faso, the cost of land reclamation dropped from 5,280 yuan/ha to 1,515 yuan/ha, and in Senegal the cost was only 720-1,200 yuan/ha, one-fifth of what was input by the World Bank in a similar project (Jiang 2013).

In the 1970s, China began to include the Taiwan issue in the scope of foreign aid. African countries, such as Senegal, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Congo (Kinshasa) and Niger, established diplomatic relations with China on condition that China take over Taiwanese African agricultural aid projects. In 1971, China began to replace Taiwan's agricultural teams and extended its agricultural assistance to 18 African countries.<sup>11</sup> By then, agricultural assistance in Africa had systematically evolved into the main content of China's aid to Africa, and China wanted to transfer to Africa its basic agricultural production technology system with cooperative and collectivised agricultural production and the Eight-Word Constitution as its core.

The main reason for the direct application of the Chinese agricultural development pattern in Africa was that China's perception of Africa was based on the basic assumption of a similar foundation for the development of China and Africa. First, the backwardness of China and Africa was in both cases a result of similar historical experiences of colonial exploitation, as Zhou Enlai stressed in his speech when he met with President Sanger of Senegal in 1974: 'China and Senegal are both developing countries and belong to the Third World. Our people have both long suffered from the aggression, slavery, oppression and exploitation of colonialism and imperialism, and have the same historical experience' (Xinhua 1974). Second, both China and Africa have rich land resources. It should also be suitable for Africa to set up farms similar to the state-owned ones in China. Third, most African countries had implemented state-owned economic systems similar to that of China. Information and knowledge about Taiwanese agricultural aid to Africa also prompted the Chinese government to transfer Chinese agricultural technology to Africa. At that time, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation believed that Taiwan's agricultural aid to Africa, characterised by overall control, monopoly technology, operation by workers, dependence on international markets and mechanical tillage, was ineffective (Jiang 2013). Through introducing agricultural production models similar to the Dazhai model, China provided assistance for the expansion of rice area by nearly 50,000ha in 14 African countries with a total output exceeding 70,000t, but this attempt did not make African countries embark on the self-reliant development path of agricultural production. After the agricultural technical experts came back, the farms developed by China in Africa soon fell into the awkward situation of 'quick implementation, quick effect and quick collapse' (Yun 2000). Agricultural technologies introduced by Chinese expertise cannot match

---

<sup>11</sup> Other key countries were Tanzania, Zambia, Guinea and Congo (Brazzaville), which established diplomatic relations with the PRC in the 1960s. The 18 countries included Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Congo (Brazzaville), Senegal, Chad, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Madagascar, Niger, Mauritius, etc.

African farmers' experience and recognition, and thus adoption of Chinese technology was quite low in Africa (Tang 2013). Furthermore, the expansion of the Dazhai model by conditioning fruitful labour resources, traditional farming experience and labour-intensive agricultural technologies was promoted by powerful central authorities and social mobilisation mechanisms. It was extremely difficult for it to survive without its special social settings and could not be replicated in Africa (Jiang 2013). Even in China the Dazhai model failed to be applied to the whole country to promote China's agricultural development. The agricultural growth at this stage mainly resulted from the first land reform, through which the individual farmers were allocated pieces of land and were motivated because throughout China's history most farmers did not own land and could only rent from landlords. The Dazhai model contradicted the principle of the first land reform and proved to be a failure thereafter. That is why China launched the second land reform in the late 1970s, which ended the extension of the Dazhai model. The misunderstanding of China's domestic development experience and the adoption of the Dazhai model in Africa led up to final failure.

#### **4. 1980s: The Household Responsibility System and Adjustment of China's Aid**

In the late 1970s, because of the institutional barriers of the extreme cooperative agricultural model and collectivisation, China's agriculture ran into troubles. According to national statistics, from 1958 to 1978 the per capita value of agricultural output only increased by 2.7 percent annually and annual growth of per capita agricultural grain yield was 0.3 percent; from 1973 to 1977, about 43 percent of total provinces encountered food scarcity, which affected 50.15 percent of the rural population, or 390m people (Zhou and Gao 1993). In 1978, the poverty rate was 30.7 percent (250m people) in rural areas. Obviously, the collective-based agricultural production system had failed to promote China's agricultural development. The family-based agricultural system was considered to be triggered by the success of a test in a village in Anhui province and historical experience during the first land reform. China subsequently launched the Household Responsibility System (HRS) to allocate land-use rights and residual income rights to households.

Under the HRS, the agricultural land controlled by the former collectives was contracted to individual households. Households agree to meet certain grain production quotas and tax obligations in exchange for use rights to specific plots of land. Once they have met their quota obligations, households are generally free to determine what crops to grow and to whom to sell their produce. This allocation of use rights to individual households has spurred the decentralisation of markets for agricultural products and services (Krusekopf 2002). Upon the adoption of the HRS in the early 1980s, China's agriculture developed rapidly. From 1979 to 1984, China's domestic agricultural output rose by 355.4 %, food production rose from 304.77m tons in 1978 to 407.31m tons in 1984, with an average annual increase of 17.09m tons, up 4.95 percent; and the per capita income of farmers increased by 176.2 yuan. At that stage, the motivation of Chinese agricultural growth was from institutional innovations characterised by household contract responsibility and the contribution

was about 46.89 percent (Lin 1982).

At the same time, numerous state-owned farms also adopted the HRS to turn losses into profits. Before the HRS's introduction, Gansu provincial farms had been running at a loss since 1956, and in 1979 the total loss was about 18.25m yuan. In the 1980s the food grain output increased by 23 percent, oil grain output increased by 54 percent and the total loss decreased to 5.45m due to adoption of the HRS (Yu 1981). In some Liaoning state-owned farms, the yield of food grain increased by 31.8 percent and per capita income increased by 99%, driven by the HRS (MOA 1983). The HRS gradually became the basic agricultural production system.

The success of the HRS in rural and state-owned farms enlightened China's policymakers to solve problems in agricultural aid projects in Africa and to improve aid effectiveness. In 1985, China sent agricultural experts to help to reform the three paddy fields built in Burkina Faso. Learning from the practice of the HRS in China, the ownership of farmland still belonged to the state but the administrative rights were allocated to farmers. The farmers can cultivate land and gain harvest with supervision of Chinese agricultural experts. In 1987, the total rice yield was about 176m tons, the yield per hectare was about 10.5t (double cropping rice) and the per household income was about US\$1,300-2,600 in the three farms (Zhang 2013: 169-170). This model was successively applied to the Chinese supported Lubendi Farm in Rwanda, Luwama and Afeifei Farms in Ghana and Luoge and Saibaili Farms in Niger, among others. After the Chinese agricultural technicians left, these farms still developed well for years (Zhou and Wang 1997). Tang (2013) summarised the main features of this model: China's government offered the financial resources to construct required irrigation infrastructure and to purchase agricultural machinery. The local government participated in the management and organisation of local farmers to rent the farm. Chinese agricultural experts supervised local farmers who rent or contract the farm to prepare land, cultivate, manage the field and harvest. The two governments would not burden themselves with long-term economic inputs and the farmers' agencies on agricultural production can be motivated. This model can prolong sustainability of agricultural aid projects.

Inspired by the successful application of the responsibility system in these aid projects and the failure of the application of the previous agricultural cooperation and collectivisation mode for big farm and experimental station building, the Chinese government re-examined the mode of agricultural aid to Africa. Meanwhile, due to the decrease in the total aid budget at that time, the Chinese government reduced assistance for large-scale farm building, but mainly dispatched agricultural technical experts to support the reform of operating mode and explore new ways to improve its agricultural aid to Africa, aiming at promoting the independent development of African countries. The reform of the contract system, however, did not completely solve the problem of sustainable development of China's agricultural aid to Africa. After the Chinese experts came back, some agricultural aid projects reformed through leasing, cooperative or contract operation by the Chinese government witnessed a vicious cycle of 'building – transfer – suspension – re-investment –

re-transfer – re-suspension’ (Li et al. 2012: 232), such as Kindia Farm in Guinea and Mba Larry Farm and Mali Sugar Factory in Tanzania.

## **5. 1990s: Market-Driven Development and Reform of China’s Aid**

From early 1990s to the beginning of this century, based on the formation of the mutually beneficial assistance framework under China’s market economy system, the market gradually replaced the government to play a fundamental role in allocating resources. China carried out, on the one hand, a market economic system reform, separated government functions from enterprise management and reformed state-owned enterprises. On the other hand, China tried to attract foreign direct investment by establishing wholly foreign-funded companies, joint ventures and cooperative businesses, and foreign investment became a driving force of China’s economic growth. From 1992 to 1998, foreign investment’s contribution to China’s economic growth exceeded 15 percent (Wang 1999). At that time, China’s market-oriented reform was not limited to the economic sphere, but spread to public services, especially agricultural technology promotion. In the late 1980s, China launched the commercial and marketisation reform of the agricultural extension system and permitted agricultural technology research and promotion agencies to provide commercial technical services, such as sales of improved varieties and fertilisers (Huang et al. 2001), to promote self-support by fee-based services of agricultural technology promotion departments (Mei 2005).

Market-driven developments did not stay within Chinese borders; they moved to Africa through aid. In China’s aid architecture, the market-driven reforms have been applied within two approaches.

First, the companies which were required to implement Chinese aid projects were controlled and managed by administrative authorities in the 1980s. The companies performed as semi-governmental institutes. In the 1990s, these companies were reformed into real and independent market actors, involved in market competition. At the same time they remained the main forces to undertake China’s aid projects. For example, in 1980, the Ministry of Agriculture constructed a China-Farm Company to undertake agricultural aid projects. In 1994, the China-Farm Company became an independent commercial company. Promoted by its aid experience in Africa, the China-Farm Company started to invest in commercial farms, investing in some nine farms in six African countries.

Second, market-oriented reform was introduced in the operation of aid projects. Since 1984, China Foreign Economic and Trade Company had provided technical support for cooperative management of the earlier built Mali Sugar Factory, but it remained difficult to improve the business situation. China Foreign Economic and Trade Company signed a partnership contract with Mali in 1996 and established the Complexe Sucrier Du Kala Superieur SA, based on Mali Sugar Factory, with the Chinese party holding 60 percent of the shares. After the restructuring, the joint venture had a total of 4,500 employees, reaching 7,000 in the harvest season (Zhou 2013: 25); the sugar output reached 330,000t; and the company could pay more than

€3m in taxes to Mali's government per year (Zhong 2004). Similar cases include the China-Zambia Friendship Farm project of China State Farms (Group) Corporation in Zambia and 23 fisheries cooperation projects implemented by Chinese aquaculture in 13 African countries (Yun 2000). In 1996, the African Agricultural Development Centre established by the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture cooperated with the Guinean Ministry of Agriculture and jointly invested in a China-Guinea Agricultural Cooperative Company. China owned 80 percent of shares. The company constructed a 2,000ha farm and cultivated hybrid rice. The yield of hybrid rice was about 3,000t every year. The company also invested in chicken raising and a series of workshops including small-scale feedstuff, plastic bags, rice processing and agricultural machinery maintenance. Several years later, this company sustained and gained good profits. It provided the local market with plenty of agricultural products, trained numerous local agricultural technicians and displayed Chinese agricultural technology and farming systems (Tang 2013). Meanwhile, many African countries also believe that foreign investment invitation is a more effective development mode compared with the traditional farming aid between governments, and hope to get more investment (Zhou 2013: 26). Expectations of African countries, China's own development experience and the sustained effect of the market-based mechanisms introduced by agricultural assistance projects made the Chinese government believe that the use of the enterprise management model has a positive effect on the implementation of agricultural aid projects. Thus, China has gradually developed a market-oriented system for its agricultural aid to Africa.

The reformation of the market-oriented aid system has promoted the overseas expansion of Chinese companies. Some agricultural companies which carried out Chinese aid programs later became the main forces in China's overseas investment. At the same time, the marketisation reform of Chinese aid programmes also resulted in blurred lines between business-seeking and public service. The market mechanism adopted in aid programmes has changed the nature of aid projects. The aid projects became pure enterprises and lost their functions of demonstration and technology service. As a result, the international community began to criticise China for the commercialisation of its foreign aid and the lack of social responsibility of Chinese enterprises, and China's foreign aid in Africa faced difficulty in balancing business and public interests (Zhang 2012).

The international community believes that China provides market-oriented foreign aid in Africa in order to expand its overseas market, but they have ignored the internal relationship between China's aid modalities in Africa and its domestic development path; ignored the fact that China's foreign aid policy is actually an extension of its domestic development model; reversed the causality between aid and marketisation; and ignored the fact that the marketisation of China's aid in Africa is based on China's own development experience and the real logic that the market mechanism serves foreign aid. In 1995, the work conference on the reform of foreign aid organised by the Chinese government clarified that 'we encourage Chinese enterprises to implement foreign aid projects through launching joint ventures,

cooperative enterprises or wholly Chinese-funded enterprises' in order to 'apply China's successful experience in market-oriented reform to its assistance to the recipient countries', 'expand the sources of funding and project scale and improve the effectiveness of assistance' (Wang 2001: 168-169).

## **6. The Twenty-First Century: China's Agricultural Development Experience and the ATDCs**

Since the beginning of this century, a pro-poor development strategy giving priority to agricultural development has turned China into the world's second largest economy and the country with the most significant decrease in the number of poverty-stricken people. Meanwhile, a development contract has formed between China and the African continent. However, the improved varieties, biotechnology, high subsidies and mechanisation mode adopted by China to accelerate its agricultural development are obviously incompatible with the current development stage of Africa, and China's development practice cannot be transferred directly to Africa.

Yet even with the current development gap between China and Africa, China's development experience appears to be attractive to African countries because of their common history. And China has laid a foundation for the transfer of its development mode to Africa after three decades of development. In 2006, Hu Jintao said at the summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation that 'we both respect the development path independently chosen by the other and earnestly learn from each other's development experience'. The core of China's development experience is the strategy of giving priority to agriculture, while 'relying on policy and science and technology', as stated by Deng Xiaoping in 1982, is the core of China's experience in agricultural development (Li et al. 2012: 61).

Technology is the driving force of China's agricultural growth. The Chinese government supports the agricultural technology system and the extension system and promotes the application of new technologies and new varieties, which is the main reason for rapid agricultural development (Zafar 2010). Many studies in China have shown the role of technological progress in boosting agricultural growth. Improved varieties can increase production by 8-12 percent; increasing fertiliser and improved fertilisation methods can increase production by 16 percent; improved farming methods and cultivation techniques can increase production by 4-8 percent; and the implementation of pest control technique can make up production losses by 10-20 percent (Li 1989). According to Hu (2013), from 1978 to 2010, technological progress contributed 51.9 percent to agricultural development in China. From the Sixth Five-Year Plan period to the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period, technological progress contributed to China's agricultural development at contribution rates of, in each five-year period, 34.84 percent, 27.66 percent, 34.28 percent, 45.16 percent, 48 percent and 53 percent (Lu and Yu 2013). Technological progress made an increasing contribution to agricultural growth while the contribution of institutional change

began to show a downtrend (Qiao 2006).

Even though this modern agricultural technology adoption also induced soil degeneration and pollution due to abusing of fertiliser and pesticide, in China's authoritative narratives new technology has been perceived as a primary indicator to promote China's agricultural development. In 1991, China started to implement the strategy of 'developing agriculture through science, technology and education' (科教兴农). In 1997, China emphasised the importance of this strategy again. In 1998, China's central government stated that the developmental promotion of agriculture derived from science, technology and education absolutely. In 2002, China announced this strategy again. In the following years of 2005, 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2014, each Document No. 1 of the central authorities, which is the primary development guideline in China, pointed out that the Chinese government would support agricultural technology innovation and adoption. For example, Document No. 1 in 2014 stated that agricultural science and technology is the supportive pillar for food security and a crucial factor to modern agriculture.

The effect of emphasis on agricultural science and technology is obvious: The improved varieties adoption rates of all main crops in China reached 100 percent; food crop varieties change every six or seven years on average; and new varieties usually increase production by 15 percent or so (Zhang, 2008; cited from Li Xiaoyun, Qi Gubo, Tang Lixia, etc. 2012). One-third of the existing farmland in the country and 2/3 of domestic sown area were covered by the multiple cropping system; the multiple cropping index increased from 128 percent in 1949 to 158 percent, even 250 percent in some areas; and the land use rate and agricultural production capacity were significantly improved (Zhang, 2004; cited from Li Xiaoyun, Qi Gubo, Tang Lixia, etc. 2012). China's rice yield reached 6.4t/ha, while this figure in Africa was only 2t. With less than 10 percent of the world's arable land, China fed more than 20 percent of the world's people, and the self-sufficiency rate of food reached 95 percent (Zafar 2010). In sub-Saharan Africa, however, the proportion of improved varieties in the sown area of major crops such as rice, wheat, maize, sorghum, cassava and potato remained the lowest in the world (World Bank 2007, cited from Li Xiaoyun, Qi Gubo, Tang Lixia, etc. 2012). The proportion of well promoted new maize and wheat varieties only reached 40 percent and 60 percent respectively, while those of rice, sorghum, cassava and potatoes reached 22 percent, 17 percent, 19 percent and 15 percent respectively. In Africa, 90 percent of the agricultural production still relies on the use of simple hand tools; pesticides and fertilisers are not widely used; and agricultural mechanisation and irrigation levels are rather low (Yao 2002). In spite of that, the fact that pesticides are not widely used in Africa is arguably a good thing. Pesticides and fertilisers are used much too heavily in China, which also has its downsides in terms of pollution and public health. But from the yield perspective, suitable usage of pesticides and fertiliser is required.

The severe food security issue in Africa stems from complicated factors including colonial heritage, lack of agricultural inputs, poor governmental efforts and harsh natural conditions. China's governmental discourse on the rationality of agricultural

cooperation in Africa derives from a perception of the significance of technology, and it makes very clear that China's agricultural aid in Africa must focus on technological cooperation. 'China's African Policy Paper', for example, clearly states that China must:

focus on strengthening the cooperation in the field of land development, planting and farming techniques, food security, agricultural machinery and agricultural processing. We should strengthen agricultural technical cooperation, actively hold agricultural technology trainings and establish agricultural technology experimental and demonstration projects in Africa (MoFA, 2006).

The Letter of Intent for South-South Cooperation signed between China and FAO puts forward that 'China should provide Africa with investment, tools and equipment by sending 3,000 experts there in order to introduce relevant technologies suitable for local areas and improve the productivity of small producers as soon as possible'. The agricultural aid in Africa put forward by the follow-up actions of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum in 2006, 2009 and 2012 all focus on technological cooperation and aim at demonstrating and promoting China's agricultural technologies, including dispatching experts, establishing agricultural technology demonstration centres (ATDCs), holding agricultural technological trainings and dispatching technical experts for South-South agricultural cooperation. So far, China has basically established the agricultural technology-based African agricultural aid system and framework, in which the ATDC model is the most important part.

The ATDC model bears three features. First, demonstration centres must have attractive new technologies that can be demonstrated. Second, demonstration centres should have the ability to hold trainings for local farmers. Third, demonstration centres should maintain sustainable operation after the Chinese government stops funding (Tang 2013; Bräutigam and Tang 2009). In policy design for the centres, to guarantee the demonstration function of the centres, only agricultural enterprises or research institutes with certain qualifications, outstanding performance and certain cooperation or development experience in Africa can be selected as the construction units.

Therefore, agricultural science and technology strength is an important indicator for the selection of demonstration centre construction units. At present, among the selected 22 construction units, 18 are agricultural agencies, including two provincial agricultural universities, one national agricultural research institution, one provincial agricultural research institution, eight state-owned agricultural enterprises and six private companies (four provincial or ministerial agricultural enterprises and two private companies that have invested in agriculture in many African countries). These institutions have the technical capacity for agricultural demonstration. Four of the units are non-agricultural enterprises, but have experience investing in Africa and have established a formal cooperative relationship with the agricultural research institutes or leading agricultural enterprises in their local province, which provide



technical support. For example, the construction unit of the Sudan Demonstration Centre, China Shandong International Economic and Technical Cooperation Group Ltd, cooperated with Shandong Academy of Agricultural Sciences.

According to some official discourse, demonstration centres bear the function of promoting enterprises to go global. In one workshop about ATDCs organized by Chinese MoA and MoFCOM in Beijing in 2013, a senior official stated that:

It is risky to invest in overseas agriculture as the investment is big and the return period is long. Therefore, the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Agriculture designed such a mechanism. In the project construction period and technical cooperation stage, the government will provide a certain amount of funds for project undertaking units to look for competitive and experienced enterprises to jointly promote Chinese agricultural enterprises to go global. Demonstration centre is the gateway and window for Chinese agricultural enterprises to go global and provides an opportunity for the enterprises that are willing to go global....

[However,] demonstration centres must have core technology. Many domestic agricultural technologies have a history of a few decades or even more than one thousand years, which are also needed at abroad. We need to promote these technologies and boost the development of demonstration centres on this basis. It is doubtful whether the demonstration centres without core technology will develop well and achieve commercialised operation. Some demonstration centres and construction units engage themselves in agricultural trading, agricultural technology sales and even real estate development, but these can only be sideline business of demonstration centres.

Thus, under China's policy framework, although the demonstration centre has the function of promoting enterprises to go global, its core function is still to demonstrate and promote China's agricultural technologies.

During his visit to China's agricultural demonstration centre in Zimbabwe, former Minister of Commerce Chen Deming pointed out that in 2013:

The centre must appropriately develop breeding industry and introduce China's biogas technology or farmers' small-scale biogas digesters technology to Zimbabwe because this country has good weather conditions. We'll also consider introducing China's agricultural machinery maintenance technology here to support the maintenance of agricultural machinery in Zimbabwe (field diary from author in 2013).

When talking about the functions of the demonstration centre, Zimbabwe's Minister of Agriculture said:

It is a demonstration centre established on the basis of farm machinery. It is very good. Farmers can see and learn how to use the agricultural machinery. I

hope the centre will become a training base for domestic agricultural technicians, university teachers and students, who will then hold trainings for farmers in their local areas. The centre promotes the experimental planting of potatoes here, which is totally new in our country. Of course I don't mean it is a new species. In the past, we took potato as a staple food. Potato was only an important food crop for us and could not bring income for farmers. But things are different now. French fries and potato chips are popular and potato has become a cash crop. The demonstration centre can increase income of farmers through promoting potatoes. I know a farmer living 300 km away specially came here to study after he was told there was potato planting machinery here. I am very pleased to see the demonstration centre can promote some potato planting machinery (interviewed by author in 2013 in Zimbabwe).

At present, 14 demonstration centres have completed the first phase infrastructure construction and entered the stage of technical cooperation. Every demonstration centre is equipped with offices, training classrooms and dormitory buildings and has a farm of 50-100ha. Most of the agricultural centres have implemented experimental, demonstration and promotion projects of planting or breeding and held trainings on the use of hybrid crop production technology, animal and plant protection technologies, facility agricultural technology and agricultural mechanisation technology (Zhou 2013), indicating that technology demonstration, training and promotion have become the common activities of demonstration centres.

## **7. Conclusion**

The modalities of China's agricultural assistance to Africa have been constantly adjusted and changed. What has never changed is the original intention of achieving development of African countries, which share similar development stages and history with China, by bestowing China's development experience. Some scholars believe that China's agricultural development policy and technical system based on smallholders will bring opportunities for agricultural development in Africa (Li et al. 2013; Fan et al. 2010), and some African countries also believe that China's experience is conducive to their development. Kenya's Vice President said:

China has a big population but less arable land. China can feed its people. Then, in Africa we have large tracts of land and less population, but we suffer from food deficiency.... Now that means we have to learn a lesson from China. (cited from Alden 2013)

Ethiopia is now copying China's experience in economic development zones and learning from the comprehensive poverty alleviation programs in rural China. So far, however, none of the African countries learning from China's experience have made the same development achievements as China. It is naïve to believe that replicating some of China's development policies will enable poor countries to develop as China.

China's success is rooted in its unique social, cultural and political environment and no country can replicate this (Ravallion, 2009). The former President of Madagascar argued that Africa can learn from China but cannot copy China's experience due to different country profiles (Tao 2009). The Chinese government should also be cautious to avoid universalising its unique development experience and exhibiting a superiority complex when China shares this experience with other developing countries (Li X, 2014).

The Chinese government's ability to mobilise; its history of agricultural production technology; its technology promotion system with strong support from government subsidies; as well as its complete industrial system based on agricultural inputs are important prerequisites for the fast extension of new Chinese agricultural technologies. In most African countries it is not easy to find these systems. Although a final judgment cannot be given on whether Chinese agricultural technology can be recognised, accepted and adopted by African smallholders, some Chinese institutions have begun to promote Chinese farming technology extension and adoption in some villages. It is doubtful whether local farmers would adopt such technology without Chinese interventions. China's aid modality of attaching sole importance to the dissemination of technology without considering social and cultural factors for technology extension has also restricted the diffusion of Chinese technology, to some extent. From the 1960s to 1980s, China attempted to promote extension and adoption of agricultural technology in Africa, only to find it was a failure. The ATDC model has gained broad international attention and high expectations from African countries, but thus far it is difficult to find evidence for successful technology transfer to Africa.

## References

- Alden, 2013, China and the Long March into African Agriculture, *Cahiers Agricultures*, Vol 22 (1): 16-21
- Banik, D. (2013) 'China and Poverty Reduction in Africa', in Yu, G. (ed), *Rethinking Law and Development: The Chinese Experience*, London, UK: Routledge
- Bräutigam, D. and Tang X. (2009) 'China's Engagement in African Agriculture: Down to the Countryside', *China Quarterly*, 199:686-706
- Buckley, L. (2013) 'Chinese Agriculture Development Cooperation in Africa: Narratives and Politics', *IDS Bulletin*, 44(4):42-52
- Chen, 2014, The Meaning of China's Development Model for Other Developing Countries, *Teaching and Researching*, No.2
- Fan S., Nestorova, B. and Olofinbiyi, T. (2010) *China's Agricultural and Rural Development: Implications for Africa*, Keynote Address at the China-DAC Study Group on Agriculture, Food Security and Rural Development, April 27-28, Bamako, Mali: Development Assistance Committee, Organisation for Economic Co-operation

and Development

Guo Q., Ren F. and Zhu S. (2010) 'Chinese Model has a Certain Universality', *Academia*, 2010(4)

Hu K. (2013) 'Measurement and Analysis of the Contribution Rate of Agricultural Science and Technology Progress in China: 1978-2010', *Business Studies*, 2013(6)

Huang J., Qiao F., Zhang L. and Rozelle, S. (2001) *Farm Pesticides, Rice Production, and Human Health in China*. Research Report 2001-RR3, Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre

Jiang H. (2013) 'Agricultural Aid to Africa (1971-1983): Case Study on the Model and Effectiveness of China's Aid to Africa', *Foreign Affairs Review*, 2013(1):31-49

Jiang W. (2008) 'China's Emerging Strategic Partnership in Africa', in Rotberg, R.I. (ed), *China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence*, Washington DC, USA: Brookings Institution Press

Justin, Yifu Lin, Rural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in China, *the American Economic Review*, 1992, Vol 82 No.1: 34-51

Krusekopf, C.C. (2002) 'Diversity in Land-Tenure Arrangements under the Household Responsibility System in China', *China Economic Review*, 13(2):297-312

Li A. (2014) 'Discourse Evolution in China-Africa Relationship Research', *World Economy and Politics*, 2014(2)

Li X. (2014) 'Do Not Fall into the Trap of Misunderstanding in Sharing China's Experience', *Huanqiu Opinion*, 28 October / [opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion\\_china/2014-09/5149308.html](http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_china/2014-09/5149308.html)

Li A. (2010) 'China's Aid to Africa: A Narrative of US Scholars', *Foreign Affairs Review*, 2010(5):12-19

Li X. (1989) 'It is the Fundamental Way to Accelerate Agricultural Development to Rely on Scientific and Technological Progress', *Forum on Science and Technology in China*, 1989(5)

Li X., Banik, D., Tang L. and Wu J. (2014), 'Difference or Indifference: China's Development Assistance Unpacked', *IDS Bulletin*, 45(4):22-35

Li X., Qi G., Tang L., Zhao L., Jin L., Guo Z. and Wu J. (2012) *Agricultural Development in China and Africa: A Comparative Analysis*, London, UK: Routledge

Li X., Tang L., Xu X., Qi G. and Wang H. (2013) 'What Can Africa Learn from China's Experience in Agricultural Development?', *IDS Bulletin*, 44(4):31-41

Antoine Roger Lokongo (2013) 'Reflection on the Legacy of Colonialism in Africa', *World Economics and Politics*, 2013(9)

Lu W. and Yu X. (2013) 'China's Agricultural Science and Technology Progress and the Growth of Farmers' Income', *Academic Journal of Zhejiang University (Social Science)*, 2013(7)

- Mei L. (2005) 'A Case Study of Chinese Agro-Technical Extension System', *Acta Agriculturae Slovenica*, 85:429-442
- MOA (1989) *China's Rural Economic Statistics Encyclopedia (1949-1986)*, Beijing, China: Department of Planning, Ministry of Agriculture
- MOA (1983) *The Investigation of Dayou Farm in Liaoning Province*. State-Owned Farm Economic Documents No. 3, Beijing, China: Ministry of Agriculture
- MOFA, China's African Policy Paper, 2006,  
[http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_chn/ziliao\\_611306/tytj\\_611312/zcwj\\_611316/t230612.shtml](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ziliao_611306/tytj_611312/zcwj_611316/t230612.shtml), (accessed 2 April 2013)
- Power, P.; Mohan, G. and Tan-Mullins, M. (2012) *China's Resource Diplomacy in Africa: Powering Development?*, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan
- Qiao Z. (2006) 'China's Rural Economic System Changes and Agricultural Growth: Empirical Analysis of China's Agricultural Growth in the Period from 1978 to 2004', *Economic Review*, 2006(7)
- Qin X. (2008) 'China Model in International Narratives', *Journal of China Renmin University*, 2008(4)
- Ravallion, 2009, Are There Lessons for Africa from China's Success Against Poverty? *World Development*, vol 37 (2): 303–313
- Scoones, I., Cabral, L. and Tugendhat, H. (2013) 'New Development Encounters: China and Brazil in African Agriculture', *IDS Bulletin*, 44(4):1-19
- Tang X. (2013) 'Evolution of the Forms of China's Agricultural Aid to Africa and Its Effect', *World Economics and Politics*, 2013(5):55-69
- Tao W. (2009) 'China Development Model in Africa', *International Issue Research*, 2009(1)
- Wang S. (2012) 'Experiences and Prospects of China's Infrastructure Construction Assistance in Africa', *International Economic Cooperation*, 2012(12)
- Wang C. (2008) 'New Modalities of China Agricultural Aid to Africa', *International Economy and Cooperation*, 2008(4)
- Wang C. (2001) *China High-Level Strategy: International Affairs*, Linfen, China: Shanxi Normal University Press
- Wang X. (1999) 'Contribution of Foreign Direct Investment to China's Economic Growth', *Foreign Economy and Management*, 1999(3):1-6
- Wu L. (1999) *Economic History of the People's Republic of China*, Vol. 1, Beijing, China: China Economic Publishing House
- Xinhua (1974) 'Premier Zhou Enlai's Speech at the Welcome Dinner for President Sanger', *Xinhua News Agency*, 6 May
- Yao G. (2002) 'Causes of Agricultural Crisis in Africa', *West Asia and Africa*, 2002(3)
- Yu (1981) The HRS issue in State-owned farm, State-Owned Farm Economic Documents No. 34, Beijing, China: Ministry of Agriculture

- Yun W. (2000) 'China's Agricultural Aid to Africa from the Perspective of the Development of International Assistance', *West Asia and Africa*, 2000(2):17-23
- Zafar, A. (2010) *Learning from the Chinese Miracle: Development Lessons for Sub-Saharan Africa*. Policy Research Working Paper 5216, Washington DC, USA: The World Bank
- Zhang J. (2013) 'China's Aid to Africa', in Zhou H. (ed), *Six Decades of China's Foreign Aid*, Beijing, China: Social Sciences Academic Press, 87-146
- Zhang H. (2012) 'Strategic Balance of China's Aid in Africa', *West Asia and Africa*, 2012(3)
- Zhang J. (2010) 'Aid with No Strings Attached: Formation of China's Aid Policy for Africa', *Foreign Affairs Review*, 2010(5):20-34
- Zhang B. (2009) 'Rethinking Land Reform System in China', *Economy of Special Economic Zone*, 2009(4)
- Zhang S. and Cai L. (1981) 'Tanzania's Ujamaa Movement', *West Asia and Africa*, 1981(5):28-33
- Zhang M. and Yang S. (2008) 'Africa's "Looking East": Opportunities and Challenges for China', *Contemporary World*, 2008(12)
- Zheng Y. (2009) 'Chinese Model in the International Development Pattern', *Chinese Social Science*, 2009(5)
- Zhong Q. (2004) 'Embroidery Training in Africa', *People's Daily Overseas Edition*, 5 August
- Zhou H. (2013) 'China's Foreign Aid Policy and Mechanism', in Zhou H. (ed), *Six Decades of China's Foreign Aid*, Beijing, China: Social Sciences Academic Press, 1-33
- Zhou H. (2010) 'Retrospect and Prospect of China's Six Decades of Foreign Aid', *Foreign Affairs Review*, 2010(5)
- Zhou B. and Gao H. (1993) 'Research on Poverty Issue and Poverty Reduction', *Economic Development Forum*, 1993(1)
- Zhou J. and Wang Q. (1997) 'Study of Agricultural Aid to Africa under the New Situation', *International Economic Cooperation*, 1997(3):9-11

*Tang Lixia and Dan Banik\*\**

### **Abstract**

China's growing presence in in developing countries around the world – especially in Africa under framework of South-South cooperation – has received widespread attention. We identify and analyze specific trends and mechanisms that characterize China's current international development strategy and practice, in particular the role and impact of Chinese companies operating both within and outside the Chinese aid architecture in Africa. We discuss emerging trends in China's development assistance and investments strategy in Africa based on empirical evidence from Malawi – which is particularly interesting as it is one of the poorest countries in the world and a recent recipient of Chinese development assistance. We argue that the conventional development assistance model is rapidly changing and the Chinese government has had to adapt to newer circumstances and more complex demands for more long-term oriented help from local actors. In the absence of a development agency that can coordinate requests for aid and monitor the implementation of various projects, private companies are offering various forms of assistance to the Chinese government – including feasibility studies before projects are officially sanctioned. Chinese companies are now increasingly aware of their role as providers of knowledge and expertise, which in turn is providing the new contours to new forms of public-private partnership.

**Keywords:** foreign aid, China, Malawi, infrastructure, private sector, poverty

### **Introduction**

China's growing presence in international development aid, trade and investment – especially in Africa under framework of South-South cooperation – has received widespread attention. The academic discourse on the topic has variously described China as an 'emerging donor', a 'neo-colonizer', a provider of much-needed capital, and a counterweight to the models promoted by the Global North. Some parts of this discourse is intended to highlight hidden motives behind China's interest in Africa, and accordingly there are numerous on-going discussions that point to China's need to secure natural resources for its growing market, and to out-compete its rivals in developing and developed societies. Other scholars have shed more light on China's role as the provider of an alternative approach to development – one where it is capable of turning a poor country into a rich one based on its own rich experience with economic growth and poverty reduction.

Despite growing scholarly interest in the topic, Hanauer and Morris (2014)

---

<sup>12</sup> The Research Council of Norway has funded this research. The Beijing Young Elite Programme and CIDRN network

argue that the scope, scale and mode of Chinese aid practices are not adequately understood in Western settings and often misquoted in the press. In an earlier work, one of us (Banik 2013) identified a set of factors that complicate efforts to better understand the Chinese perspective. These include the lack of empirically oriented fieldwork at local levels, the general lack of contact and communication between foreign scholars and local Chinese actors, and the dearth of good impact analyses and evaluations of Chinese aid. Another important factor in this context is the inability of academic research to keep track of the recent socioeconomic and political developments within policymaking in China, which in turn has frequently shaped and re-shaped the country's international policies and strategies in recent years. Indeed, there has been a considerable amount of scholarly attention on the non-interference and non-conditional principles as alternative approach to western traditional aid (Tull 2006), experiments with tied aid, and the growing challenge to Western political and economic dominance posed by China's rise (Mawdsley 2007). Much to our surprise, however, we observe that there are very few studies that have examined China's dynamic shifts in its policy and practice, and the country's attempt at portraying its activities in Africa as a part of its international responsibility to other developing countries (Banik 2013).

Our aim in this article is therefore to identify and analyze specific trends and mechanisms that characterize China's current international development strategy and practice. Of particular interest to us is an examination of the role and impact of private sector actors from China operating within and outside the Chinese aid architecture in Africa. We discuss recent trends in China's development assistance and investments in Africa based on empirical evidence from Malawi – which is particularly interesting in this context as it is one of the poorest countries in the world. Moreover, despite an economy that has limited natural resources and is highly dependent on foreign aid, which according to some studies accounts for almost 40 per cent of the economy), the country has not witnessed much interest from external investors (Banik 2013). While western donor countries have been the major providers of aid to Malawi, China is a relative newcomer. Formal diplomatic relations between Malawi and China was established as recently as December 2007, after which point Malawi ceased to receive aid from its long-time supporter – Taiwan.

China's engagements in Malawi are thus not the result of a long historical presence in the country, and at the outset it appears that Chinese interest is not explicitly guided by a desire to gain access to natural resources. It is precisely against this background that China's relatively large commitment to one country within a short period time appears to disprove the myth that it is trying to colonize the African continent (Ibid.). Since its entry into Malawi over seven years ago, China has extended lines of credit, technical assistance and provided grants with the aim of building and improving infrastructure and roads (De Bruyn 2014).

The focus of this article is not on the general status of Chinese funded development projects in Malawi, as these have already been discussed in considerable detail elsewhere (Chinguwo 2008; Banik 2013). Rather, we wish to



identify and highlight new trends and components of the Chinese engagement in Malawi and explore the potential impacts of these activities on development and poverty reduction in one of the poorest countries in the world. Accordingly, our main focus is on private sector actors from China active in Malawi, either conducting business on their own in the country and/or involved in implementing projects on behalf of the Chinese government.

The study is based on material gathered from a wide range of sources including interviews with Malawian politicians, civil servants, journalists, academics, civil society organizations and citizens groups. In addition, we have spent a considerable amount of time (totaling several months in the past seven years) interacting with Chinese nationals based in Malawi, including traders, business managers, construction workers and staff of the Chinese embassy in Lilongwe. We have also visited a large number of projects funded by the Chinese government as well as businesses established by Chinese nationals in various parts of the country. These included, in Lilongwe, a newly constructed Parliament building and international conference center/luxury hotel, a national soccer stadium currently under construction, the Chinese-run Golden Peacock hotel and small retail shops run by Chinese nationals. During fieldwork, we also visited the China-British-Malawi trilateral project at the Bonda Agricultural University and the agricultural demonstration farm at the Natural Resource University in Lilongwe. Similarly, we also interacted with visiting Chinese medical teams in Malawi. The main empirical material for this article is, however, drawn from a study of the Golden Peacock hotel, the Agricultural Technology Demonstration Center (ATDC) in Salima, and the China-African Cotton Company and its activities in local villages in Balaka district. We begin with a brief description of the linkages between aid and business in the Chinese model of development assistance before providing an overview of China's aid and investment strategy in Malawi. Thereafter, we identify and discuss five sets of interrelated and emerging trends in the Chinese strategy and examine the impacts these potentially have in relation to development and poverty reduction in one of Africa's poorest states.

### **Business-aid linkages**

China has rapidly established itself as a major economic partner for the great majority of countries in the African continent. Indeed, Chinese OFDI flows (the amount of investment in a given period) to Africa increased eight-fold, from \$317 million in 2004 to \$2.52 billion in 2012. The historical evolution of the China-Africa economic relationship can be broadly divided into four stages.

First, from 1949 to 1979, China's economic activities in Africa were primarily motivated by a political agenda aimed at building up a diplomatic relationship, to support African's independence and to gain the support of African in United Nation bodies (Zhang Hongming 2006). And while China provided financial support and equipment to Africa through aid programs, there was virtually no element of foreign direct investment (Yang Yishuang 2011).

Second, when reforms were undertaken in 1979 and until 1990, China's shifted its focus to development of its own domestic economy sought FDI in China from Western countries (Ayodele and Sotala 2014). In Africa, China gradually began to seek so-called 'mutually beneficial economic cooperation'. During this stage, China funded 102 programs and the total development assistance budget was roughly \$51.19 million (Zhang Hanlin 2010).

Third, in the period 1990- 2006, the main focus was on making optimal use of domestic and international markets and resources, and hence the initial phase of the now well-known 'Going Out' strategy was introduced, which resulted in a boom in China's overseas direct investment. The main factors driving this trend was Africa's rich energy reserves, minerals and raw materials, in addition to the potential of developing a huge potential market and opportunities to further strengthen political relationships that were cultivated in the previous decades in order to promote China's investments (Sun Yun 2014). Towards the beginning of the 1990s, however, China reformed its aid policy with the aim of transforming turnkey projects to become longer-term joint ventures (Brautigam and Zhang 2013). And in 1995, the government began encouraging private enterprises to be more closely involved in governmental aid projects that were funded with concessional loans, investments and bilateral trade (Huang 2010). Towards this end, China pledged the first National Investment Strategy in Africa in 1998 with the goal of identifying priority sectors in Africa (Yao 2009). Until 2006, however, the Chinese government was the major driver for China's investments in Africa, and state-owned enterprises in China played an important role in most aid activities.

Fourth, since the introduction of the China's African Policy in 2006, private investments from China in Africa have increased manifold. The 2006 policy declared that the 'Chinese Government encourages and supports Chinese enterprises' investment and business in Africa, and will continue to provide preferential loans and buyer credits to this end'. It went on to add that the government 'is ready to explore new channels and new ways for promoting investment cooperation with African countries, and will continue to formulate and improve relevant policies, provide guidance and service and offer convenience' (Xinhua agency 2006). Later, during the same year, the Third FOCAC Summit China re-declared a set of goals aimed at helping Chinese businesses establish a former footing in Africa:

The Chinese Government, placing importance on facilitating investment expansion in Africa, decided to support related Chinese banks in setting up a China-Africa Development Fund whose total amount will gradually reach US\$5 billion to give encouragement and support to well-established and reputable Chinese companies in making investment in projects in Africa which will contribute to local technological progress, employment opportunities and sustainable socio-economic development. (FOCAC 2006)

A major consequence of the above policy was the increase in FDI from private investors from 52 in 2005 to 923 in 2012, representing 55 per cent of the 1,679 Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) projects active in Africa (Shen Xiaofang 2013). An illustrative example is the group of small enterprises from a single province (Zhejiang), which have invested in 196 sub-companies spread across 34 African countries (Yang Yishuang 2011). While state-owned enterprises are driven by national interests and tend to invest heavily in the extractive sector, private companies are driven by market forces and are increasingly investing in non-extractive sectors (Ayodele and Sotola 2014). Thus, the Chinese private sector's investments in Africa are having a major impact on the Chinese state's engagements on the continent.

In the international development debate, the relationship between aid and FDI is controversial and research results remain inconclusive. Selaya and Sunesen (2012) argue that the relationship is theoretically ambiguous: aid raises the marginal productivity of capital when used to finance complementary inputs (like public infrastructure and human capital investments), but aid may crowd out private investments when it comes in the shape of pure physical capital transfers. Karakaphan et al. (2005) and Arellano et al. (2009) find that aid has a negative direct effect on FDI. And although Kimura and Todo (2010) claim that foreign aid in general does not have any significant effect on FDI, they find robust evidence that foreign aid from Japan can promote FDI from Japan – in particular infrastructure aid from Japan has a vanguard effect.

Not unsurprisingly, given the lack of aid statistics and in the absence of a Chinese aid agency, most researchers almost invariably link China's investments in Africa with its aid policies. While it is true that China views its foreign aid and investments as aimed at promoting Chinese economic interests as well as Africa's development (Haroz 2011), it is not always clear to aid observers whether Chinese firms operate on their own initiative or whether they receive Chinese government contracts to implement projects in countries that are recipients of China's international aid in the form of grants or concessional loans (Sanfilippo 2010). There appears to be ample evidence to suggest that government-supported aid programs have actively facilitated Chinese FDI in Africa, and the expansion of the Chinese government's activities has been characterized as a type of coalition investment strategy that involves a combination of energy acquisitions for China and funding infrastructure development for Africa.

Government-led economic cooperation projects between China and African countries provide significant opportunities for Chinese companies to enter African markets (Ibid.). The close linkage between aid and investments derives from aid reforms mainly undertaken since 1996, when China began to adopt concessional loans in order to promote large infrastructure and production programs via its EXIM Bank. Most of these funds have since been tied to the use of Chinese inputs, and often also involve separate investments by Chinese firms in African countries. The bulk of Chinese aid is typically transferred directly from the EXIM bank to the firms, which have successfully bid for Chinese government tenders for specific tasks to be

carried out in an aid-recipient country (Kaplinsky and Morris 2009). Thus, in the past couple of decades, a large number of Chinese companies have entered Africa through the aid channel. Yang Hongxi (2010) summarizes three types of aid-for-investment strategies adopted by China.

First, a recipient country can transfer and convert a concessional loan from China into capital for a local company. Subsequently, a Chinese company is encouraged by the Chinese authorities to invest funds and establish a joint venture with the local company. Second, the authorities may provide financial support to a Chinese company to implement a turnkey aid project in partnership with a local company. Third, the Chinese government and a recipient country government jointly sign a cooperative framework agreement aimed at supporting the joint venture between a Chinese company and a local company. Zhang Hanlin (2010) argue that Chinese aid policies play a major role in motivating Chinese firms to invest their own funds in Africa. Indeed, Gu Jing (2012) claims that the firms that were able to enter African markets via developmental assistance projects in the early years were subsequently able to secure a major advantage vis-à-vis others and were able to use their knowledge, expertise and experience of local markets to undertake subsequent investments.

### **China's aid and investments in Malawi**

China is a recent entrant to the list of donors providing assistance to Malawi, where 53 per cent of the population lives in extreme poverty, and where donor support accounts for almost 40 per cent of the national budget. The major actors providing aid include the traditional bilateral donors (e.g. United States, United Kingdom, EU, Norway) as well as a host of international organizations such as the World Bank and various United Nations institutions. Since Malawi's independence in 1964 and until late 2007, Taiwan was an important provider of foreign aid. In December 2007, however, Malawi decided to follow most of Africa and agreed to receive assistance from China, thus abandoning its political support for Taiwan.

Trade between China and Malawi has rapidly increased since China began operations in Malawi. China mainly imports tobacco, coffee, cotton and spices from Malawi, and while total trade between the countries amounted to USD 88 million in 2008, it had increased to USD 297 million in 2014 (MOFF 2014). Since 2008, however, China has gradually expanded its aid and investment portfolio, and is currently assisting Malawi through various channels. These include grants, concessional loans, technical assistance, trade opportunities and encouragement to Chinese companies to invest in Malawi. Banik (2013) summarized four major pillars of Chinese assistance to Malawi: infrastructure development, agricultural and food security, health and medical care, and education and human resources. In addition, China pledged in 2011 to offer financial assistance for a range of social service development projects in future foreign aid activities in Africa (Zhao Zhiguo 2011). The first such project – digging boreholes in rural Malawi to improve accessibility and quality of local drinking water – was implemented in Malawi in 2012. Table 1 provides an updated

overview of Chinese engagement in Malawi and highlights eighteen major projects grouped under 5 main pillars.

**Table 1: Major Chinese Engagement in Malawi, 2008-2014**

Projects	Funding source (USD)	Location	Contracted company	Status
<b>Pillar 1: Infrastructure development</b>				
Parliament building	Grant, 41 million	Lilongwe	Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Co. Ltd (AFECC)	Completed
Karonga- Chitipa Road	Grant, 70 million	Karonga- Chitipa	China Road and Bridge Cooperation	Completed
Stadium	Concessional loan, 65 million	Lilongwe	AFECC	On-going
International Conference center and luxury hotel	Concessional loan, 90 million	Lilongwe	Shanghai Construction Company Group	Completed
Golden Peacock hotel	Commercial investment, 15 million	Lilongwe	AFECC	Completed
<b>Pillar 2: Agricultural and food security</b>				
China-British-Africa cooperation on fishery development	China MOA and DFID, grant	-		On-going
South-south cooperation in FAO framework (18 agricultural experts)	China Trust fund in FAO	-	China MOA	Completed
China Agricultural Technology Demonstration Center	Grant, 5 million	-	China-Africa Cotton company	On-going
Demonstration farm in Natural resource college	Grant, 1.5 million	Lilongwe	Hubei Farm	
Balaka cotton plantation and processing project	Partly from China-Africa Development fund, 25-30	Balaka	China-Africa Cotton company	On –going

	million			
Fertilizer assistance	Grant	--	--	Completed
<b>Pillar 3: Health and Medical care</b>				
Medical team (third run, total 53 doctors)	Grant from China MOH	Lilongwe and Muzuzu	Division of Health in Shaanxi Province	On-going
CT Scanner and other equipment	Grant	Muzuzu	--	On-going
Brightness trip	500 surgeries	--	--	
<b>Pillar 4: Education and Human resources</b>				
University of Science and Technology of Malawi	China concessional loan, 70-80 million	Thyolo	Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Co. Ltd	Completed
International students scholarship	Grant from MOE, total 250 persons	-	China Scholarship Council	On-going
Short-term visiting and training in China	Grant, average 200 per year	-	MOFCOM	On-going
Secondary School	Grant, 1.5 million	Thyolo	Gansu Hualong	Completed
China-Malawi friendship primary school	Grant, 1.5 million	Lilongwe	Shanghai Construction Company Group	Completed
<b>Pillar 5: Social Service development</b>				
Boreholes project	Grant, 600 boreholes, 5 million	Dowa, 6 district	Gansu Mining Group	Completed
Solar Street Lamp and portable batteries	Grant	Lilongwe	-	Completed

Source: Based on Banik (2013); updated with additional information collected from fieldwork in 2014

As is evident from the above table, China has provided grants to Malawi mainly for infrastructure construction, which has resulted in a new Parliament building, a secondary school, a demonstration station at the Natural Resource University, an Agricultural Technology Demonstration Center (ATDC), and the 101 km long Karonga-Chitipa road (originally started with Taiwanese funding). However, China has provided grants for medical equipment and visiting medical teams from China (a new team arrives every two years, and three teams have served in the country thus far), as well as stipends to Malawian students and professionals (around 40 students and 200 professionals) to study in China or to attend short-term training sessions and workshops. And in recent years, a Chinese grant has been provided for improving quality and access to drinking water from around 600 boreholes that have been dug in selected districts of the country. The major projects funded by concessional loans include an international conference center and luxury hotel, a national stadium and the Malawi University of Science and Technology (MUST).

In addition to the above two main types of assistance (i.e. grants and concessional loans), Chinese companies are slowly beginning to invest in projects of their own in Malawi rather than simply working under a Chinese government contract to implement a specific activity. The case of the Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Company is a case in point. While the company was initially contracted to construct the Parliament building, MUST and the national stadium projects, it has since completion of these projects invested in constructing and running the Golden Peacock Hotel in addition to a large shopping mall in Lilongwe. Another example is that of the China-Africa Cotton Company (examined later in this article), which initially secured funding from the China-Africa Development Fund but has subsequently poured additional resources into its cotton plantation and processing projects in Balaka district. The same company has now also been contracted by the Chinese government to construct and operate Agricultural Technology Demonstration Center in Salima.

Over the years, China's activities in Africa have undergone several important changes, and many of these recent trends are observable in Malawi. A typical challenge for many scholars and aid practitioners has been the blurred boundaries between Chinese aid and investments, particularly since the 1990s, when China began implementing a large number of activities that encouraged the formation of joint ventures, co-operation contracts, debt-equity swaps, public-private partnerships and aid for joint ventures (Brautigam and Zhang 2013). In Malawi, China continues a practice where only Chinese companies can bid for contracts related to aid programs, thus preventing international and local companies from being involved.

The motivation behind Chinese aid has been rapidly evolving in recent years. Lengauer (2011) argues that Chinese aid is guided by four major sets of motives, which include securing natural resources, establishing new consumer markets, increasing global influence and spreading of Chinese values. Others typically argue that economic and commercial interests are at the heart of Chinese aid, which in



turn require access to huge amounts of natural resources and raw materials that are abundantly available in Africa (NYU Wagner School, 2008). Chinese activities in Malawi, however, offer a contrasting picture to such claims of one-sided benefit accruing to China. Successive Chinese ambassadors to Malawi have, for example, argued that Malawi neither has oil nor an abundance of minerals, and hence Chinese assistance is not based on ulterior motives, but rather on genuine friendship and mutual respect. China also portrays its engagement in the country as part of its international responsibility as a permanent member of the UN Security Council (Banik 2013). Moreover, the Chinese embassy staff reiterate the fact that most infrastructural projects in Malawi cater to the general public in contrast to Chinese activities in other countries such as Zambia, Tanzania, Mali and Sierra Leone, where other types of activities have been prioritized, such as textile and sugar factories.

Another argument used by Chinese officials in Malawi is that the main sectors of Chinese involvement are agriculture, health care, education and social service development – areas that do not have direct linkages with economic profit. Indeed, while some of China's activities in Malawi resemble China's general policy on Africa, other activities appear to be more Malawi-specific (Ibid.). In the following sections, we examine emerging trends of Chinese aid and investments in Malawi against the background of micro-level evidence. Our focus is on three specific interventions: Construction of a national stadium in Lilongwe; the establishment and daily operations of the Golden Peacock Hotel in Lilongwe, and the operations of the China-Africa Cotton Company in Balaka district.

### **Emerging trends in Chinese development assistance**

Available evidence from Malawi shows that foreign direct investments are still strongly driven by official aid. According to information available on the website of China's Economic and Commercial Counselor's Office in Malawi, a total of 18 Chinese firms have registered their interest in operating in Malawi and at least 10 firms have completed, or are bidding for, aid-funded projects. However, the Malawian case also exhibits some new and evolving aspects of Chinese aid policies, which we believe exhibits a new trend which in turn will have important implications for China's activities on the African continent in the near future.

#### *Exit from, and entry into, a new market*

We find evidence of a growing trend where Chinese companies begin operations in a country even before they receive a Chinese government contract. For example, the China-Africa Cotton Company had already made considerable investments in Malawi before they were contracted to construct the Agricultural Technology Demonstration Center. Similarly, Gansu Mining Company had been operating with its own capital in Zambia before it received a contract from the Chinese government to dig boreholes in Malawi. Thus we notice a growing trend whereby some companies make a decision to enter into a local market even without the backing of the Chinese state. The decision to expand to a neighboring country or another country in the African

continent, however, seems to be more often than not, influenced by a Chinese government contract to implement an infrastructure project.

We also find that not all contracted Chinese companies have expressed an interest in continuing to do business in Malawi. Thus, China Road and Bridge Cooperation and Shanghai Construction Company did not invest in Malawi upon completing their infrastructure construction turnkey contracts. In contrast, the Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Company followed up their turnkey projects in Malawi (funded by the Chinese government) by investing in the construction and management of a hotel and a shopping mall as part of their investment strategy in Africa (having similarly invested in hotel and shopping centers in countries such as Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Mozambique, Zambia and Ivory Coast).

Another important trend we notice is that except for isolated instances (e.g. the China Africa Cotton company will manage the ATDC in Malawi for at least three years upon completion of construction), we do not find Chinese companies being involved in maintaining or managing the final outputs of aid programs. For example, although the international conference center and luxury hotel in Lilongwe were built with Chinese concessional loans, Chinese companies have not been involved in the management of these properties since they were handed over to the Malawian government. Indeed, media reports indicate that the Malawian government has repeatedly turned down offers by Chinese hotel chains to operate the properties, and has recently signed a contract with a South African hotel chain to start hotel operations.

#### *Interest in long-term engagement*

China also appears to be experimenting with new aid practices in Malawi. Traditionally, China's policy has focused on bilateral aid, almost neglecting multilateral collaboration (Huang, 2012). Any form of multilateral or even trilateral cooperation was for long considered to be a sensitive matter, and hence did not receive much support from core ministries that are involved with aid management in Beijing. However, recent evidence paints a different picture. For example, in 2008, China donated USD 30 million to set up a trust fund in the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations to support South-South agricultural cooperation. Thus, in 2010, Malawi was included in a first group of pilot countries – which also included Mongolia, Mali, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Liberia, Uganda, Ethiopia and Namibia – where agricultural experts from China were deputed to assist in promoting local agricultural development. Thus, eighteen Chinese agricultural experts were sent to Malawi in March 2011, and a new team will arrive in 2016. Another interesting experiment relates to trilateral cooperation on agriculture, which China negotiated with DFID in 2010. Although the two countries originally selected for project implementation were Sierra Leone and Uganda, due to unexpected reasons, the projects ended up being implemented in Malawi in addition to Uganda. As part of this on-going initiative, China has sent several fishery experts to work at Bonda Agricultural College and National Aquiculture Institute.

### *Networking and reputation building vs. profit incentive*

Our findings show that Chinese companies operating in Malawi under Chinese government contracts are not primarily driven by a profit incentive. Rather they seek to establish thriving networks and strengthen their reputation, which can further down the road help them make a profit. Indeed, none of the 18 companies operating in Malawi are new actors in Africa, as some have completed infrastructure projects in other African countries. For example, the China Road and Bridge Company and the Shanghai Construction Company Group have invested in other African countries while others like the Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Company have completed infrastructure projects and invested in projects in other countries. Some companies have also managed to work with large international contracting firms. In the process, these Chinese companies have acquired considerable international constructing experience and skills and can therefore claim to complete projects punctually while charging far less than rival companies. And while Chinese companies initially depended on governmental aid projects to make profits, they are now increasingly seeking to enhance their social reputations and consolidate their networks through aid-funded projects. The following quote is illustrative of this new trend:

The budget for one borehole from a Chinese government-funded project is only about 60 per cent of the budget for a similar project undertaken on behalf of other actors. For example, while we received around \$6000 per borehole from China, the amount we received from a similar project a few years ago funded by the African Development Bank and UNICEF was around \$8000-9000. So, why are we willing to complete this China-aid funded borehole project without worrying about rising costs and our profit margins? The reason is simple – we do it in order to enhance China’s international image as well as the reputation of our company for doing something good for local society. This allows us to gain a foothold in the country and allows us to bid for international contracts, as we can document our work experience. For example we are currently preparing a proposal for boreholes projects that is funded by UNICEF.

The experience of another actor – the China-Africa Cotton Company (CACC), which is responsible for implementing a Chinese aid-funded Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre (ATDC) project – similarly provides a useful lens to understand the motivations of Chinese private sector actors. In order to construct the ATDC in Malawi, CACC had to first acquire land. The location and quality of a plot of free land offered by the Malawian government was not considered by CACC to be appropriate for the ATDC construction. The alternative, and in order to successfully implement the project, CACC purchased a more suitable piece of land, spending its own funds in

the process. A senior CACC official we interviewed pointed out that his company intended to successfully complete the project, which he considered to be a 'brilliant advertisement' for the company. He went on to observe that it was particularly important for Chinese companies in Africa to build a 'good working relationship with the host government'. The two examples discussed above thus indicate that there is currently a shift away from direct profit to one where companies aim at creating enabling environments for future investments.

**Table 2: Linkage between Chinese firms and Chinese aid to Malawi**

Company	Aid programs	Nature of company	Before entering Malawi	Investment in Malawi
Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Co. Ltd (AFECC)	Parliament building; Stadium; Malawi University of Science and Technology	Private	Had Invested in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Madagascar, Benin, Togo	Golden peacock hotel and shopping mall, housing project
China Road and Bridge Cooperation	Karonga-Chitipa Road	State-owned	Have constructed road, harbor, bridge, et al. in about 23 African countries	None
Shanghai Construction Company Group	China-Malawi friendship primary school International Conference center and luxury hotel	State-owned	Have invested in Zambia	None
China-Africa Cotton company	China Agricultural Technology Demonstration Center	Private	Have invested in Zambia and Mozambique	Balaka cotton procession
Hubei Farm	Demonstration farm in Natural resource college	State-owned	Have invested in Mozambique	None
Gansu Hualong	Secondary School	State-owned		Local housing and small infrastructure projects
Gansu Mining Group	Boreholes project	State-owned	Have invested in Zambia	Local small infrastructure projects and plan to bid for boreholes project by

				UNICEF
--	--	--	--	--------

*Private sector support for public sector policies*

We find a growing trend in the past few years where Chinese companies have become strong supporters of China’s foreign aid programs. Unlike most Western donors, China bases its assistance on the needs articulated by recipient countries themselves. As an official in the Chinese embassy in Lilongwe noted, ‘The government of Malawi provides me with a requirements list every month’. However, he also went on to add that the Malawian officials ‘always have new ideas and always change their priorities’, and that it was ‘really difficult to evaluate which project is feasible’. This indeed poses a major problem for embassy officials, as unlike western countries, China has not yet established a professional agency to channel its development aid. The FOCAC summit has simply reiterated a three-year pledge for a holistic cooperation strategy for Africa including political interactions, aid, investment, trade, cultural exchanging, etc. Consequently, information about activities that fall under bilateral cooperation are typically collected by embassy officials and the commercial counselor’s office based on a list of requirements submitted by recipient country representatives. It is not uncommon at most Chinese embassies for only one individual to be assigned with the task of coordinating aid-related activities. As a result, feasibility studies are not undertaken, especially in relation to activities where China provides concessional loans to recipient country governments. However, China’s EXIM bank actually requires that evaluations of feasibility of a project must be carried out before a final decision to provide a loan is reached. This is where the Chinese private sector companies have begun playing an increasingly important role. Private companies are keenly interested in bidding for Chinese government contracts, and for this purpose they have begun undertaking pre-evaluation exercises, which provide a considerable amount of information to embassy officials who in turn are better able to articulate the need for aid projects vis-à-vis decision makers in Beijing.

An illustrative example is when the Malawian government requested Chinese aid for expanding hydroelectric power capacity. A preliminary study conducted by a Chinese firm concluded that the existing electricity transmission lines could not support the new power station, and that the project was only feasible if the transmissions system was updated. Such information was invaluable to the embassy as it began discussing the possibility of undertaking the power project. Another example comes from the China-Africa Cotton Company (CACC), whose manager told us about his firm’s association with the Chinese government in relation to the construction of an Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre (ATDC) in Malawi. The story goes as follows: When China established diplomatic relations with Malawi, it was not certain as to what exactly it could do to assist Malawi, particularly in the agricultural sector. The country’s first ambassador to Malawi had previously been posted to Zambia, and was aware of the work there by the China-African Cotton Company. He therefore enquired whether the company would be interested in investing in Malawi. As the CACC factory in Zambia is close to the Malawian border,

many Malawian cotton farmers had already established a relationship with the company by regularly selling their cotton. CACC expressed interest in establishing a branch in Malawi and the ambassador helped facilitate contact with MOFCOM, which in turn suggested an application for capital from the China-Africa Development Fund to support the company's foray into Malawi. The official went on to observe that after CACC had operated in the country for around two years, it realized that the Malawian agricultural system needed considerable assistance from China. Accordingly, the company took the initiative to establish an agricultural technology demonstration center in the country.

### *Increased investments by small enterprises*

We find that the rapid increase in private investments by small Chinese companies are primarily driven by their desire to gain greater access to markets and higher profits rather than the Chinese government's desire to promote and push development projects funded by aid. Gu Jing (2012) argues that Chinese firms arrive in Africa for three reasons. First, they were involved in implementing development projects funded by the Chinese government. Thus, many infrastructure-contracting companies won bids for concessional loan projects from China EXIM bank and then subsequently began expanding their businesses in local contexts. Second, investments by private actors have involved the search for oil and gas and other resources that could be exported to China. Third, a limited number of apparel manufacturers established processing factories in Africa in order to boost sales, and the major goal for some of these companies was also to circumvent protectionist trade restrictions imposed by the United States and the European Union on products from China. By changing the country of origin of their goods, these Chinese companies gained access to Western markets under various preferential trade agreements that developed countries had established with Africa. The Huajian shoe factory in Ethiopia provides a good example of this trend. The company has not only created over 100,000 jobs for the local population, but has also gone against the grain of what African officials have come to see as China's primary purpose on the continent – to extract raw materials and source new markets for its own manufactured exports, typically carried out by state-owned enterprises and large private companies such as Huawei telecom and ZTE (Wallis, 2013). Creating employment opportunities in countries recipient of Chinese aid has become the domain of smaller private enterprises. As China gradually moves up the value chain in strategic industries, many companies operating in China and involved in the manufacture of simple and labor-intensive products must find newer ways of survival. This particularly situation within China thus offers a special and time-bound opportunity for less developed countries including Africa (Shen Xiaofang 2013).

In addition to around 15 Chinese state-owned enterprises, there are around 200 smaller private enterprises operated by Chinese actors. These private enterprises are involved in a wide range of sectors, including retail, hospitality, clothing, shoes, luggage, handbags, and catering. Some of these firms arrived directly from China,

while others moved to Malawi from other African countries. PYH luggage factory, located in an industrial park in Lilongwe, is one such example, having chosen Malawi from China's Hebei province simply based on the advice and introductions provided by friends. Despite not having any experience from working in Africa, they invested around \$150,000 in building a factory and purchasing machinery for the production of luggage equipment and blankets, which are widely available in local stores, including Chinese-owned supermarkets. In other cases, firms have moved to Malawi from other African countries. The Chinese owners of a large supermarket, for instance, told us how they moved to Malawi from Cameroon in 2008 as they learned about the peaceful political climate in Malawi as compared to many other countries in Africa. However, despite numerous advantages of re-locating to Malawi, the smaller Chinese private firms face challenges due to the small and relatively underdeveloped market in the country. The PYH factory is unable to use its full machine capacity due to low market demand relatively high government taxes. As a result, the owners claimed that they are yet to break even. Similarly, the supermarket managers claimed that business is relatively profitably only during certain months of the year (mainly August – September), when farmers are in possession of cash following the harvesting season.

### **The impact of China's aid and investments in Africa**

A group of western aid agencies and international NGOs, in addition to some local journalists and civil society organizations claim that the Chinese interventions are not focused on poverty reduction. The argument is that rather than tackling the causes of poverty, Chinese efforts are aimed at broad-based economic development resulting from commercial activity. One of us has previously argued the contrary, highlighting the emphasis on local employment generation that has underlined the Chinese aid policies in Malawi (Banik 2013). In addition, there are numerous indirect spill-offs from Chinese activities in the country that positively impact on livelihood strategies of the local population. Retail shops and outlets, historically owned and operated by the Indian and Pakistani communities, have now passed onto the hands of Chinese traders, who offer a wide range of consumer products at very affordable prices that the typical Malawian consumer did not have access to until very recently. These include cellphones, radios, electrical equipment, construction material, locks and fabrics. In the ensuing section, we will highlight employment to discuss China's aid and investment impacts on development and poverty reduction in Malawi.

Table 3 shows that in all 17 Chinese companies in Malawi, local workers constitute the majority of employees, and that many private investments are so-called 'green-field', where a company starts a new venture in a foreign country by prioritizing the construction of new facilities and go on to create long-term employment by hiring new employees. The PYH luggage factory is a good example, where out of a total of 140 workers, only 9 are Chinese. The owners claimed that they often end up hiring more local workers than required. As one of the managers of the Chinese supermarket noted, 'Local salary is very low and Malawians cannot



find job. I hired 20 local workers; actually I only need 10'. Similarly, companies involved in construction projects were gradually increasing the number of local workers employed. There is a corresponding decrease in the number of workers being imported from China. In the process of building the Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre (ATDC), Qingdao international construction company only sent 10 Chinese workers to supervise local workers. And in order to run their operations, the company hired around 400 local workers, selected mainly from villages within a 50-kilometer radius. The National Stadium construction site was no different, with 200 Chinese workers and 900 Malawians employed.

In virtually all companies we surveyed, local workers have become the main source of labor. One reason for this is the growing costs of labor in China and the additional expenses related to travel, accommodation and insurance that have to be borne by the companies for Chinese workers. Another reason is the growing availability of attracting skilled local workers. As one factory owner observed,

It is too expensive to take Chinese workers to Africa. In China, the construction worker can easily find a job with salary 300 Yuan per day. They can take care of their family. In Africa, the Chinese worker can expect \$ 2000 dollar per month, almost on par with a salary in China. The only advantage of working here for Chinese is that they can save money because we pay them a lump sum upon their return to China. While in Malawi, we usually give them some pocket money. Thus, a Chinese worker typically wants to work in Africa only when they wish to save a huge amount of money for a house or to spend on their children's education.

**Table 3: Chinese workers and local workers in Chinese companies**

	Chinese workers	Local workers	% local
PYH Luggage Factory	9	140	93.96 %
EVA Shoes	7	54	88.52 %
CSH sanitary tissues	6	24	80.00 %
Purity Sanitary towel	7	14	66.67 %
Cherry Blossom Kitchen Utensil Company	6	18	75.00 %
White Crane Washing Powder	5	24	82.76 %
Hua Li Food	5	16	76.19 %
Lin Zeng Brothers clothes workshop	4	20	83.33 %
Shanghai Supermarket	4	16	80.00 %
China Weave Supermarket	4	16	80.00 %
Noble Restaurant	5	20	80.00 %
Orient Garage	6	24	80.00 %
China-Africa Cotton Company	9	130	93.53 %
The Golden Peacock Hotel	12	150	92.59 %
National Stadium project	200	900	81.82 %
ATDC construction	12	400	97.09 %
Boreholes project	9	30	76.92 %
Total	310	1996	86.56 %

Despite gradual improvements, the number of skilled local workers remains far below market demand, and this is increasingly turning out to be one of the biggest challenges facing Chinese companies who typically have very little time to plan project implementation activities and simultaneously prioritize the completion of projects on time. One solution is to involve a larger number of Chinese workers towards the beginning of a project and thereafter gradually increase local training and recruitment. Another challenge is the fact that the average age of Chinese workers willing to come to Africa is rapidly increasing (currently at around 45 years in Malawi), with companies finding it difficult to attract the younger generation of Chinese workers who associate the manufacturing sector with hardship. In most construction sites, we found the Chinese workers to be far older than their local colleagues. Employers argued that younger local workers are often more brave, and more willing to undertake hard tasks and physically challenging tasks. However, these very same workers did not possess the skills to carry out the tasks on their own,

and required supervision by their older Chinese colleagues. One manager claimed that a Chinese worker would typically supervise 5 local workers. The challenge therefore is to try and harness the potential of a very large youth population of Africa and give them the necessary skill sets to make them active agents of economic development.

We find growing evidence that China's developmental aid projects and private investments are generating a considerable amount of new job opportunities for the local population. This is undoubtedly an important impact given that employment strengthens the livelihood strategies for local workers and their families. This is particularly the case in Malawi, where it is claimed that only 8 per cent of the population receives a regular monthly salary (Durevall and Mussa 2010). A female employee of Lilongwe's relatively new Golden Peacock hotel told us that she had spent over three years trying to find work, and was delighted to be shortlisted by the hotel for an interview. She was ecstatic when she received her first salary, and since has been conscious about fulfilling her duties to her best ability, as she fears that if she loses this job, there will not be many other opportunities available to her in the near future. Another positive factor we find is that Chinese companies, particularly those in the hospitality and retail businesses, have a good track record at recruiting women. For example, at the Chinese supermarket, almost all cashiers are female, while at the Golden Peacock hotel, almost half of all local workers are female. In the China-Africa Cotton Company, there are about 70 buyers of cotton and about 30 are women, and most of them come from rural families. The Chinese manager explained that the women are more patient and serious-minded than men.

While employment with a fixed monthly salary is a positive development for many, we also find evidence that Chinese projects and enterprises also are creating new business opportunities for a section of the local population. At the entrance of many factories and construction sites, there has been a rise in informal sector activities including lunch places and small shops selling food, drinks and cellphone cards, many of which are run by women. Lunch menus served by around 10 food stalls around the national stadium construction site in Lilongwe vary from MWK 150 to MWK 300 and attract almost 400 local workers every day. Similarly, at the ATDC construction site in Salima, villagers from neighboring villages frequently sell chicken, fish and vegetables to Chinese workers affiliated with the ATDC.

It is, however, not just small stalls that are benefiting from construction activities. More than half of the workers at the stadium construction site in Lilongwe are from other districts. The growth in demand for accommodation has resulted in many locals renting their houses or subletting rooms (for sums ranging from MWK 2500-3500) and therefore supplementing their monthly incomes. The chief of Salima village noted that the ATDC construction was turning out to be a blessing for this village:

My village never got any development projects. Now ATDC is bringing new opportunities for us. The outsiders now

consider my village to be unique and special as the Chinese have chosen to build their demonstration center here. Now one Indian investor has arrived and has rented a large piece of spare land, hiring 15 local villagers to feed his cattle. The Japanese also plan to support one irrigation project here. Before ATDC project, the village did not have access to electricity, but now suddenly we have electricity. I believe that after the ATDC project has been completed, more and more outsiders will come to my village and bring us business. I am also hearing that some of my villagers are planning to set up and manage small family hotels.

In Malawi, like elsewhere in Africa, Chinese companies generally employ most of their local workers in labor-intensive positions while the Chinese normally fill managerial posts. However, we notice a growing trend in Malawi, where Chinese companies are making a genuine effort to hire locals for managerial tasks. Although most of the senior management at the Golden Peacock hotel is Chinese, the administrative heads for most divisions in the hotel are Malawian. Apart from speaking English and local languages, the hotel is increasingly depending on Malawians to negotiate deals with service providers, in addition to attracting local clientele to its facilities. The situation is no different at the China-Africa Cotton Company in Balaka, where a group of 9 Chinese workers are employed at the head office, while locals have been hired as ginnery managers, import and export officers and logistics coordinators. Moreover, the regional heads of the company and their assistants together with 20 routine managers are Malawian.

When compared to many western companies operating in the region, we find that the ratio of Chinese workers to locals is indeed high. A major reason for this is the nature of the Chinese company itself. In many large state-owned construction enterprises, a core activity involves contact with Chinese authorities, including receipts of payments from the Chinese government, applying for loans from Chinese banks, importing necessary material from China and reporting progress to the Chinese embassy.

Many of the small and medium enterprises do not have enough capital to hire local managers. In order to save costs, owners and their family members double up as frontier managers. However, the most important explanation for the comparatively large number of Chinese nations in the management positions of these companies is simply the low availability of local skilled workers in Malawi. As Castel et al. (2010) argue, the shortage of a skilled workforce is by far the most important obstacle to doing business in Malawi – with over 62 per cent of large companies and 58 per cent of foreign-owned companies identifying the lack of skilled labor as a major constraint. The availability of skilled workers is also season dependent, and Chinese managers struggle to find workers before and after the rainy season, when the competition for skilled workers is tough. Several companies expressed a fear of replacing too many Chinese workers with locals, as they feared

that local workers have a tendency of joining rival companies even if the increase in pay is minimal.

Gaining loyalty to the company from Malawian workers has become increasingly important for many of the companies we studied. Indeed, there are many attempts now being undertaken to provide stability and job security. The Golden Peacock hotel has, for example, undertaken several measures to retain local workers by providing a package of benefits, including paying higher salaries (minimum salary of MWK 15000, while average salaries are approx. MWK 60000 for local workers). Another set of initiatives at strengthening worker loyalty is offering a social welfare package that include subsidies for transportation, housing and medical insurance. Thus, a hotel maid, who receives an average monthly salary of MWK 40000, is additionally entitled to MWK 6000 as transportation subsidy, MWK 8000 as housing subsidy and the hotel also pay MWK 3000 to local insurance authority for every staff monthly towards a medical insurance policy. Another incentive is a bonus of MWK 3000 per month for full attendance at work. Thus, the total package of MWK 60000 per month is proving to be attractive for many Malawians with little formal education, who would normally not be able to attract a similar salary elsewhere. The most popular incentive for Malawians employed at the hotel is the program for recruiting and promoting workers identified as promising, who are sent to the company's hotels in China for short training sessions lasting around 6 months. Several of the staff members we spoke to (approx. 20 have been selected for such training in the past couple of years) highlighted this scheme as a highly motivating factor for their continued interest in working for the hotel. There are, in addition, several other measures that the hotel management has encouraged in order to cultivate worker loyalty, including monthly birthday parties for its employees, and providing financial and other support during weddings, funerals and illnesses.

The China-Africa Cotton Company (CACC) also has a set of measures in place aimed at motivating the workforce and cultivating loyalty. We were able to access detailed information showing payments and other benefits offered to company staff. Local workers were represented in various positions in this company – from regional manager to casual workers. The salary for contracted workers included basic salary, bonus, subsidies and insurance. The bonus was in the form of a performance allowance and long-term service award, a mechanism to encourage more workers to remain in the company. In November 81 local workers had got the long-term service award. This award has promoted the stability of employees of the CACC. Among present 105 employees in CACC ginnery, 22 joined in 2008, 28 joined in 2009 and 31 joined in 2010 and 2011.

CACC began its operations in Malawi in 2008, and almost half of the hired workers have continued to work here since the very beginning. The assistant manager forcefully argued that retaining skilled workers is a priority for the company as 'skilled workers can decrease production costs' and hence they try to 'create better working conditions and deals for local workers'. Table 5 provides an overview of the benefits provided to CACC staff. Regional managers are provided with vehicles, 200-400 liter diesel allowance and MWK 15000 for telephone costs. Similarly,

supervisors are provided motorcycles with diesel and telecom subsidies. And cotton buyers at the village level are provided with bicycles and telecom subsidies. The company relies on hiring a large number of casual workers. As the cotton-harvesting season runs from May to August, the ginnery is primarily actively under operation in the period May—September, during which CACC hires around 400 casual workers who are paid MWK 600 MWK for an 8-hour shift. However, as the ginnery machines must run at 11 hours at a stretch because ginnery has to stop all processing before rain season comes. So overtime work is required, for which the casual workers receive 150 per cent of their regular wages. Thus a casual worker may receive almost MWK 1000 per day.

The number of casual workers is much higher in construction companies than in greenfield companies. Most construction companies argue that they are unsure whether they will be able to win contracts for new projects, and hence retaining a large pool of contracted workers is not a financially viable option. Another important reason is that contracted workers in Malawi are not very loyal, and are constantly on the lookout for newer opportunities offering higher wages. Finally, most Chinese companies are unfamiliar with local labor laws and fear being prosecuted for not abiding by local customs and practices. With casual workers, they need not worry about such matters.

## **Conclusion**

China's development assistance strategy differs considerably from those of other donor countries active in Africa. Indeed, China does not abide by the Paris principles of harmonization, alignment and results management. Moreover, it does not provide budget support or basket funds as many western donors do in countries like Malawi. Rather the Chinese model highlights the principles of 'win-win', 'mutual respect' and 'non-interference', and is largely premised on the belief that any form of assistance should be primarily based on the actual needs of a country as articulated by the government. China considers its aid policies to be much more in tune with local requirements and without the conditionalities of good governance and protection and promotion of civil and political rights often imposed by western donors.

When an agreement is reached, often rather quickly, between the Chinese and the recipient government, funds are allocated and Chinese companies are approached to submit tenders. There is a perceptible belief that the public administration of recipient countries should be bypassed in order to avoid mismanagement, corruption and delays. Once a Chinese company wins the contract, it goes rapidly about implementing the project using a both Chinese and local expertise. The tender process, however, continues to exclude non-Chinese firms. We find that the realities on the ground in Malawi, as perceived by aid agencies and their representatives, are much more favourable of Chinese interventions despite the widespread criticism of China's activities often found in the western media.

We have argued that China's aid is visible and is appealing precisely because China highlights the 'win-win' nature of its interactions with local governments. In a major departure from western donor practices, China makes it a point to convey the

message that it appreciates what local actors can provide to China. Rather than charitable hand-outs, China has been relatively successful in making recipient governments believe that they too have something valuable to offer a major power in the world. These in turn make receiving grants and loans from the Chinese more palatable than many other actors who are unable to clearly communicate what they expect from recipient countries in return for their aid.

An important characteristic of the Chinese model is the close linkage between official development assistance from China and the role of private sector companies. We have discussed how this linkage has gradually evolved since it was initially introduced in 1979, and how it was further strengthened since 1990. The lack of detailed aid statistics provided by China, and the blurred boundaries between grants, concessional loans and investments, creates several misunderstandings in international forums and gives rise to allegations of ulterior motives guiding Chinese activities on the African continent. Our focus in this article has been on identifying and examining new trends and components of the aid-business relationship in Malawi – which has only been the recipient of Chinese assistance for the last eight years. We have demonstrated that the Chinese development assistance portfolio has been steadily expanding, and in addition to traditional infrastructure projects, also includes a focus on agriculture and food security, medical care and education, human resources and social development. Malawi's relationship with Western donors has deteriorated in recent years following sensational corruption scandals such as 'Cashgate', which resulted in most donors freezing their budget support to the Malawian government. In this new scenario, Malawi has begun to rely even more heavily on China than before. The Chinese, however, do not feel that their efforts are being compromised by corruption – indeed, they are of the view that budget support itself encourages corruption. Hence, they argue that the use of private Chinese firms to undertake development projects provides an opportunity to avoid misuse of its assistance package.

Our study has, in particular, highlighted the changing nature of the involvement of Chinese firms in countries like Malawi. Rather surprisingly, Chinese firms are not involved in the future management and maintenance of the projects they undertake. Indeed, in this respect, the Chinese have been steadfast in maintaining that it is up to the recipient government to decide on who they allocated contracts to for such purposes – e.g. running a hotel or a conference centre. We also find that even after the completion of projects funded by the Chinese government, many private sector actors from China have chosen to make investments of their own in Malawi. On other occasions, companies have used their experience with implementing a government contract in one country to start a new venture in a neighbouring country. Thus, for many of these firms (except small companies), it is not the profit-seeking incentive that is the main incentive for being involved in China's development assistance strategy but rather the reputation-seeking incentive. Experience in implementing a major project in a new country helps these firms establish important contacts and networks, which are important for most Chinese actors as they weigh in the possibility of investing in these new local contexts.

Our study finds evidence on the ground in Africa that the conventional development assistance model is rapidly changing and the Chinese government has had to adapt to newer circumstances and more complex demands for more long-term oriented help from local actors. In the absence of a development agency that can coordinate requests for aid and monitor the implementation of various projects, private companies are offering various forms of assistance to the Chinese government – including feasibility studies before projects are officially sanctioned. Indeed, many Chinese companies are now increasingly aware of their role as providers of knowledge and expertise, which in turn is providing the new contours to new forms of public-private partnership. At the same time, many of the companies we have studied also recognize the importance of providing a broad range of benefits to increase worker loyalty and help improve local livelihoods



## References

- Arellano, C., Bulir, A., Lane, T., and Lipschitz, L. (2009), 'The Dynamic Implications of Foreign Aid and its Variability', *Journal of Development Economics* 88(1): 87–102.
- Ayodele, T. and Sotala, O. (2014), 'China in Africa: An Evaluation of Chinese Investment', IPPA Working Paper Series, [http://www.ippanigeria.org/china\\_africa\\_working.pdf](http://www.ippanigeria.org/china_africa_working.pdf) (Accessed: 10 November 2015).
- Banik, D. (2013), 'China's Aid and Poverty Reduction in Africa', in Guanghua Yu (ed.), *Rethinking Law and Development: The Chinese Experience*, London: Routledge.
- Bräutigam, D. and Zhang, H. (2013), 'Green Dreams: Myth and Reality in China's Agricultural Investment in Africa', *Third World Quarterly*, 34(9): 1676-1696.
- Castel, V., Phiri, M. and Stampini, M. (2010), 'Education and Employment in Malawi', Working Papers Series No. 110 African Development Bank, Tunis, Tunisia, <http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/WORKING%20110%20PDF%20d%2022.pdf>
- Chinguwo, P. (2008), 'Study of Chinese Investments in Africa: The Case Of Malawi', Africa Labour Research Network (ALRN) report, <https://rebeccachimjeka.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/study-on-chinese-investment-s-in-africa-the-case-of-malawi.pdf> (Accessed: 10 November 2015).
- De Bruyn, T. (2014), 'Brazil, India, China And South Africa in Agriculture And Food Security In Malawi', *KU Leuven and HIVA* paper nr. 13., <https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/13-de-bruyn-afs-24032014.pdf> (Accessed 10 November 2015).
- Durevall, D. and Mussa, R. (2010), 'Employment Diagnostic Analysis on Malawi, ILO working paper, [http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed\\_emp/---emp\\_policy/---cepol/documents/publication/wcms\\_143247.pdf](http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_policy/---cepol/documents/publication/wcms_143247.pdf) (Accessed: 10 November 2015).
- FOCAC, 2006, FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION, BEIJING ACTION PLAN (2007-2009) , <http://www.focac.org/eng/ltada/dscbjhy/DOC32009/t280369.htm> (Accessed: March 20<sup>th</sup>, 2015)
- Gu, J. (2012), 'China's Private Enterprises in Africa and the Implications for African Development', *European Journal of Development Research*, 21(4): 570–587.
- Hanauer, L. and Morris, L. J. (2014), 'Chinese Engagement in Africa Drivers: Reactions, and Implications for U.S. Policy', RAND Corporation Report, [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\\_reports/RR500/RR521/RAND\\_RR521.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR521/RAND_RR521.pdf) (Accessed: 19 November 2015).

- Haroz, D. (2011), 'China in Africa: Symbiosis or Exploitation?', *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 35(2): 65-88.
- Huang, M. (2012), 'China Foreign Aid: Policy Evolution and Development Trend' (中国对外援助: 政策演变及未来趋势), *International Economy Cooperation*(国际经济合作), 2012(3): 81-84
- Huang, Meibo. (2010), 'The Current Situation, Problems and Measures of Medium and Small Scale Enterprises' Investment in Africa' (我国中小企业对非投资的现状、问题与对策), *International Economic Cooperation* (国际经济合作), 2010 (12) , pp 15-19
- Kaplinsky, R. and Morris, M. (2009), 'Chinese FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa: Engaging with Large Dragons', *European Journal of Development Research* 24(1): 551-569.
- Karakaplan, U. M., Neyapti, B., and Sayek, S. (2005), 'Aid and Foreign Direct Investment: International Evidence', Bilkent University discussion paper no. 05-05.
- Kimura, H. and Todo, Y. (2010), 'Is Foreign Aid a Vanguard of Foreign Direct Investment? A Gravity-Equation Approach', *World Development*, 38(4): 482-497.
- Lengauer, S. (2011) 'China's Foreign Aid Policy: Motive and Method', *Culture Mandala: Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural & Economic Studies*, 9(2): 35-81.
- Mawdsley, E. (2007), 'China and Africa: Emerging Challenges to the Geographies of Power', *Geography Compass* 1(3): 405-421.
- MOFF, 2014, The Relationship between China and Malawi, [http://www.chinanews.com/gj/zlk/2014/01-16/267\\_2.shtml](http://www.chinanews.com/gj/zlk/2014/01-16/267_2.shtml) (Accessed: March 20<sup>th</sup>, 2015)
- NYU Wagner School, April 25, 2008, 'Understanding Chinese Foreign Aid: A Look at China's Development Assistance to Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America' <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40361.pdf> (Accessed: November 19<sup>th</sup> 2015)
- Sanfilippo, M. (2010), 'Chinese FDI to Africa: What Is the Nexus with Foreign Economic Cooperation?' *African Development Review*, 22(S1): 599-614.
- Selaya, P. and Sunesen, E. R. (2012), 'Does Foreign Aid Increase Foreign Direct Investment?' *World Development* 40(11): 2155-2176.
- Shen, X. (2013), 'Private Chinese investment in Africa: Myths and Realities', World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series 6311, available at: <http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-6311> (Accessed 10 November 2015).
- Sun, Y. (2014), 'Africa in China's Foreign Policy', *Brookings working paper*, [http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2014/04/africa-china-policy-sun/africa-in-china-web\\_cmg7.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2014/04/africa-china-policy-sun/africa-in-china-web_cmg7.pdf)(Accessed: November 19<sup>th</sup> 2015)

Tull, D. M. (2006), 'China's Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 44(3): 459–479.

Wallis, W (2013), 'China plans multimillion Ethiopia investment', 03 June 2013, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/37011562-cc6d-11e2-9cf7-00144feab7de.html#axzz3StOeZ14W> (Accessed: November 19<sup>th</sup>, 2015).

Xinhua agency, 2006, China's African Policy , [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-01/12/content\\_4042521\\_3.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-01/12/content_4042521_3.htm), (Accessed: March 20<sup>th</sup>, 2015)

Yang Hongxi (2010), China's Foreign Aid: Achievements, Lessons and Benign Development, (中国对外援助：成就、教训和良性发展), *International Landscape (国际展望)*, 2010年第1期, 46-56,

Yang Yishuang, 2011, the Effects and Promotion of China FDI in Africa (中国对非投资的发展效应与推进路径研究), *Economic Affairs(经济界)*; 2011(02): pp91-96

Yao Guimei, (2009), 'The Overall Evaluation of China FDI in Africa (中国在非洲直接投资的总体评估)', *West Asia and Africa(西亚非洲)*, 2009(7): pp 48-54

Zhang Hanlin, 2010, The Relevance between China ODA and FDI to Africa (中国对非洲 ODA 与 FDI 关联度研究), *World Economy Study (世界经济研究)*, 2010 (11), pp 69-74

Zhang Hongming, 2006, The Evolution of China Aid Policy and Means for China-Africa Cooperation(中国对非援助政策的沿革及其在中非关系中的作用), *Asia & Africa Review (亚非纵横)*, 2006(04): pp 44-49

Zhao Zhiguo, 2011, China will support more civil welfare projects in the twelfth-five years. ("十二五"期间中国对外援助将更加关注民生项目), *China Construction News( 中国建筑报)*, C01, April 28<sup>th</sup>

## Appendix 6: Blurring Boundary: An Exceptional Strategy for Sustainability

### 模糊的边界—另类的可持续方案<sup>13</sup>

唐丽霞 李小云

玉米是属于挣钱比较少的作物，实际上所有大田作物都不挣钱，经济作物我们中心不能种，因为中心的职能就是大田作物示范，因此这就有矛盾了，一边要试验示范，一边还要可持续发展，这两个就矛盾了。当地农民、协会、大学和研究所经常来中心参观，示范中心的农场经营并不比白人农场种得好，但白人经营农场，不教非洲人。

---示范中心的于工如是说

#### 一、 国际发展援助框架中的可持续性问题和应对

在国际发展话语体系中，可持续性是和援助有效性密切的，是评价援助有效性的重要指标，而援助的不可持续性，也被称为不确定性，通常被视为是影响援助有效性的一个重要因素（Mcgillivray, 2006）；对于传统援助的一个广泛的批评就是当援助资金停止后，援助项目难以自我维持或者就失败了（Lawson, 2012）。通常来说，援助的可持续有三层含义：首先，是援助行动本身的可持续性，这主要是指指援助国和受援国都能够积极创造条件努力，降低两国政治、经济、社会变革对援助行动的影响，使得援助行动具有连续性，这个层面的可持续性更多是与援助的条件性相对的，西方援助体系往往会将发展中国家的政治结构和治理设置、人权纪录等作为是否提供援助的依据，如 2014 年年底，因为坦桑尼亚独立电力公司第三方托管资金丑闻，12 个坦主要援助国宣布暂时冻结对坦共计约 5.58 亿美元援助资金；津巴布韦宣布实施土地改革后，西方国家则停止对其提供发展援助，直到 2014 年，欧盟和国际货币基金组织才取消对津巴布韦的制裁；“现金门”事件发生后，英国等随即停止了对马拉维的预算援助等。国际社会对于援助本身的可持续关注是比较多的，2002 年，蒙特雷共识提出的国际发展援助要和受援国发展需要和目标相结合、取消援助附带条件、依托发展中国家自己的发展框架等都是在努力改善援助国和受援国之间的合作和协调关系，从而确保援助行动的可持续性。2005 年巴黎合作宣言则又增加了援助国之间的合作以及相互责任来提高援助资源的协调性；2008 年阿克拉行动计划则更加强调了受援国的自主权，强调援助国应当尊重受援国的发展优先序等。

第二个层面的可持续是项目实施的可持续性，主要是指援助项目的确定、设计、实施和监测评估等周期性活动能够持续进行，不会出现中止或大的根本性的调整等情况。这个层面的可持续性通常也和受援国和援助国双方的政治经济文化条件密切相关，如一些大型基础设施内项目是否会受到国内外环境关注者的压力、一些社会发展项目是否受到本土社会文化的排斥以及受援国政府能否为项目实施提供必要的配套条件，包括信息、组织、人力以及适当资金上的支持，这些因素都会影响到援助项目是否能够可持续进行。Ostrom（2012）等研究认为受援国对项目的所有权和拥有感是影响援助项目效果可持续的关键因素，项目的所有权

---

<sup>13</sup>本研究得到了“北京市青年英才计划”、“英国国际发展部资助的中国国际发展研究网络研究课题系列”和“中国和巴西在非洲的农业行动（CBAA）”等研究计划的联合支持。

和拥有感可以通过四个方面的行动来培育：1) 参加援助行动的讨论，表明需求，并共同讨论如何获得相应的资源；2) 直接参与和投入援助项目，如投入时间、精力和相关资源；3) 分享援助项目成功的收益以及分担项目失败的风险；4) 参与与项目相关活动的决策（如决策项目启动后是否要继续）。Rizkallah(1998)认为影响到项目可持续的因素包括三个方面：1) 项目设计和实施方面的因素，主要包括项目的协商谈判、项目的效果、项目周期、项目的财政资源、项目类型以及相关培训活动；2) 项目的组织设计和管理，主要包括组织和机构的优势，和当前其他项目的匹配程度以及项目的领导和管理；3) 社会环境因素，主要包括社会经济和政治诉求的一致性以及社区参与程度等。澳大利亚海外发展署一直都重视项目的可持续性，对影响项目可持续的因素进行了系统的分析和研究，并积极运用到该国的国际发展援助项目，该机构认为影响到项目可持续性的因素包括9个方面：1) 受援国的政策和援助国的援助政策；2) 当地的参与和拥有感；3) 项目的组织和管理；4) 项目的财政资源；5) 意识倡导和培训；6) 技术；7) 社会、性别和文化因素；8) 环境；9) 外部的政治和经济要素（AusAid, 2000）。

第三个层面是援助效果的可持续性，是指援助项目运行周期结束后，援助提供的基础设施和服务条件仍然能够继续为受援国所用和服务，援助提供的相关技术能够继续为受援国所采纳等。一些国际机构，如世界银行、亚洲开发银行等，比较重视项目结束后的绩效评估，绩效评估主要考察项目成效、结果的可持续性、制度发展影响、世行与借款人的工作绩效以及经验和教训等，项目影响的可持续是绩效评估的重要内容，可持续标准考察的是人力资源、制度资源、资金资源和自然资源是否足以维持项目周期内取得的成果，是否存在需要管理或者能够管理的风险，可持续是运营绩效不可或缺的组成部分，受项目设计和实施的影响。在可持续评估中关注的重点是项目的财务安排、社会支持、项目机构的管理能力、相关政策支持等方面的要素，而不仅仅是项目产出的可持续性。世界银行提出的可持续测量的9个要素是值得参考和借鉴的：技术恢复力；金融恢复力（包括成本恢复政策）；经济恢复力；社会支持（包括受安全政策影响的条件）；环境恢复力；政府所有权（包括中央政府和机构，获得运行维护基金的可能性）；其他利益相关者的所有权（包括地方参与、受益者激励、公民社会、非政府组织、私人部门）；制度支持（包括提供相关支撑的法律规章框架，组织管理成效）；对外部影响的恢复力（包括贸易、经济波动、地区政治和安全状况）。对于可持续的评判标准，世界银行和亚洲开发银行仍然采用的是四级衡量标准（优、良、一般和差）。

从对援助可持续的关注三个层面来看，国际社会更多是从受援国提供相对稳定并数量可观的援助资源、重视和受援国之间的关系以及强调受援国的优先需求、对援助管理提供更为细致和更为全面的技术规范和制度约束以及增强不同援助主体之间的援助协调性等方面来解决援助的可持续性问题。这些方面的努力在一定程度上能够让援助产业整体的效果得到改善，但很难解决个体的援助项目的可持续性问题，援助的有效性仍然面临很多挑战。并且随着全球性金融危机和经济增长的不景气，发展筹资出现了困难，一些国家削减了对外援助预算，如2009年爱尔兰对外援助预算减少了24%，德国援助预算减少了12%（Conley, 2012）。因此，在讨论发展筹资的蒙特雷共识开始倡导私人部门在国际发展中的作用，建议在国际发展援助体系中更多运用公私合作方式（Public Private Partnership, PPP），从而改善发

展援助的效果，公私合作模式可以通过融入商业利润机制来促进援助的可持续性（Lawson, 2011）。

公私合作是指公共部门和私人部门合作共同提供某种服务，在这个过程中，公共部门和私人部门共同分担风险、成本和收益（Klijin and Teisman, 2003），这种方式并不是一个新的发展模式，但更多被运用于国内发展中，尤其是基础设施建设领域，在这种模式下，私人部门能够提供项目设计、施工、财务管理以及后续维护等服务（Sambrani, 2014）。公私合作方式的优点在于通过市场机制的引入，能够降低项目的运行成本，提高项目的效果，尤其是能够改善所提供服务和产品的质量（Auzzir, 2014）。近年来，国际发展领域开始越来越多的采用公私合作方式，如美国、英国、德国、澳大利亚、荷兰、法国等国以及世界银行、欧盟等国际机构。从1999年到2009年，德国大约用14亿欧元的发展援助资金启动了3375个公私合作项目，从2003年到2012年，荷兰使用了22.3亿欧元实施了75个公私合作项目，英国虽然没有公布公私合作项目的资金额度，但在其发展战略文件中明确强调了开展公私合作将是英国未来对外援助的一个重点方向（Conley, 2012）。目前在国际发展援助领域中，有四种常见的公私合作模式，包括穷人参与供给环节（pro-supply-chain initiatives）、购买公共服务（service delivery partnerships）和在卫生领域内共同合作（product development partnerships in health）以及包容性的商业行为（inclusive business approaches in general）模式，即发展机构为企业提供的技术、知识和前期抵抗风险资金的支持，来促进企业向有利于穷人的产业和行业进行投资（Callan & Davies, 2013）。虽然从理论上来说，市场机制能够提高援助的可持续性，但除了一些案例以外，并没有实证的研究来证明公私合作方法比非公私合作方面更能促进可持续性，虽然很多发展机构认为是能够带动更多资源进入发展领域，在援助资金结束后，发展干预能够继续开展的全新的机遇（Lawson, 2011），但也会带来很多挑战，诸如管理的困难、发展优先的曲解、不公平竞争以及糟糕的合作伙伴等（Lawson, 2011）。此外，不同国家在公私合作上的理解也存在很大的不同，英国更强调公私合作对援助效果改善的作用，更多将受援国的公司企业或非政府机构作为合作的伙伴，而非本土的英国机构；德国则更多将公私合作当成捆绑援助的方式，从而更多促进本国企业产品的出口，法国则将公私合作作为进行发展预算筹资的重要手段，希望借助增加私人部门税收的方式来提高发展援助资金规模（Conley, 2012）。但是，无论如何，公私合作显然成为国际发展体系藉以改善援助效果和可持续性的重要途径。

## 二、中国对外援助政策对可持续问题的关注

中国的对外援助从基本理念、主要原则、援助方式等方面和西方发展援助体系都呈现出显著的差异，但二者都非常关注援助的效果问题，尤其是关注援助的可持续性。1958年，中国的第一个有关对外援助工作的正式文件《关于加强对外经济技术援助工作领导的请示报告》中指出，为了保证我国对外提供的经济技术援助能够取得较好成效，必须按照受援国的具体情况，“采取因地制宜，以中、小为主和土洋结合的方法，帮助他们建立起自己的工业基础”，援助“不是造成他们对我们的依赖，而是帮助和推动他们自力更生。”以及“要确保援外项目的工程质量和按期完成”（李伟，2010年）。在第一次系统概况和阐明中国对外援助的基本立场和原则的八项基本原则中，中国政府就明确提出：“中国政府对外提供任何一种技术援助的时候，保证做到使受援国的人员充分掌握这种技术”，从而表明中国对外提供援

助中希望负责到底的精神（李承为，1986），这种“负责到底”实际上就是要保持援助项目的可持续性。

在计划经济时期，中国对外援助采取的国家控制型的援助管理体制（唐丽霞，等，2014），通过中央负责制定援外政策、相关部委负责援外政策执行和项目管理的方式（周弘，2008年），利用行政指令和政治动员来保证援外物资和成套项目建设的质量，援外项目的顺利实施，并要求“派到受援国帮助进行建设的专家，同受援国自己的专家享受同样的物质待遇，不容许有任何特殊要求和享受”。这一时期，中国的对外援助由于政策制定过多地与政治斗争、革命事业相联系，决策更多来自于最高领导人意志，没有坚持量力而行的方针（李伟，2010年），1971-1975年间，中国的援外财政支出始终占5%左右，最高年份达到7.2%（朱蓉蓉，2011年），使得当时中国提供了超出了经济能力的对外援助，同时高度政治动员模式下援助项目管理方式也造成了援外项目过于依赖中国援助专家的作用，一旦中国专家撤离，项目就容易陷入失败的困境，如美国学者黛博拉调研发现，非洲大部分中国援助的农业项目均已中止，只有冈比亚等少数国家的农民还在坚持种植中国水稻，有些农业项目在中国专家撤离后荒废的速度令人吃惊，1979年塞拉利昂农业部管理的十个农场长满杂草，此时距中国结束援助只有两年（蒋华杰，2013年）。因此，援助项目的可持续性成为困扰中国对外援助的主要问题，对可持续问题的关注和改善也成为后来中国援助管理改革的基本出发点（唐丽霞，等，2014）。

改革开放初期，邓小平提出对外援助效率原则的基本要求是减少数量，但不影响质量（周弘，2008年）。1980年，国务院颁布的《关于认真做好援外工作的基点意见》客观分析了过去援外工作中存在的弊端：“对外援助没有坚持量力而行，不注意经济规律，浪费比较严重”（朱蓉蓉，2011年），但中国政府仍然认为对外援助是“一个带有战略性质的问题”<sup>14</sup>，强调不能因为规模减少而影响援助质量和效果，援助的“具体办法要修改，真正使受援国得到益处”<sup>15</sup>。1983年，中国宣布了同非洲经济合作的“平等互利、讲求实效、形式多样、共同发展”四项基本原则，明确提出“中国同非洲国家进行经济技术合作，方式可以多种多样，因地制宜，包括提供技术服务、培训技术和管理人员、进行科学技术交流、承建工程、合作生产、合资经营等等”（朱蓉蓉，2011），1984年，中国政府出台了《关于巩固建成经援成套项目成果的意见》，提出了包括“加强项目建成后的技术合作，根据受援国的需要，积极参与企业的经营管理”等措施。这一时期密集颁布的各项政策文件希望能够通过援助方式的多样化来改善中国对外援助的经济性、质量和可持续。

为了实现援助效果改善的目标，采取的具体行动包括：第一，调整了援助领域，从援建生产性项目转向援建标志性建筑，援建了一批纪念碑式的项目，如会议中心、人民宫、体育场和医院等，由于管理标志性建筑比管理生产性项目简单，这种转变既减轻了中国的负担，又增加了项目的可持续性；从援助大型项目转向援建中小型项目，如援建乡村学校和一些必要的社会基础设施，派遣专家到受援国讲学、传授技术，邀请并资助受援国人员来华考察学习和进行技术培训等（周弘，2008年）。第二，调整援助方式，中国开始由提供物资和现汇为主的输血型方式，转向提供成套项目援助以及项目建成后的技术援助为主的造血型方式，如1979-1985年，中国对非洲经济援助中成套项目和技术援助所占的比重从37%提高到78%（李伟，2010年）。第三，改变传统的成套项目援助单纯的“交钥匙方式”，传统交钥匙方式是指中国负责项目的考察、设计，提供全套或部分成套设备、建筑材料，派人组织或指

---

<sup>14</sup> 出自1982年1月中共中央总书记胡耀邦《关于对外经济》关系一文。

<sup>15</sup> 出自1979年邓小平同志在第五次驻外使节会议上就对外援助工作的讲话。

导施工、安装或试生产，在项目建设过程中提供全面技术援助等（周弘，2008年）。这种方式由于受援国缺乏管理经验，许多成套项目效益不佳，甚至濒临倒闭，为了改变这种情况，中国开始主动与受援国就已经建成项目开展包括参与管理、代管经营、租赁经营、合作经营等在内的多种形式的管理合作（李伟，2010年），帮助受援国获得自力更生的能力，“授人以渔”，从而提高援助项目的可持续性。对于非生产性的成套项目，则配套提供技术合作项目，中国专家在工程完成后，继续与当地技术人员合作，提供技术管理和咨询服务，指导当地技术人员能够管理好这些项目（吕学俭，1988年）。

对于生产性成套项目效果改善实施的参与管理、合作管理、代管经营、租赁承包以及合资经营等方式的提出和实施，标志着中国在对外援助中开始引入了企业的力量，开始在对外援助中采用经济手段来提高援助效果，而不再是改革开放前仅仅依靠政治动员和强制型行政干预手段。同时，伴随着国内援助主体机构的企业化改制，援外项目的承包责任制等市场化改革等，企业主体和市场机制和中国的援外项目开始紧密结合。但是，需要指出的是，这一时期，这种结合的目标还仅仅是为了改造已经濒临困境的成套项目，巩固对外援助项目的成果，参与管理、合作管理和代管经营这三种模式下，改造后的援助项目的收益仍然属于受援国一方，如中国在和马里的糖厂、药厂、纺织厂、皮革厂和茶厂的合作管理协定中，明确提出“企业的经营成果全部归马方”（金言文，1988年），在实行代管的卢旺达水泥厂，也是由卢方享受盈利并承担亏损（王海燕，1987年）；租赁承包和合资经营两种方式下，中方企业能够参与一定的利益分享，但采取这种方式的改造项目非常少，分别只有多哥的糖联和牙买加纺织厂（吕学俭，1988年）。这种改革为后来中国援外体制进一步改革，企业更多参与援外工作奠定了基础。但是，以合作管理为主的对援建项目的改造在中国专家撤出后重新荒废，出现了“建设-移交-中断-再投入-再移交-再中断”的恶性循环（李小云，等，2009年），如马里糖厂，从1984年起，中国的中经对外公司一直对早期援建的马里糖厂提供合作管理技术支持，但其经营状况始终难以改善，直到1996年，中经对外公司和马里签订了合股经营合同，这种情况才有所改变。中经对外公司在中国援建的马里糖厂的基础上组建“上卡拉糖联”，中国占股60%，转制后的合资公司雇员达到了4500人，高峰期达到了7000人（周弘，2013：25，），白糖的产量达到了33万吨，每年为马里上缴300多万欧元的税收（钟清，2004<sup>16</sup>）。马里糖厂的合股经营改制则是中国政府为改善援助效果所采取的又一次制度上的改革和尝试。

企业参与援外工作真正开始于1990年代中期。1995年，中国再次召开了全国援外改革工作会议，这一次会议上，朱镕基副总理提出“要采取鼓励政策，推动中国的优秀企业到非洲开展各种形式的经济合作，选择有资源、有市场、有效益的项目，在当地建立合资经营企业”（齐国富，1995年），时任外经贸部部长吴仪明确指出改革援外方式，把政府援外资金与银行资金、企业资金结合起来，充分发挥金融机构和企业的作用，要推行两种方式：一种是提供具有援助性质的优惠贷款，一种是推动援外项目合资合作的方式，中国和受援国政府提供政策和资金扶持，主要以合资经营、合作经营的方式或中国企业独资经营的方式事实中国对外援助项目，从而使得援助项目效益和企业利益挂钩，提高援助效益，同时使得受援国能够增加收入和就业（齐国富，1995年），1998年，中国批准设立了“援外合资合作项目基金”，用于支持企业利用受援国当地资源和我国的设备、技术，与受援国企业在受援国经营有市场、有效益并以生产性为主的中小型合资合作项目（李伟，2010年）。将援助与企业经营相结合不仅可以产生利润，供养常驻人员，保证设备维护，从而延续援助项目的生命力和可持续性；更可作为示范样本带动其他企业模仿成功经验，或直接融入当地经济完善产业体系，提升产

---

<sup>16</sup> 钟清，2004，刺绣培训到非洲，《人民日报海外版》（2004年08月05日第八版）



能，创造就业；同时，企业能够切实深入地了解当地市场环境、把握发展动态，这意味着对利润的追求反而能够有利于改善援助的效果，提高援助的可持续性（唐晓阳，2014年）。虽然，这种方式在一定程度上模糊了商业与援助的界限，这些援助项目在企业化管理下改变了性质，基本演化成了完全的企业，原来具有公益性的试验站的技术示范功能则大多不存在，从而导致了对中国援外的商业性和中国企业缺乏社会责任的批评逐渐显现，中国对非援助也面临企业和国家、市场化和公益性的艰难平衡（张海冰，2012），但是，这种方式的提出直接催生了马里糖联的成功案例，类似案例还有中国农垦总公司在赞比亚的中赞友谊农场项目以及中国水产在非洲13个国家实施了23个渔业合作项目（隗文聚，2000），这些成功的案例也坚定了中国将援助和商业有机结合的做法进行扩展和推广的信心。

不管是1980年代中期的中国企业以各种方式参与管理，还是1990年代中期以来的中国企业的合资经营，这种商业化和市场化机制引入的援助项目主要都集中在生产性的成套项目，如农场、纺织厂、糖厂等；在非生产性成套项目中，如楼堂馆所建设等，中国仍然主要采用的是“交钥匙+技术合作”的方式，技术合作资金仍然以中国政府提供的无偿援助为主，这样的援助方式缺乏突破“建设-移交-中断-再投入-再移交-再中断”恶性循环的机制，在农业项目上情况尤为突出，如，几内亚金迪亚农业技术试验推广站项目，1982年建成后移交几内亚政府管理，1989年-1999年，中国政府又继续提供了四期技术合作项目，技术合作期结束后，随着中国专家的撤离，这个已经有了20年历史的农业合作项目再次关门（隗文聚，2000）。因此，2006年，中国国家主席胡锦涛在第三届中非合作论坛北京峰会上提出“要在非洲建立10个有特色的农业技术示范中心”之后，各方在讨论援非农业技术示范中心建设的时候达成了共识，要摆脱这一怪圈，实现可持续发展（徐继峰，秦路，2011年）。

### 三、一个机构，两块牌子---示范中心的可持续发展制度设计

生产性成套项目通过商业化合作实现了可持续和非生产性成套项目的技术合作维持公益性运作给示范中心的机制设置提供了参考的依据，农业示范中心项目从一开始就被赋予了三个目的：第一，要运用先进技术和机械设备，示范高产作物、良种繁育和各类蔬菜牲畜的生产，向当地社会展示现代化农业科技；第二，要培训所在国的技术人员和农民，传授实用技术；第三，希望中心能长期持续地运转（唐晓阳，2014年），为了实现这三个目标，中国政府设计了“成套项目+技术合作+商业运作”的复合型模式，也就是说，中国政府通过赠款项目直接将示范中心建设委托给公司、企业或者科研机构来进行成套项目建设，示范中心建成后，继续以技术合作的方式让承建公司或机构提供三年的示范培训活动，同时鼓励公司和企业利用建设期的三年和技术合作期的三年来在受援国寻求商业机会或者将中心建设成为能够收支平衡甚至盈利的商业农场，从而使得示范中心在技术合作期结束后能够持续运转。具体操作方式为：将示范中心项目分成三个阶段，即建设期、技术合作期和商业运营期。在建设期，中国政府通过成套项目方式提供4000万元的无偿援助资金建设示范中心，包括园区建设和农田基本建设等；在技术合作期，中国政府将每年提供500万元左右的援助资金来支持示范中心的基本运作，示范中心需要完成必要的生产试验、示范、培训和技术推广活动；商业运营期，通过承包企业和机构自身的商业化运营来满足示范中心的公益性功能的资源需求。很明显，这种政策设计下的示范中心符合国际上讨论日益增多的公私合作模式的基本特征。从基本运作设计来看，中国农业示范中心属于 Callan & Davies（2013）总结的公私合作四种模式中的第一种：包容性的商业行为（inclusive business approaches in general）<sup>17</sup>，即发展机构为企业提供一定的技术、知识和前期抵抗风险资金的支持，来促进企业向有利于穷人的产业和


---

<sup>17</sup> 其他三种分别是穷人参与供给环节（pro-supply-chain initiatives）、购买公共服务（service delivery partnerships）和在卫生领域内共同合作（product development partnerships in health）

行业进行投资。

在示范中心的运营实践中,商业化的投资经营行为和公益性的技术服务功能对于示范中心和其管理人员的身份界定带来了一定的困惑。“当我们和土豆收购公司去谈判、去收账的时候,我不能说我是示范中心,更不能说我是 China Aid 的;我们在给工人制定工资和签署合同的时候,也不能以中心的名义,因为如果以中心的名义,那就要按照政府部门的标准做工资;那工资太高了,我们承担不起,我们只能以农业公司的名义去定工资,我们只承担起农业工人的工资标准。”示范中心的人表达了他们在身份定位上的尴尬。为了解决身份认同问题,示范中心采取了“一个机构,两个牌子的”管理结构设置,即依托示范中心,注册一家农业公司,但公司的员工和中心的管理人员是同一批人,办理中心的事情的时候以中心的名义出场,办理公司的事情的时候则以公司的名义出面。这是中国在进行党政分家和政企分开改革过程中出现的特殊行政和管理现象,其含义是指一个机构有两个名称,根据工作需要,以不同的名义对外使用相应的名称和身份。目前大部分示范中心的承建公司和机构在当地注册了农业公司,负责农业投资。以津巴布韦示范中心为例,自从示范中心正式挂牌启用后,承建示范中心的中机美诺公司就在津巴布韦注册了 Agric-min 公司,该公司是示范中心所依托的国内承建公司的海外农业发展子公司,这样示范中心就兼具示范中心和农业开发公司两种性质完全不同的身份。作为示范中心,职能主要包括生产示范和培训;作为农业公司,职能主要包括农机销售、农业生产和农产品销售等。根据不同的职能,示范中心设立综合部、农业生产部、培训部、项目部和财务部。综合部主要负责劳动人事、安全、后勤服务等;农业生产部主要负责示范农场的农业生产和试验示范;培训部负责中心的各项培训任务,项目部负责外部联络,寻找农业合作机会;财务部则负责中心的财务事宜。同时, Agric-min 公司则相应设立了综合部、财务部、农业生产部、项目部和销售部。

图 1 示范中心的管理结构图



为了保证可持续,在示范中心的政策设计中还采用了一些其他技术性手段。第一个技术设计是选择承建的农业企业。中国政府延续对外援助传统的“以省包国”的方法来确定参与的企业,即由农业发展较好并且援外工作经验丰富的省份来确定示范中心的承建企业

(Brautigam & Tang, 2009),如承建坦桑尼亚中心的重庆中一种业,埃塞俄比亚中心的广西八桂田园。同时辅之以采取直接选定中央级别的国有农业企业的方式,如在南非和贝宁的中农发集团以及津巴布韦的中机美诺公司。无论是以省包国还是央企的直接介入,都是为了对这些企业行为有了多一层的监督和管理,尤其是以省包国的方式,还能够调动省级资源,以弥补可能出现的援助资金的不足,并且也能够将示范中心建设成各省农业企业在非洲发展

的合作平台，为将来援助停止以后，中心能够获得更多资源支持奠定基础。如莫桑比克中国农业技术示范中心由湖北省负责承建，时任湖北省委书记罗清泉访问莫桑比克期间，同莫科技部部长、农业部部长及中国驻莫大使、商务参赞等为示范中心奠基，并提出了“高水平建设一流示范中心”的指示精神，强调一定要把示范中心建成湖北优质农产品的展示基地，建成湖北先进农业技术推广的平台，目前，承建示范中心的湖北联丰公司已经成功将湖北万宝粮油公司和禾丰公司引进莫桑比克，在莫桑比克形成了农业投资联合体，提升示范重心的技术影响力和影响范围。

第二个技术设计是对公司企业的可持续发展进行全过程的指导和监督。承建企业在示范中心建设期就要进入受援国开展前期调研和简单的生产实验活动，在此基础上编制技术合作期和商业运营期的可持续经营方案，商务部和农业部组织专家对可持续发展经营方案进行评审。与此同时，商务部还委托农业部对外经济合作中心为示范中心的可持续发展提供技术支持，出台了《示范中心可持续监测评价手册》，对示范中心进行监测和评价。此外，商务部和农业部每年还组织“示范中心可持续发展研讨会”，邀请相应政府机构、金融机构、各个示范中心的代表和研究人员共同讨论和交流。这些政策措施和行动的最终目标是让各个机构、各个部门“共同协作、形成合力，积极营造示范中心可持续发展的有利环境”（农业部外经中心，2012）<sup>18</sup>。

第三个技术设计是鼓励受援国的参与和能力建设。对中国农业援助项目不可持续的原因中有一点几乎已成共识，那就是受援国政府在中国提供资金阶段参与性和主动性不足，援助结束后缺乏后续管理的能力，在示范中心技术设计时，也充分考虑到了这一点，明确提出示范重心建设期结束，就移交给受援国政府，示范中心的产权属于受援国，这样能够提高受援国的主动性和参与性。在技术合作期阶段，受援国政府要参与示范中心的管理，从而提高受援国的管理能力，为将来中方机构如果撤出，受援国有熟悉示范中心运营的团队继续进行管理，保证示范中心的可持续，如在津巴布韦，该国农业部委派了教育培训司的正、副司长，农机化司的副司长和示范中心所在地圭比农校校长四人组成管理委员会来共同参与示范中心的管理和运作。

#### 四、商业经营还是技术服务---示范中心功能的模糊

在示范中心的制度设计中，商业经营是为了让示范中心能够可持续运作，示范中心的优先功能仍然是进行技术示范和推广等公益性服务。中国商务部、受援国政府和承建公司等管理主体对于示范中心有着利益上的一致性，都希望示范中心能够持续运转下去，并且在“通过商业化运行来实现示范中心的可持续”的示范中心基本运行逻辑也达成了共识，如津巴布韦农业部教育司司长（管理小组组长）说：“这个中心还要继续运营至少 10 年的时间，我们希望中心能够可持续运营下去，中心进行一些商业化的经营，这是可以的。”中国商务部的官员也曾经在一次会议上明确表示“可持续发展是示范中心项目的目标，建立示范中心旧事要为企业走出去提供平台，通过可持续发展发挥示范中心的公益性”。示范中心的承建单位也认为“只有把示范中心建好了，才能创下品牌，找到投资的机会”。由此可见，示范中心兼顾商业经营和技术服务双重功能已经得到参与到示范中心管理的各个不同主体的共识，但是这种共识在实践中遇到了挑战。

为了实现这双重功能，示范中心的建设基本全部按照“园区+农场”的模式，每个示范中心都会有占地 1-2 公顷不等的园区和面积在 50-100 公顷不等的配套农场，以津巴布韦示范中

---

<sup>18</sup>农业部对外经济合作中心，援非农业技术示范中心可持续发展研讨会在京成功召开，[http://www.moa.gov.cn/sydw/wjzx/xwdt/201205/t20120507\\_2619079.htm](http://www.moa.gov.cn/sydw/wjzx/xwdt/201205/t20120507_2619079.htm)

心为例，园区占地 2 公顷，分为办公区、生活区和生产加工区三个部分，办公区有 20 多间房间，其中，三间培训教室，每个培训教室有 30 个座位，示范中心的培训活动和接待来参观的代表团都是在这些教室进行的；有四间仪器陈列室，用来水分、产量、质量等农业生产测产和监测；有一间会议室，中心的接待参观考察以及内部会议都是在这个会议室进行，每天早上 7 点半，中心工作人员会在这里召开工作例会，讨论一天的工作。办公区的南侧是两层的生活楼，生活楼有独立的厨房、餐厅、储藏室以及 30 间左右带独立卫生间的房间，示范中心的管理人员及家属住在一层，有来访的客人也会住在示范中心空余的房间里。办公区的北边是生产加工区，这个区域有全封闭式的库房，存放在农业机械的配件和种子、化肥等生产资料，此外，还有半封闭式的仓库和混凝土浇筑的广场，主要用来存放农业机械以及晾晒收获的农产品等，主要有电脑烤烟箱、拖拉机、喷药机、联合收割机、犁铧等，这些农业机械大部分都是示范中心承建的农机公司生产的，一些机械只是用来展示，如烤烟机，一些机械既用于展示，也同时用来进行生产。此外，示范中心还拥有面积为 74 公顷的农场，农场距离园区大约 300 米，在每年的雨季，农场主要种植土豆、大豆和玉米，在旱季，农场主要种植小麦。莫桑比克、埃塞俄比亚和坦桑尼亚等国的农业技术示范中心和津巴布韦示范中心有着相似的布局。从园区建设和农场配置来看，农业技术示范中心和中国国内的农业技术实验站的结构基本上是一致的：生活办公综合楼、实验辅助用房、晾晒场院、农机仓库以及配套农场<sup>19</sup>。

参照中国国内农业技术试验站基本架构建设的中国农业示范中心基本上能够满足“试验示范、技术培训和推广”功能的需求，也正因为此，虽然目前尚难以对农业技术示范中心的影响进行全面的评估，但是农业技术示范中心“在国际上已经声名远扬，联合国开发计划署、粮农组织等国际机构，发达国家和发展中国家的政府都对此给予了高度关注”（刘俊峰，2013），示范中心已成为“金字招牌”，是中国对非农业援助的标志性形式，并成为“同非洲国家共享现代农业技术的重要平台”（FOCAC，2012）。在津巴布韦，联合国粮食计划署（WFP）官员两次前往示范中心，对于示范中心的硬件设施条件进行了考察，对于未来能够依托示范中心开展相应的农业技术培训活动表现出极强的兴趣和信心。对于示范中心的培训，中国政府有最为基本的要求：“要进行试验示范，要每年至少培训 120 人次”，因此，各个示范中心也都在开展品种试验和培训活动。如在津巴布韦的示范中心，先后开展了试种国内品种和当地品种、开展农机使用培训、和农校合作开展了土豆种植周末培训班以及参加各种农业展览会等；埃塞俄比亚的示范中心举办农民培训班和农业技术员培训；坦桑尼亚示范中心开展水稻种植技术农民培训班以及试验不同的水稻、玉米、蔬菜品种等；莫桑比克示范中心开展了 15 期的农民培训以及试种水稻、玉米和大棚蔬菜等。

虽然各个示范中心都非常清楚中心在技术推广和传播方面的公共服务功能的重要性，但是，显然，让示范中心管理人员更有压力的是示范中心的可持续运作，津巴布韦示范中心的蒋总在调研的时候表示，“园区的正常运营每年至少要 200 万，包括人员工资、设备维护、迎来送往以及培训等；虽然这三年有国家的钱，运作不成问题，但是我们要考虑三年以后，三年以后我们要靠自己”。承建示范中心的部分公司企业以及科研机构没有在所在国家甚至非洲有过投资经历，如承建津巴布韦、坦桑尼亚和埃塞俄比亚的公司在这些国家都没有投资经历，对于他们来说，寻找商业机会还面临很多困难。在示范中心调研时，一位负责人非常明确的表示：“要带动企业走出来，这是一件很复杂的事情，不能想象这里很适应，我们国内有几个农业公司能挣钱？我不懂他们的盈利模式是什么。但没有加工可能做不能挣钱，非

---

<sup>19</sup> 笔者对中国农业大学设立在曲周、开封、上庄、通州、武川等地的农业技术实验站的简介进行了总结，发现所有的农业技术实验站都是这样的框架配置。

洲的农产品市场在哪里，有劳动力有土地，但没有基础设施，如果投入成本很大，没有公司能承担起这个成本。非洲农产品的市场在哪里，比如说养牛，牛肉卖到哪里，皮具等半成品卖到哪里。”这个承建公司虽然已经在东道国经营了近四年，但仍然没有找到投资机会。另一个示范中心的负责人的一项主要工作就是编写项目可研报告，考察了东道国很多的农场，并且也和很多农场主、农业公司和协会等联系过，该示范中心负责人表示，首先，寻找合作项目的机会，目前正在竭力争取和当地监狱局合作，希望能够扩大合作农场的种植面积；其次，通过各种机会试图扩大农场面积和扩大经营范围，如经商处汇报、部长来访以及国内公司的活动等，让当地政府能够多提供土地，或者允许其在当地开展农机维修服务。但是从目前来看，扩大土地面积和经营范围难度很大，“农业部也没有权力给我们更多的土地，搞农机维修的报告还在申请，难度也很大。”因此，中心目前就把工作的重点放在了找合作项目上了。在一次中心的全体会议上，示范中心负责人部署了 2013 年工作重点，包括物资保管、销售分成以及项目工作，“2013 年，一共有 11 个项目要计划，第一个是监狱局项目，第二是阿达公司的项目，关于三个农场，.....第九个是奶牛场项目，第十个是视频教材项目；第十一个是沼气项目。大家分头准备。”在 11 个项目中，有 8 个是关于争取合作项目的。但是，示范中心对于这些合作项目的前景并不乐观，“刚才说的那么多项目肯定一个都搞不成功。”

商业投资和经营面临很多困难，这些公司为了能够实现可持续运作，只能努力经营示范中心附属的农场，希望获得收益来满足园区运作所需经费；以津巴布韦示范中心为例，示范中心不仅在其近 80 公顷的农场上轮作了土豆、大豆和玉米三种作物，还和圭比农校合作种植了 100 公顷的土地，同时还为周边农场提供了代耕代收服务，销售其国内公司的农机，每年的利润收入大约在 18 万元左右。埃塞俄比亚的示范中心种植了 120 亩蔬菜，还饲养了蛋鸡、肉牛和肉猪，通过销售蔬菜、鸡蛋等获取部分收入；莫桑比克示范中心则更多借助整合湖北省的农业投资资源，共同在莫桑比克进行大农场开发等。但是，仅仅依托示范中心现有的农业生产资源，其收入是难以维持示范中心的运作的。“维持示范中心园区的运作每年至少要 200 万，包括人员工资、设备维护、迎来送往以及培训等；农场目前刨去生产投入，种地收入大约能有 18 万元。如果农场面积扩大到 600 公顷才可以维持中心运转。”

表 1 示范中心的双重功能

示范中心	技术推广服务	商业经营活动
津巴布韦示范中心	周末土豆协会农民培训 农机技术员培训 高校大学生实习培训等 生产试验示范	农场种植大豆、玉米和土豆销售 农机代耕代收服务 销售农业机械 转租土地等
埃塞俄比亚示范中心	周边农民技术培训 生产试验示范	蔬菜种植和蛋鸡养殖
莫桑比克示范中心	举办了 15 期农业官员、农业技术员、农业生产者培训	建立湖北-加扎友谊农场和其他公司合作进行农业开发
坦桑尼亚示范中心	水稻、玉米、蔬菜等品种生产试验示范 举办了 7 期农业技术员培训	蔬菜生产销售和蛋鸡养殖

资料来源：实地调研

虽然示范中心通过“一个机构，两块牌子”的方式来架构示范中心在公共服务功能和商业

功能上的界线，这种在中国特定历史阶段发挥“政府和市场”双重作用的经验虽然在一定时期内缓解了中国进行市场化改革所面临的制度性障碍，但这最终只是过渡性的制度安排，最终还是要实现“政企分开”，并且这种设置和当时中国的经验刚好相反，中国成功的经验是让政府主体兼负市场功能，从而逐渐走向市场化，而示范中心机制则是促进企业主体承担公共职能。虽然全球和国内农业技术服务主体市场化和私人化已成为趋势，但是这些企业从事技术推广服务的动力主要来源于对市场的占有，通过市场推广服务来扩大其在农业投入和农产品市场的份额（Schwartz, 1994<sup>20</sup>），但显然，目前示范中心的承建公司在东道国还不具备这样的条件和能力，其承担的农业技术推广服务内容和本身企业的经营范围之间没有直接的联系，同时，公司目前还未能东道国进行有效的商业投资。在强烈的政策和可持续生存双重压力下，虽然各个示范中心都已经按照商务部的要求完成了每年的培训任务，一些示范中心还开展了一些其他的技术示范活动，但是由于可持续的压力更为直接，示范中心更多呈现出来的是将更多精力放在了经营农场上了，从而造成了示范中心功能上的模糊，让示范中心处于相对尴尬的境地。东道国政府不满足于示范中心偏重于商业运作，“他们忘了他们为什么要来这里，他们来这里的真正目的，他们总是来找我谈如何扩大土地经营”；示范中心的主管部门经商处也对其有不满，“中心现在以商业投资为重，援外的配置不足；给他们说了很多次了，如果不提的话，他们在示范培训方面都要歇业了。”而示范中心负责人也很无奈，“我们也很为难，我们已经做了很多事情了，但是他们仍然说我们是‘大白象’”，东道国希望示范中心要优先考虑提供技术示范和培训，中国政府则希望中心在完成技术示范和培训的任务基础上来进行适当的商业化经营和运作，公司则希望示范中心要完成每年的经营任务和项目目标，某示范中心的员工表示“我们中心是一个复杂的机构：一方面要完成中国政府的工作，要办培训班、要作试验、要作宣传；一方面还要搞可持续运作，要为公司挣利润，第三个是当地的农业部，农业部说你占了我的土地，要为我们服务，我们身上压着三座大山。”

国际上对于中国对非农业合作的一个特别普遍的判断是很难将以公共部门为主体的发展援助和以企业为主体的经贸合作区分开来，他们之间的边界是比较模糊的，这些讨论大部分是因为在非洲进行农业投资的企业是具有极强公共性质的国有企业，如在赞比亚的 15 个中资农场有 6 个都是国有农场，这些投资也更倾向于被认定为发展援助（Freeman et al, 2009）。换句话说，商业开发的主体带有公共性从而产生了商业开发行为具有了公共服务的援助功能，而农业示范中心则正好相反，是公共服务的提供主体带有很强的商业色彩，从而导致了行动的商业化特征超过了援助的公共服务性特征，在示范中心工作的人首先是公司的人，然后才是提供援助的人，而这种情况也正是很多研究者所担心的公私合作导致的发展优先的曲解（Lawson, 2011）。商业化和公益性双重目标使得示范中心“既要考虑咱们国家的利益，还要考虑受援国的利益，还要考虑公司的利益，还要考虑中心的利益，还要考虑个人的利益”，但是，“中心就这么几个人，让我们去考虑这么多利益基本上是不可能”。不同目标之间的冲突时常发生，而这不同的目标来自于不同的主体，示范和培训的目标来自于中国政府和津巴农业部，商业化的目标来自于国内的总公司，示范中心也就成为了国内公司、津巴农业部和中国政府不同主体之间相互角力的场域。

## 五、援助人员还是农场经营者？---示范中心员工的身份困惑

和传统西方援助体系相比，中国对外援助既没有专门的海外援助管理机构，也没有建立起职业的发展产业（Haan, 2011），援外人员通常都是由援助项目的承建机构来选派，由于

---

<sup>20</sup> THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND CASE STUDIES, 1994,

<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.89.8798&rep=rep1&type=pdf>

过去援外项目主要以成套项目为主，主要是基础设施建设等“交钥匙”工程，即便后期提供技术合作援助，援外人员主要是工程技术人员，与当地互动的需求相对较弱，项目结束以后，大部分援外人员都回到国内的工作岗位上，因此，虽然中国已经开展了 60 年左右的援外工作，完成了 2000 多个援外项目，但并没有形成专业化和职业化的援外队伍。援助人员的选拔还是依托各个公司现有的人力资源，从人员选择上，通常都是具有比较强的专业知识，但是在援外工作上则大部分人员缺乏足够的经验。调研发现，示范中心的工作人员同样大部分都是国内的公司员工，一些非农业企业承建的公司会聘请一些农业专家来示范中心开展工作。以某示范中心为例，一共有八名员工，从其受教育背景、国内工作经验来看，没有一个人有对外援助的管理经验，甚至没有参与援外项目工作的经验，选拔的标准是以经营和管理农场出发的，“我们真不懂援外，我来这里以后，也看到其它国家的搞援外工作的人，感觉别人做的挺专业的，我们做的好像和他们不太一样。来这里之前，我们也参加了培训，主要内容包括农业经济、农业机械、植物保护、财务管理、国际法律法规和马铃薯种植等方面的内容，一个曾经在示范中心呆过两个月的老师给介绍了一些这个国家和示范中心的情况。”于是，示范中心的工作人员在组织培训以及其它技术生产示范等公共服务功能上经常会遇到困难，并且也经常因为缺乏宣传和介绍自己所做工作的经验和能力而让东道国不能理解和接受。“示范中心是一个新的方式，我们公司也的确没有这方面的经验，也没有成功成熟的经验供我们参考，因为每个示范中心目前面临的困境都是一样的。我们做了很多事情，但的确不太会宣传，他们就觉得我们什么也没有做，说我们是大白象，我们也很委屈。”西方的发展项目因为雇佣大量的发展专家和技术人员，从而产生了大量的人员费用，Brautigam（2009 年）的研究发现，莫桑比克有 3500 名西方技术专家，每年的费用大约是 3.5 亿美元，平均每名专家的费用为 10 万美元；整个非洲大约有 10 万外籍技术人员，每年的费用为 50 亿美元，人年均 5 万美元。从援助体系来讲，西方有大量的咨询公司，这无形中会增加援助的管理成本（Lancaster，2007 年）。中国采取依托公司派驻人员执行驻外项目，能够节约大量的人力资源，但是在一定程度上也带来了援助管理和项目实施上的一些困难。“公司觉得搞培训很简单，但实际上很困难”。目前 Y 工是目前示范中心培训部的负责人，但是他同时还是生产的负责人，对于培训工作，Y 工更多的是无奈，“关于培训，需要真正的培训专家，现在就我一个人负责培训，也不能去调研，还要做很多其他工作，我们现在的人员，英语连沟通都不顺畅，还要用英语去讲专业知识，不说我们了，就是国内也没多少人能做到”。“我是一个农场经理，我知道如何经营农场，但我的确不知道如何开展援助活动，在这里，也没有人给我指导。”

表 2 某示范中心工作人员基本情况

姓名	性别	年龄	教育背景	在国内的工作	英语水平	示范中心的岗位	农业公司的岗位
蒋总	男	54	农业机械专业本科	国有农场退休场长	不会	示范中心主任	农业公司总经理、工程项目部负责人
于工	男	51	农业机械专业本科	国有农场退休副场长	熟练	副主任，生产部和培训部负责人	农业公司副总，生产部负责人
刘工	男	52	高中	司机	简单交流	培训部工作	销售部负责人

						人员	
鞠工	男	45	高中	厨师	不会	综合管理部负责人	综合管理部负责人
郝某	女	46	会计高职	会计	不会	财务部负责人	财务部负责人
小王	男	25	园艺本科	刚入职的本科毕业生	熟练	生产部和培训部工作人员	工程项目部、生产部、综合管理部、财务部工作人员
小杨	男	26	农业机械专业本科	刚入职的本科毕业生	熟练	培训部工作人员、综合管理部工作人员	销售部、综合管理部工作人员
小李	男	24	国际贸易专业本科	刚入职的本科毕业生	熟练	培训部、综合管理部工作人员	工程项目部、综合管理部、销售部工作人员

在示范中心和农业公司运作的实践中，示范中心管理人员身兼数职的情况比组织架构文件所规定的还要复杂。我们记录某示范中心工作人员小王一周的主要工作，从他这一周的工作中，可以看到，作为示范中心生产部的工作人员，小王先后进行了制作农场试验品种标示牌和整理马铃薯生长记录两项工作，作为培训部的工作人员，小王开展了制作教学片，整理仪器室等活动，除此之外，小王还承担了部分示范中心综合管理部的工作，如处理中心网络故障和缴费以及采购割草机等工作。作为农业公司的工作人员，小王先后开展了生产部的土豆分拣工作、财务部的财务整理和工资核算工作、项目部的和中烟讨论合作以及综合部的采购工作。这种身兼数职并且要时时进行角色转化的情况并不仅仅发生在小王身上，示范中心的8名工作人员几乎人人都是一方面有着自己相对明确的分工，一方面又要时时准备承担临时出现的工作。此外，虽然示范中心雇佣当地的农业产业工人和保安，但是示范中心管理人员自己也会经常要干农业产业工人和保安，“在收玉米的时候，我们每个人都要下地，抢收，否则玉米在地里容易被偷；为了防止被偷，我们每天夜里轮班去地里巡逻，如果地里保安发现有偷盗情况，就会给我们打电话，我们都要去抓小偷。”

#### 专栏1 小王的一周

2月17日，上午运送土豆到当地的一个薯片公司，中午去通讯公司处理中心网络故障和费用问题，下午到机场接前来调研的团队。

2月18日，早上在办公室制作农场试验品种的标识牌；到生产操作区指导当地女工分拣土豆。然后去中烟国际公司讨论合作申请项目的事情，再到商业购物中心购买割草机，并在一家大型超市门口，和一个经纪人讨论到赞比亚投资的相关事宜。

2月19日，给前一天制作的标识牌喷漆，整理示范中心的仪器室，下午整理公司财务，核算临时工的用工信息，并计算工资和社会保险，整理工资单；制作教学片。

2月20日，上午安排当地女工分拣土豆，到农场地里插品种标示牌；中午整理公司财务，下午去超市采购中心的食物和生活必需品，整理马铃薯试验结果，并传回国内。



2月21日，上午安排当地工人打扫园区，整理示范中心的介绍材料，下午和蒋总一起陪同津巴布韦农业部的农业部长、大司长和常秘的检查，并担任翻译。

这种管理结构和人员配置上的安排，带有了工作人员在身份认同上的困惑，“我在做销售的时候，感觉自己是为公司工作，我在做培训准备的时候，感觉自己是为中心工作；一会公司，一会中心，感觉很不好”，虽然，工作人员也表示“我出去向别人介绍自己的时候总是说自己是示范中心的人”，更倾向于示范中心的身份认同，但是由于他们来示范中心工作是和公司签订了合同，其工资和奖金都是由公司决定的，因此，在实际的工作中，他们不得不以公司的安排为优先考虑，“我们的身份首先肯定是受雇于公司。我只是干好公司交给我们的事情”。

## 六、谁才是真正的管理者？--国内公司、东道国或者是商务部

按照中国和东道国签订的合作协议，示范中心建设工作完成并通过验收后，就移交给东道国政府，“示范中心是属于东道国政府”，东道国政府则将示范中心的管理权交给了农业部、科技部或者其它政府职能部门，如津巴布韦和埃塞俄比亚，由农业部来负责管理示范中心，莫桑比克则由科技部来负责管理；各个示范中心的负责人对这一点都非常明确，津巴布韦示范中心J总不只一次的强调：“中心是和津巴农业部合作的，由它来主管。”由于对示范中心拥有法律上的所有权，东道国通常会任命专门的人来管理示范中心，如，津巴布韦农业部专门任命了4个人成立了示范中心管理委员会，来参与示范中心的管理，这四个人分别为：教育和培训司的司长和副司长、农机化司的副司长以及圭比农校的校长。因为示范中心属于津巴布韦农业部，示范中心里的两辆车挂上了农业部的专门牌照，“这个非常重要，在这里，挂了政府牌照的车，不会被交警拦下罚款，到任何地方的停车场都不用缴费。”此外，示范中心目前所有的中方人员的工作签证都是由农业部向移民局提供的邀请和证明办理。除此之外，在日常工作中，津巴农业部也尽力为示范中心提供一些力所能及的支持，如帮助提供试验示范用的当地品种、协助参加农机展以及联络去参观津巴布韦的示范农场等。“农机化司认为中心以后他们要接管的，就想为中心做点事情，找了十几家公司来给我们提供生产试验的种子，但最后只有四家公司来了，每个公司就给了我们17个品种，每种2公斤，说还给我们提供化肥、农药、指示牌等”；“去年我们去参加哈拉雷农机展，这是农业部要我们去的。我们会以中心的名义参展，在展会上我们会做一些宣传和介绍，其它公司都是自己租地方展示，我们是占用农业部的地盘，我们和农业部的农计划司的机器放在一起，并且也和中国的农业专家的试验田放在一起，所以影响力比较大。”

津巴农业部非常希望将中心当成自己的一个品牌，虽然他们对中心的工作有着很多的不满，但是在对外宣传时，仍然竭力夸奖中国和中心对津巴农业的支持，他们希望这些机构能够依托中心来提供支持，为津巴布韦农民来中心参观考察提供资金的支持。这个出发点也使得示范中心在接受任何参观和访问时，津巴农业部都会呈现出对示范中心非常满意的态度，甚至是国内国内代表团来评估该示范中心时，“他们为我们说了很多好话，和平时对我们的态度完全不一样。”津巴布韦农业部表现出来的对示范中心的拥有权和直接管理权外，在示范中心日常的运营中，津巴布韦农业部的管理作用也是随处可见的，“津巴布韦农业部认为示范中心是他们的，他们也的确帮我们联系很多事情，安排我们参加当地的农业展览，展示我们的农业机械；和当地的种子公司联系，安排我们试种当地种子提供的品种；农业部还邀请我们去参观当地的农场开放日活动，学习如何进行农场的生产示范；他们还让圭比农校和我们联合一起举办培训班等，并且我们举办培训班的时候，他们的官员都要来在开班仪

式和结束仪式上讲话。”此外，发生在调研期间的迎接西方代表团参观的准备和接待工作也体现了津巴布韦农业部对示范中心的管理功能。

## 专栏2 迎接西方代表团的来访

示范中心接到了农业部的通知，西方国家代表团要参观，但大家并没有作太多准备，津巴农业部很重视，教育培训司副司长 Vengar 和农机化司副司长 Koza 提前一天来到示范中心，讨论第二天参观的具体安排，非常细致，谁讲话、讲什么、讲多长时间、座位安排以及参观路线都作了计划。Koza 表示：“我们主要是希望这些机构能够了解示范中心在研究、示范和技术推广方面所能发挥的作用，因为这些机构都在做社区项目，今后我们希望他们能够支持我们的农民来参观示范中心，能够为我们的农民提供交通、住宿等方面的费用。”在第二天的参观中，蒋总简要介绍了中心的基本情况，Venga 则非常详细的介绍了示范中心的主要功能以及已经开展的活动，Venga 说到：“示范中心有教室，有实验室，有示范田，有农业机械，农民可以来参观学习；我们并不限于中国在这里开展培训活动，其他的援助机构也可以来这里进行培训；这里有很好的条件，虽然我们现在有一部分资金来支持培训，但我们希望国际社会能为距离远的农民提供交通费 and 住宿费等”。当代表团结束参观离开后，Venga 对我说：“你看示范中心还是非常具有吸引力的，这些机构都是直接和社区和小农服务的，他们都不愿意在津巴布韦继续开展工作了，他们想离开，但是现在有了中心，让他们来参观，他们又有了留下来的打算了。”

但是，东道国并不向示范中心提供财政支持，这从根本上削弱了其对示范中心的拥有权和主动权，J总表示“他们没有拿钱，我们之间也不是真正的合作关系。如果双方都拿钱了，就是合作关系，可以共同进行活动，共同花这个钱。我们怎么花钱，不需要跟他们说。Koza 现在要求的太多，实际上他们只需要提供协调咨询，我们与政府打交道的时候，他们出面协助。我们的计划也可以给他看，他们也可以提出他们的建议和想法，但是我们是自己做事，自己运营。”此外，中国和东道国管理人员在援助经费使用上的分歧也成为双方在合作上面面临的很大的困难，东道国认为他们参与管理的人员成本，包括工作补贴、交通补贴以及餐费补贴等，“我们是兼管示范中心的，农业部没有为我们提供为示范中心提供服务的报酬，我们要自己开车去，没有人为我们付油费；我们用干完本职工作以外的时间去，也没有给我们支付津贴和补助。”几次东道国政府官员和示范中心讨论工作安排时，都提出了他们的费用和补贴的事情，但是对此，中方员工则认为既然是双方合作，那么这些费用对方国家应该自己承担，“我们是来帮助他们的，他们当然自己也要作出贡献，就像西方国家援助我们的时候，我们政府自己都要自己掏钱的。”这种双方理解上的差异主要源于中国和非洲国家同时作为受援国接受发展援助时的不同做法和态度，中国虽然曾经很长时间内是接受援助的大国，但中国政府一直将自己定位为“合作者”的身份，接受援助时通常政府会提供配套资金，中方人员的参与，尤其是中国政府工作人员参与的费用由中方来承担；中国作为一个发展中国家向非洲提供援助时，也一直强调是“互利合作”的双赢，强调双方是合作关系，因此在政府官方话语中，将接受中国援助的国家称为“东道国”，而非“受援国”。但是，在非洲国家的眼里，中国已经发展成和西方国家一样的发达国家，中国正和西方国家一样对其提供援助，长期作为受援国身份接受西方发展援助的非洲国家已经养成了自己是一个接受者的身份，“习惯于做任何事情，提供任何贡献都会被支付费用，习惯于参加会议都被支付补贴，出差支付补贴以及各种活动的补贴，如果没有补贴，我们会觉得为什么我们要参加。中国把我们当成合作者，需要我们自己贡献，但是我们还不习惯这种安排，就像示范中心，这个负责的官员签了字，但是他没有得到任何个人的刺激，他就会对这件事情没有兴趣，因为我为什么要多做，如果我不做，我同样有这份工作，同样有这份工资，如果我做了，就需要有额外的收益，否则我就不会作。”一位非洲的研究人员曾向笔者解释了为什么示范中心的非洲人员

在中国人看来不是那么积极的配合工作。

中国商务部是目前示范中心运营经费的提供者，在很多示范中心的工作人员眼里，示范中心实质上应该是属于中国政府的，中国驻各国的经商处代表中国政府来对示范中心进行管理，示范中心要接受经商处的指导和管理，“中心有什么想法，都必须要和经商处沟通，我们是不能直接向津巴农业部请示的，因为双方的协议中很明确，中心有任何事情都应该通过外交途径来运作，经商处要求每个月向他们作一次书面的简报，我们在简报中会提出我们遇到的问题”。但是，中国商务部向示范中心提供的运行经费是通过承建公司转拨到示范中心，示范中心的收支是按照公司的规定来执行，并不直接和商务部有联系，并且从经费监管制度本身来看，商务部的代表机构经商处并没有权力去监管示范中心的财务，这种财务上的管理安排削弱了经商处对示范中心的约束力。正如某国经商处 W 所说：“除了简报之外，我们对示范中心没有其它过多的要求，在项目质量督促方面也没功夫监管，业务上也谈不上指导，也就是让领导去现场看看，讲讲话，开开会。”。即便是简报，示范中心也并不十分重视，中心的小 Y 负责编写简报，“我就在办公室花一天时间编简报，有事情的时候还好一点，没有事情的时候就编几件事情。反正也没人重视这件事。”W 对他们编写的简报也是十分不满意，有一次中心小 L 去送简报，W 对他说：“你们简报的语言太生活化了，太随意了，竟然还有‘XX 这时插话了’这样的句子，以后你们简报请你们负责人看一遍。”

对于承建公司来说，其主要目标是通过中心的建设提升企业在当地的知名度、扩大影响、获得投资和利润机会是参与这样政府主导工程的根本目标。“公司有自己的想法，想把这个（示范中心）作为敲门砖，是打开非洲市场的桥梁”，“我们等国家拨款，然后做市场项目，多投点钱也无妨。但是如果做不到那种程度，我们就撤。就像我们跟司法部做的这个项目，就是拿国家的钱来做项目，担保申请贷款”，“中心如果能够做得好，当然是更好，如果做不好，我们也没辙”。为了把农场经营好，公司选派的两位中心负责人都是具有丰富的农场经营管理经验，都曾经担任过场长。目前，农场主要种植大豆、玉米、小麦和土豆四种作物，因为津巴布韦一年四季均可生产，在种植制度上全部采取的是轮作的方式，在农忙的时候，中心所有的工作人员都去地里干活，“前一阵子收土豆，因为卖给当地一家土豆食品公司，公司要求严格，土豆要分大小，还要把上面的土弄干净，我们在地里干活，从早到晚。周末的时候，这边的工人不愿意干活，我们就得下地去干活。”工作人员对农场的生产是非常认真的，为了测算和比较不同品种和作物的收益，他们进行了非常详细具体的投入成本分析，从他们的分析结果来看，种植土豆的利润最高，种植玉米则利润最低，因此，中心计划种植更多的土豆。而这客观上也符合津巴布韦的农业生产需求，调研中，该国农业部长表示：“中心在这里推广试验种植土豆，这对我们来说是新的，当然不是说它是新品种，我们过去将土豆作为主食，土豆是粮食作物，不能给农民带来收入，但现在薯条和薯片很流行，土豆开始成为经济作物了，能够给农民带来收入。我知道一个距离这 300 公里以外的农场主知道这里有土豆种植示范，有土豆种植的机械，专门跑来参观学习过”。

国内公司、中国商务部以及代表机构商务处从不同的角度对示范中心都有着管理权，国内公司是示范中心的直接资金供给者，工作人员合同的签署机构，对于示范中心，尤其是基于示范中心注册的农业公司有着直接企业管理权；东道国政府因为拥有示范中心的产权和双方政府的协定对示范中心有共同管理权；商务部及其代表机构经商处因为是援外项目的直接管理机构，示范中心是中国政府的援助项目，也拥有管理权利。不同的管理权主体，对于示范中心的期望各异，东道国希望示范中心要优先考虑提供技术示范和培训；中国政府则希望中心在完成技术示范和培训的任务基础上来进行适当的商业化经营和运作，因此，对于示范中心另一块牌子公司的活动也是非常支持的；而依托在示范中心注册的公司的直接主体则是国内的农业公司，该公司则希望示范中心要完成每年的经营任务和项目目标。一个示范中

心的工作人员表示：“我们中心是一个复杂的机构：一方面要完成中国政府的工作，要办培训班、要作试验、要作宣传；一方面还要搞可持续运作，要为公司挣利润，第三个是当地的农业部，农业部说你占了我的土地，要为我们服务，我们身上压着三座大山。”由此可见，虽然各方主体的利益诉求和期望不同，但是在示范中心这个载体上不同的主体的意愿都得到了一定程度上的实现，对于公司来说，通过示范中心参加农机展会、利用示范中心平台争取项目合作机会等扩大影响以及寻求投资机会；J国农业部则一方面推进示范中心的培训活动，另一方面也积极利用示范中心这个平台获得更多中国的支持以及国际社会的支持；示范中心作为中国政府向J国提供农业援助标志性意义却十分明显，承担着展示中国对外援助形象的任务。对于中国商务部和经商处来说，示范中心是其安排国内以及国际代表团的好去处，是宣传中国在非农业援助的有利平台，从中心接待来访的记录来看，示范中心先后接待了近20次不同机构来访，包括粮农组织、国际玉米小麦中心等；还先后接受了J国电视台、先驱报和路透社的采访等。示范中心成为各方利益实现的载体，在有些时候，各方共同协助配合，达到各自的目标，如中国部长的来访和西方国家代表团的参观。中国部长的来访，被J国农业部部长和示范中心视为一次非常重要的获取中国国家资源支持的重要机会，J国农业部部长的提前视察、安排高级官员陪同、等候中国的部长等。虽然东道国对示范中心管理人员在培训计划、经费支付等存在着不满，但仍然十分支持示范中心的工作，示范中心已经成为其和国际发展援助机构谈判的重要筹码，获取国际发展资源的依托。

## 七、 结论

中国国内“示范+推广”农业科技成果转化实践和农技推广体系的市场化改革，对1970年代在非洲援建的农场经营管理体制的改革以及中国在非洲基础设施建设领域内公司依托援助项目建设走出去的成功经验促使中国政府将商业和援助相结合的模式扩展到农业援助领域，采用“政府引导、企业为主、市场运作”的模式来实施农业技术示范中心的援助项目，希望通过中国政府全额财政支持的三年援建示范中心成套项目和三年技术合作来“促进受援方粮食增产，改进农业技术，提升粮食安全水平；搭建企业在非洲发展的平台，推动农业走出去”的战略目标（周海川，2012），中国国内的一家公司获得了在J国承建农业示范中心的机会，示范中心已经建设完成，并已经进入技术合作期。为了能够让示范中心能够开展商业化的生产经营活动，承建公司在J国注册农业公司，成立了相应的部门，于是，“一个机构，两块牌子”的管理框架形成。在公司这块牌子下，中心开展农场经营、农产品销售、代耕代收以及扩展投资渠道等商业化行为；在示范中心这块牌子下，中心开展了有限的试种、示范和培训活动。

促进示范中心的可持续性是中国政府、受援国和承建公司的共识，但是三方对可持续的理解显然有差异。中国政府希望中心能够成为承建公司的平台，在受援国能够进行农业投资，投资获得的收益能够维持示范中心的运作，但前提是示范中心能够提供技术传播服务，尤其是在技术合作期，商业化经营和公益性服务两者并重；受援国则希望示范中心首先要作为公益性服务，经营不是最终的目的，商业化经营是为了公益性服务，让受援国农业发展受益；承建公司则认为只有商业化经营实现了，才能提供公益性服务。但由于公司是示范中心最直接的管理者，示范中心在当前阶段的行动更多体现了公司的利益和目标，在商业化经营活动的投入要远远高于公益性服务，而这也正证明了 David Mosse（2005:17）提出的“发展实践和行动越来越少的是政策目标或者正式目标导向的，越来越多地被机构目标所决定”。将发展援助和商业发展紧密结合起来的方式在国际社会通常被称为是公私合作模式（the public-private partnership），该模式的主要特征是政府公共部门和市场主体共同计划和投入以及共担风险，这种模式能够带动更多资源进入发展领域，在政府停止提供援助资金后，商业资本的引入能够为发展援助项目活动继续开展提供全新的机遇（Lawson, 2011），从政策设计

来看，中国农业示范中心属于Callan & Davies (2013) 总结的公私合作四种模式中的包容性的商业行为 (inclusive business approaches in general) 模式，即发展机构为企业提供一些的技术、知识和前期抵抗风险资金的支持，来促进企业向有利于穷人的产业和行业进行投资，这种模式是否能够成功，并且克服国际发展援助中公私合作的“发展优先序失衡”的问题，进行判断还为时尚早。

国际上经常采用“行动者 (actor)”和“代理人 (broker)”框架来讨论国际发展援助机构的行为和功能，在行动者分析框架中，强调行动者如何利用“能动性 (agency)”来促使不同社会生活、知识和权力不同“界面 (interface)”之间的协商 (negotiation)，强调不同行动者在微观层面的互动；代理人分析框架则更加突出分析发展干预机构是如何通过“代理 (brokerage)”和“翻译 (translation)”来将援助资金提供者和受益者链接起来，虽然这两种框架各有侧重，但分析和讨论更多的关注发展干预的提供方和受益方之间的关系，将援助机构看成是援助资金供给方的“代理人”，中国农业技术示范中心框架下形成的中国商务部、受援国相关政府部门和中国国内公司三方主体共同介入的管理结构实际上让示范中心本身突破了行动者和代理人的身份，示范中心既是援助者又是受助者，既是公共服务部门又是公司企业，这无疑是对国际发展援助体系和结构关系的一种补充。西方援助机构出于自身机构发展的需求和从业人员的职业需求会使得援助机构的行动偏离资金提供方的目标 (Mosse, 2005)，从示范中心的运行来看，三方主体的介入管理虽然使得示范中心经常会面临“选择”的困难，但是三方主体的角力使得示范中心的行动却难以偏离各方的利益诉求，示范中心目前所开展的所有行动几乎都是围绕三方主体的目标进行。中国国内的发展经验，如“一个机构，两块牌子”和“身兼数职”等为示范中心能够实现三方主体目标提供了宝贵经验。虽然对示范中心目标定位上有着差异，但示范中心依然具有中国政府、受援国政府和承建公司的建设初衷之外的共同利益，即将示范中心打成一个成功的名片，中国政府可以宣传中国的对外援助，受援国可以证明自己是能够接受并有效使用援助资源，而公司则建立起良好的声望获得政府支持和商业投资的机会。于是，中国政府、受援国政府和承建公司在维护各自核心利益目标时谨慎的协调和博弈，试图达到中心运转的平衡，从当前情况来看，这种平衡暂时实现了，但能够维持多久则需要更长时间的检验。

#### 参考文献:

- AusAID, 2000. Promoting Practical Sustainability,  
<http://www.aid.gov.au/publications/pdf/sustainability.pdf>
- Auzzir, Zairol A., Haigh, Richard and Amaratunga, Dilanthi (2014) Public-private Partnerships (PPP) in Disaster Management in Developing Countries: A Conceptual Framework. *Procedia Economics and Finance*, 18. pp. 807-814.
- Brautigam & Tang, 2009, China's Engagement in African Agriculture: Down to the Countryside, *the China Quarterly*, 199: 686-706
- Brautigam D. 2009. *The Dragon's gift. The Real Story of China in Africa.*: Oxford Univ. Press: Oxford, UK
- Callan, M & Davies, R 2013 "When business meets aid: analysing public-private partnerships for international development," *Development Policy Centre Discussion Paper 28*, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University, Canberra.

- Conley, Leading from Behind in Public-Private Partnership? An assessment of European Engagement with the Private Sector in Development, CSIS report, 2012
- David Mosse, Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice, London and Ann Arbor, MI, Pluto Press, 2005:17
- De Haan. 2011. Will China Change International Development as We Know It? Journal of International Development. 23: 881-908
- Freeman D, Holslag J, Weil S, 2008, China's foreign Policy: Can Land Provide Security? Brussels Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies, BICCS Asia Paper 3
- Klijn, E.H. & Teisman, G. 2003. Institutional and Strategic Barriers to Public-Private Partnership: An Analysis of Dutch Cases. Public Money & Management, 23/3: 137-145.
- Lancaster, The Chinese Aid System, 2007,  
[http://www.cgdev.org/files/13953\\_file\\_Chinese\\_aid.pdf](http://www.cgdev.org/files/13953_file_Chinese_aid.pdf)
- Lawson, 2012, Foreign Assistance: Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), CRS Report for Congress Mcgillivray, Aid Allocation and Fragile States, NAU-WIDER Discussion Paper No. 2006/01
- Ostrom, E., Gibson, C. et. al. 2001. Aid, Incentives, and Sustainability: An Institutional Analysis of Development Cooperation. MAIN REPORT. Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University. Sida Studies in Evaluation 02/01.
- Sambrani, PPP from Asia and African Perspective towards Infrastructure Development: A Case Study of Greenfield Bangalore International Airport, India, Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 157 ( 2014 ) 285 – 295
- Schwartz, 1994, THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND CASE STUDIES , 1994 ,  
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.89.8798&rep=rep1&type=pdf>
- Shediak-Rizkallah, Mona C. & Bone, Lee R. Planning for the sustainability of community-based health programs: conceptual frameworks and future directions for research, practice and policy [J]. Health Education Research, 1998.13(1).
- 蒋华杰:《农技援非(1971-1983):中国援非模式与成效的个案研究》,外交评论,2013(1):31-49 吕学俭,1988年
- 金言文,巩固经援项目,加强南南合作的尝试--中马管理合作成效简述,国际经济合作,1988年第12期
- 李承为,巩固经援成果 提高经济效益,国际经济合作,1986年12期
- 李小云,等,李小云,齐顾波,唐丽霞,等,小农为基础的农业发展:中国与非洲的比较分析,中国社会科学文献出版社,2009年
- 吕学俭,探索多种形式 巩固经援成果,国际经济合作,1988年第12期
- 唐丽霞,等,中国对非洲农业援助管理模式的演化与成效,国际问题研究,2014年第6期
- 唐晓阳,中国对非农业援助形式的演变及其效果,世界经济与政治,2013(5):55-69
- 王海燕,代管--巩固经援成果的一种形式,国际经济合作,1987年第7期
- 徐继峰,秦路.中国援助非洲农业技术示范中心可持续发展建议.世界农业,2011.12

郇文聚.从国际援助的发展看中国对非农业援助.西亚非洲, 2000 (2): 17-23

张海冰, 中国对非援助的战略平衡问题, 西亚非洲, 2012 (3): 39-52

钟清, 2004, 刺绣培训到非洲, 《人民日报海外版》(2004年08月05日第八版)

周海川.援非农业技术示范中心可持续发展面临的问题与对策.中国软科学, 2012年第9期

李伟, 当代中国史研究, 2010年第5期

周弘, 2008, 中国对外援助与改革开放30年, 世界经济与政治, 2008年第1期

周弘, 2013, 中国对外援助的政策与机制, 周弘主编《中国援外60年》: 1-33, 社会科学文献出版社

朱蓉蓉, 中国共产党的对外援助策略的历史和演进, 《毛泽东邓小平理论研究》, 2011 (9): 71-76

## Appendix 7: Demonstration of Development: the Modalities of China Agricultural Aid to Africa

### 发展的示范：中国对非农业援助的路径选择<sup>21</sup>

唐丽霞 李小云

“示范中心有力地推动了农业‘走出去’的进程，帮助受援国提高自主发展能力，把我国改革开放 30 多年来的成功经验和装备与技术装备与受援国分享，达到‘授人以渔’的效果。”

--2012 年中国农业技术示范中心可持续发展研讨会上商务部官员的讲话

#### 一、背景：不同视角下的中非新遭遇

中国与非洲的农业合作起始于上个世纪 50 年代末。自 1959 年中国首次向几内亚提供无偿粮食援助 10000 吨（张浚，2013）以来，非洲一直是中国对外援助的重点区域。在 20 世纪 60-80 年代初，中国在非洲兴建了 87 个农业项目，16 个水利项目（唐晓阳，2013），向大多数非洲国家提供了农业援助，包括农业技术试验站、推广站和农场等（王晨燕，2008 年），占到中国对外农业援助项目总数的一半（蔡玲明，1992），即便是在中国大规模削减对外援助规模的 1980-1990 年代，中国仍继续为非洲提供新贷款，并对多个非洲国家免除债务，中国高层领导对非洲的访问有所增加（李安山，2010），但是，这一时期，国际社会对中国在非洲的活动并未十分在意，一些研究者甚至认为中国只是一个中等国家，在国际政治上影响较小（李安山，2014），Brautigam（2009）认为中国已经奠定了当前介入非洲的基石，但无人真正关注。2000 年以来，这种情况发生了变化，中非合作论坛的召开、中非贸易额和中国在非洲的投资快速增长以及中国对非农业援助的日益增多，国际社会对中国在非洲的行动感到意外，中非关系的迅速发展引起了国际社会的关注（Bräutigam and Tang，2009；Buckley，2013；李安山，2014）。

对中非农业合作的高度关注一方面来自全球政治经济格局以及中国在全球治理中角色的演变，尤其是中国从全球接受援助最多的受援国转变为最为重要的新兴援助体；另一方面是因为经济增长与减贫为核心的中国发展经验，尤其是农业优先发展战略导致的亲贫性经济增长的经验引起了国际社会，特别是非洲国家的高度兴趣（Ravallion，2009）。总体来说，对于中国在非洲农业发展中的参与，国际社会已经形成了三种分析视角：中国是非洲的新殖民者和经济竞争者和发展伙伴、(Alden,2007； Buckley，2013； Scoones，2013)。前面两种话语都将中国视为是非洲发展的潜在威胁，中国在非洲的很多努力都是基于国内自身经济发展的资源需求以及国内粮食安全的巨大压力（Buckley,2013； Alden，2013），发展伙伴视角强调在南南合作框架下中国发展经验对非洲转型的借鉴意义；此外，也有学者认为中国在非洲日益增长的农业兴趣是源于中国自身对其在国际发展框架中作用的认知，表示中国希望通过农业贸易、投资和援助等更多参与到全球粮食治理体系中，来平衡国内日益增长的粮食需求和国际责任之间的关系（Morton，2012）。虽然这些分析视角对中国在非洲行动的动机和影响有着截然不同的判断，但都无法回避中国对于非洲来说是“新的不断崛起的力量（rising power）”（Scoones，2013）的事实，无论是何种观点，其关注的焦点是“中国在非洲”的动

<sup>21</sup> 本研究得到了“北京市青年英才计划”、“英国国际发展部资助的中国国际发展研究网络研究课题系列”和“中国和巴西在非洲的农业行动（CBAA）”等研究计划的联合支持。



机和影响。

中国经济发展和社会转型的成功又使得在全球话语体系从过于关注中国“动机”转向开始讨论中国发展经验对其他发展中国家的借鉴意义。2004年,英国著名思想库伦敦外交政策中心发表题为《北京共识:提供新模式》的论文,该论文指出中国摸索出了适合本国国情的发展模式,这种模式适于追求经济增长和改善人民生活的发展中国家效仿,随后,多家国际媒体和经济学家纷纷发表文章表示“中国的崛起为其它国家提供了西方发展模式之外的一个强有力的选择”,“其他国家可以分享到中国经济发展的成果”,“中国为发展中国家树立了鲜活的榜样,提供了切实可行的现代化模式”(秦宣,2008),中国模式对发展中国家具有了非常重要的借鉴意义(郑永年,2009)。在此背景下,2004年5月上海全球扶贫大会上,世界银行行长呼吁全球分享中国的脱贫经验;2006年非洲世界经济论坛上,非洲开发银行行长表示非洲可以学习中国的经验(秦宣,2008)。非洲国家也开始将目光转向中国,推行“向东看”的战略,如津巴布韦和肯尼亚政府分别在2005年和2007年公开宣布要“向东看”,认为“中国的经验更具参考价值”,要学习中国经济发展模式(张茂春,杨恕,2008年),坦桑尼亚总统基奎特认为“中国今天成功的发展模式是非洲在未来实现腾飞的样板”(郭强,2010),在南南合作框架下,非洲可以从中国学习农村改革、港口管理、汇率管理、吸引海外投资、粮食安全、冲突管理等,从而促进非洲经济的发展(Ali Zafar,2010)。中国崛起为非洲提供了经验,其主要原因在于中国与这些国家一样都属“第三世界”,一样都处在“发展中”(陈学明,2013),中国和非洲面临着相同的政治、经济、技术、安全及社会挑战,但中国已经克服了其中大部分,已成为令人注目的大国(龙刚,2013)。非洲国家学习和分享中国发展经验的热情持续高涨,一些非洲国家已经开始践行中国的发展经验,南非的学者Martyn Daives(2005年,转引自郭强,2010)指出:“工业特区是试验区,让几个中国主要产业投资商进驻,几乎是像中国80年代中期一样,用经济特区吸引外资,这在中国取得了成功,我想,同样的战略已经在非洲实行了。”尼日利亚建立了24个经济特区,这些特区为国家的发展经济发挥了很好的示范作用,毛里求斯与中国建立了首个中国海外经济特区。

与此同时,在中国对外战略中,中国本身也开始越来越重视中国经验的分享和推广。在过去十多年中,中国着眼于提升软实力和增加在全球治理体系中的话语权,支持、举行了各种高级别发展对话和培训等活动,很多发展中国家纷纷支持类似的交流和分享。毫无疑问,这些活动都极大提高了中国发展经验在全球范围的影响(李小云,2014),因此,一些学者开始研究中国对外援助方式和国内发展路径之间的关系,如唐晓阳(2013)认为中国对非农业援助形式向商业化的转变源于中国自身的经验,与中国市场经济改革历程密切对应,当中国仍处于计划经济时,援助也自然以政治为中心,不计成本;而当责任承包制在中国推广时,援非的垦区开发也采取了类似的模式,鼓励农民自种自营;此后当中国农业生产进入资本化和产业化运作阶段时,援助方式也体现出相应转变,由大企业借助优惠贷款在非洲经营农业项目,并将科技培训等内容与商业项目有机结合,在在援助中强调市场经济正是为了协助受援国复制中国式的发展道路。王胜文(2012)表示大力建设基础设施是中国经济发展的成功经验,因此,中国愿意加大对非洲的基础建设的支持力度;周弘(2010)认为中国援助最初集中在中国具有比较优势的工程建设领域,现在开始向受援国提供社会民生设施、教育培训基地等,这种转变就是因为中国在总结自身发展经验的时候发现投资教育是发展的捷径和必由之路,于是在对外援助中注入了更多的教育、培训、知识传播和技术转移内容。示范和分享中国经验成为中国加大对非援助支持力度的一个重要推动力,因为通过提供援助,可以便利当地人直观具体地学习现代化生产生活方式,作为范例引导促进社会转型(唐晓阳,2013),中国在非洲日益增长的农业援助、贸易和投资活动有助于将中国的发展经验传播到非洲(Fan Shenggen,2010)。

## 二、中国在非洲：“农业”和“技术”话语体系的形成

### 1: 非洲发展：农业的缺失

根据农业考古学的研究，全世界600多种主要种植作物中，大约有250种起源于非洲，起源于非洲的作物主要包括谷类、块茎、豆类、油类、饮料、纤维、瓜果等七大类（李继东，1991年），非洲的撒哈拉中部的高原地区在公元前7000年也开始出现原始耕作农业（陆庭恩，2000年），高粱和粟类是非洲农业起源中最重要的作物，而这两种作物至今仍然是非洲的主要作物，以2007年为例，非洲大陆高粱和粟类的收获面积分别为2950万公顷和2133万公顷，占到总收获面积的29.43%，占谷物收获面积的48.04%，中国大陆水稻和小麦的收获面积分别为2918万公顷和2372万公顷，占到总收获面积的31.88%，占谷物收获面积的61.47%（李小云，齐顾波，唐丽霞，等，2011）。但是，15世纪西方帝国的入侵直接中断了非洲农业文明的延续发展，“非洲被西方的帝国所瓜分，非洲的农业也因此而遭受破坏（斯塔夫里阿诺斯，1999）”。西方国家在非洲推行单一栽培制，推行以出口为导向的经济作物替代非洲传统的农业作物，造成了非洲农业的畸形发展，形成了种植单一经济作物的特点：埃及和苏丹尼罗河流域的棉花产区，西非海岸的可可、棕榈、咖啡、橡胶产区和内陆的花生、棉花产区，东非沿海和附近岛屿的丁香、剑麻产区和内陆的茶叶、棉花、咖啡产区，南部非洲的烟叶、甘蔗产区等。单一经济作物的大面积快速种植，使得非洲成为经济作物的重要生产和出口的地区之一，到1950年代，非洲棉花在世界市场上的份额约占12%、棕榈占80%、可可占75%、花生占30%、茶叶占40%-50%、剑麻占65%；和经济作物占的分额较高的情况相反，同期非洲的粮食作物占世界粮食产量比重却非常低，小麦的产量低于世界产量的4%、玉米低于7%（李小云，2011）。

民族独立革命取得成功以后，很多非洲国家也将发展的重心放在农业，一些国家大力推行农业合作化，如加纳、塞内加尔、坦桑尼亚、几内亚、博茨瓦纳、莫桑比克、刚果（金）、刚果（布）、马达加斯加、贝宁、多哥和埃塞俄比亚等，其中以坦桑尼亚的“乌贾马（Ujama）”最具有代表性。这一时期，非洲国家以合作社为载体，增加了农业投资，促进农业生产结构调整，同时政府还采取了一系列积极的措施，如降价和免费向农民提供种子、农药、化肥等，提高土地利用效果，开垦新的耕地，并且也积极开展农田水利建设，从1962年到1980年，非洲耕地面积从1.54亿公顷增加到11.7亿公顷，可灌溉面积从738万公顷增加到932万公顷。一系列的有利于农业生产的政策措施的实施，使得非洲大陆在20世纪60年代农业生产增长明显，年均增长率为2.7%，并且由于粮食作物生产的发展，粮食产量增加明显，从1960年代初期的5047万吨增加到1980年的7083万吨，粮食自给程度提高，据FAO的统计，1962-1964年，非洲粮食自给水平为96%，1972-1974年间为83%。但是，1970年代中期的严重的旱灾对非洲的经济和农业生产带来严重的打击，从1970年到1977年，非洲农业增长率为1.3%，还不到世界发展中国家年平均增长率2.8%的一半（庄仁兴，1982）。

1980年的《拉各斯行动计划》中首次提出“把实现食物自给作为首位重点，大大减少食物的进口和促进本地的食物生产和消费”，强调“农业部门要为加工工业提供必要的投入，并为国内工业部门的产品提供市场”，提出“1980~1985年间的目标，要为实现谷物、畜产品和渔产品的自给打下基础”。而世行（1981）的《伯格报告》则认为，出口作物应该优先发展，强调出口导向的发展战略。在具体的改革措施方面，1985年非统组织《1986-1990年非洲经济复兴优先计划》要求各国政府需将发展预算指出的20%-25%用于农业，通过调整农业生产

结构,调整汇率政策、价格政策和贸易政策来实现改革,但是这些行动计划并没有有效执行,推动非洲农业的发展,非洲粮食自给率持续下降,1980年代下降到60%-70%,90年代只有50%左右,粮食进口逐年增加。1970-1980年非洲进口粮食的数量每年平均增加8.4%,1980年代,进口粮食高达2040万吨,耗费外汇50亿美元。80年代至90年代粮食进口数量虽有起伏,但粮食消费依靠进口的现象没有多大的改变。除了玉米基本能满足地区需求、国际市场进口额仅占非洲消费总量的5%以外,非洲国家消费的水稻和小麦中,45%的小麦和80%的水稻都依赖进口,资料显示,非洲53个国家中,有21个国家需要粮食援助(李淑芹,石金贵,2008)。投入不足成为许多非洲国家农业难以发展的重要因素,1967-1973年,许多国家农业投资仅占政府预算的5%-6%(陆庭恩,2000),2004年这一比重仅仅为4%(世界银行,2008年),虽然近年来,一些非洲国家开始重视对农业生产的投入,但是其效果并不明显,2003年,非盟国家发表《关于农业和粮食安全的马普托宣言》。非盟国家在这份宣言中,承诺在五年内将10%的国家预算拨给农业和农村发展<sup>22</sup>。不过,目前只有五分之一的国家实现了这一点。目前,撒哈拉以南非洲地区对农业低的公共投入不能满足农业可持续增长的要求(世界银行,2008)。

非洲农业长期发展的不足促使国际社会将其列为国际发展援助的重点领域之一。国际社会对非洲的农业援助最早可以追溯到殖民时期,1938年,由 Lord Hailey 领导的一个委员会提出了“应该采用一定技术方法来帮助改善土壤肥力”等农业援助的建议,但是对非洲农业的真正援助开始于上个世纪70年代,受到亚洲“绿色革命”成功的启示,国际援助领域也希望在非洲能够复制亚洲农业发展的成就,开始重视对非洲进行农业援助,开始将家庭粮食安全、健康卫生及教育置于首位,通过综合农村发展项目支持小农户的农业生产。但随着上个世纪80年代结构调整计划的实施,经济自由化改革和良治成为在非洲的国际发展援助的重点,农业的重要性日益下降,农业援助所占的资金份额也在逐年下降,到1990年代,农业援助的份额仅维持在10%左右,近年来,随着非洲粮食安全问题的日益严峻和饥饿人口数量的增加,国际社会又开始转向支持非洲农业发展,以世界银行为例,从1991到2006年度,一共向非洲提供28亿美元农业援助,占其在非洲总援助的8%,在其77个发展政策性贷款项目中,农业项目数量为18个(世界银行,2006)。2005年,世界银行制定了《非洲行动计划》,承认农业了在非洲经济增长中的地位,世界银行的努力获得了一定的成效,长期以来国际社会每年对非洲的农业援助总额维持在20亿美元左右的规模,到2007年,这一数字上升到28亿美元(UK Food Group, 2007)。

## 2、中国的发展经验：农业基础和技术至上

新世纪以来,以农业优先的亲贫性发展战略使得中国不仅成为全球第二大经济体,并成为全球贫困人口减少最多的国家,中国与非洲大陆开始形成发展反差,虽然中国现在所采取的生物技术、高额补贴以及机械化等促进农业发展的方式显然和非洲当前的发展阶段不相适应,中国的发展实践已经无法直接转移到非洲,但是,正是因为当前的中非发展的反差性使得曾处于和非洲国家现在发展阶段相似的中国发展经验更为非洲国家吸引,中国也因为三十多年的发展成就而有信心和非洲共享发展经验,正如胡锦涛在2006年中非合作论坛上提出的“我们双方都尊重对方自主选择的发展道路,认真学习对方的发展经验”。无论是世界银行还是很多国内外学者,在总结中国发展经验时,都无一例外提到中国农业发展的经验,“一靠政策,二靠科技”(邓小平语,1982)则是中国农业发展经验的核心,技术是中国农业增长的驱动力。

---

<sup>22</sup> MAPUTO DECLARATION, To the Second Summit of the Heads of States and Governments of the African Union, Maputo, Mozambique, 4th- 12th July 2003

正如斯塔夫里阿诺斯所言，“4000多年前，中国人在欧亚大陆最东端发展起一个独特、自治的社会，这一社会以农业而不是商业为基础，由地主和官僚而不是商人和政治家统治（斯塔夫里阿诺斯，1999）”，重农抑商一直是中国古代和近代国家统治者的基本政治态度，农业文明是中国发展的核心。中国公元前7000年前河姆渡氏族的时候开始人工培育水稻，是世界上最早种植水稻的国家，公元前5000年左右开始种植小麦和粟类。中国早在公元前221年就建立了大一统的国家，虽然经历了数次的朝代更替，但是农耕文明并没有受到破坏，一直得以延续和不断发展，每一个朝代建立之初的休养生息、鼓励农耕的政策使得中国农业发展具有历史延续性，长期形成的农业生产制度、耕作方式、生产工具等基本农作制度一直沿用到今天，仍然是中国当代小农农业生产模式的核心（李小云，齐顾波，唐丽霞，2011）。新中国成立以后，农业仍然是国家发展的重心，建立在第一次土地改革基础上农业生产经营方式的转变是社会主义三大改造之一。在后来出台系列国家发展的五年计划中，中国将农业发展定位于基础地位，1957年，出台的《1956年到1967年全国农业发展纲要》明确指出“.....迅速发展农业生产力、以便加强我国社会主义工业化、提高农民以及全体人民生活水平.....”。1962年9月，中国共产党八届十中全会正式制定了“以农业为基础、工业为主导”的国民经济发展总方针，农业的基础性地位得以明确和巩固。1965年，第三个国民经济发展五年计划提出“必须以农业为基础，大力发展农业”，规定国家的主要任务是“发展农业，解决人民的衣食问题”，1970年，第四个五年计划仍然坚持保证农业的基础性地位，强调农业机械化进程的加速。自此，农业在中国国民经济中的基础性地位得以确定。

1978年，以家庭联产承包责任制为核心的第二次土地改革再次成为中国经济体制改革的发端，随后，中国先后出台五个中央一号文件来规制农业发展，1982年1号文件将包产到户、包干到户界定为社会主义经济，从而促进了“双包制”在全国的广泛推行。随后，1983年1号文件取消人民公社制度；1984年1号文件强调促进农村商品生产的发展；1985年1号文件取消30年来农副产品统购派购的制度；1986年1号文件再次肯定了农村改革的方向。农村经济制度基本建立，农业发展的制度性保障得以完善。2000年以来，虽然农业经济在国民经济中的比重下降，但是农业的基础性地位仍然没有动摇，从2004年到2014年，连续出台11个一号文件来解决当前新时期农业发展面临的问题。2004年1号文件解决了促进农民增加收入问题，特别是提出了“三项补贴”政策；2005年1号文件解决了提高农业综合生产能力问题；2006年1号文件解决了新农村建设问题；2007年1号文件解决了积极发展现代农业问题；2008年1号文件解决了加强农业基础建设问题；2009年1号文件强调农民持续增收和国家粮食安全，围绕“稳粮”、“增收”、“强基础”、“重民生”等，出台了一系列政策措施；2010年1号文件强调促进城乡统筹发展，2011年1号文件关注农村水利建设，2012年1号文件强调了农业科技发展，2013年1号文件关注推动现代农业发展，2014年1号文件再次强调农村各项发展制度的改革，并再次将粮食安全放在农业发展的重中之重。

总体来说，在不同发展的历史阶段，中国选择了不同农业发展战略和发展路径，从强调集体化和合作化到个体经营和市场化再到强调国家的财政支持，农业的基础性地位一直没有改变，农业发展一直是中国发展政策关注的首要问题和核心问题。不同时期的农业发展制度改革推动了中国农业的发展。第一次土地改革极大地促进农业生产力的发展，与1949年相比，全国的粮食产量在1950年增产17%，1951年增产28%，1952年增产45%，平均每年增长15%。第二次土地改革以及配套的系列改革使得从1979年到1984年，国内农业总产值增长了355.4%，平均每年递增7.9%；近年来的农业投入的不断增长使得农业总产值仍然保持高速增长势头，平均增速保持在14%左右（张本飞，2009）。

中国政府支持农业科技体系和推广系统，推广新技术和新品种，是实现农业发展的主要原因（Ali Zafar，2010）。中国国内的很多研究都显示了技术进步对农业增长的作用，优良品

种的增产作用可达8-12%，增施化肥及改进施肥方法可增产16%；改进耕作方法和栽培技术可增产4-8%；施行病虫害防治技术可挽回产量损失10-20%（李小云，1989），胡凯（2013）的研究发现，从1978年到2010年，科技进步对于中国农业发展的贡献率达到了51.9%。分阶段来看，中国“六五”到“十一五”期间农业科技进步贡献率分别为34.84%、27.66%、34.28%、45.16%、48%和53%（陆文聪，余新平，2013），科技进步在农业增长中的贡献在逐年上升，而制度变迁在农业增长中的贡献则开始下降（乔榛，2006年）。

对农业科技的重视在中国农业政策体系中的最直接的呈现是“科教兴农战略”的提出和实施。毛泽东曾经就农业生产指出“水利是农业的命脉”（1954），以及“农业的根本出路在于机械化”（1959），而关于农业的八字宪法“土、肥、水、种、密、保、管、工”<sup>23</sup>更是在长达20年的时间里成为指导中国农业生产的口号。1989年12月27日《国务院关于依靠科技进步振兴农业加强农业科技成果推广工作的决定》开始把科技兴农作为振兴农业的重大战略措施，指出：“要从根本上解决关系到国家兴衰的农业问题，科技兴农尤为重要。……各级政府必须把依靠科技进步振兴农业作为一项重大战略措施，坚持不懈地抓下去。”该文件还指出：“大力加强农村教育，广泛开展技术培训”，这已经包含了依靠教育振兴农业的思想。1991年11月29日十三届八中全会通过的《中共中央关于进一步加强农业和农村工作的决定》指出：“推进农业现代化，必须坚持科技、教育兴农的发展战略。”开始把科教兴农作为我国的发展战略。1992年2月12日《国务院关于积极实行农科教结合推动农村经济发展的通知》则进一步提出了科教兴农的具体实现形式，指出：“在科技、教育兴农工作中，积极实行农业、科技、教育相结合”，“农科教结合是实现农业现代化的一个重要途径”。1992年10月12日江泽民在十四大报告中指出：“坚持依靠科技、教育兴农，多形式、多渠道增加农业投入，坚持不懈地开展农田水利建设，不断提高农业的集约水平和综合生产能力。”1995年9月28日党的十四届五中全会通过的《中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展“九五”计划和2010年远景目标的建议》指出：“加大科教兴农的力度，实施‘种子工程’，推广节水、节肥等适用技术。”1997年9月12日，十五大报告指出：“大力推进科教兴农，发展高产、优质、高效农业和节水农业。”1998年10月14日党的十五届三中全会通过的《中共中央关于农业和农村工作若干重大问题的决定》指出：“实施科教兴农，农业的根本出路在科技、在教育。实行农科教结合，加强农业科学技术的研究和推广，注重人才培养，把农业和农村经济增长转到依靠科技进步和提高劳动者素质的轨道上来。”2002年，党的十六大又提出了“加快农业科技进步”、“大力发展教育和科学事业”的要求（郑生权，2009）。2005年、2007年、2008年、2010年、2014年的中央一号文件都强调了要加大对农业科技进步的支持力度，2012年，中央发布了题为《关于加快推进农业科技创新持续增强农产品供给保障能力的若干意见》的一号文件，明确指出“农业科技是确保国家粮食安全的基础支撑，是突破资源环境约束的必然选择，是加快现代农业建设的决定力量，具有显著的公共性、基础性、社会性”，以“提升农业技术推广能力”和“加强农业教育科技培训”。对农业科技重视的效果是显而易见的：中国各主要作物的良种推广率都达到了100%，粮食作物品种平均6~7年更换1次，一般新品种可比老品种增产15%左右（张学彪，2008）；全国现有耕地中的1/3、播种面积的2/3实行了多熟制，复种指数从1949年的128%提高到158%，最高地区达到250%，土地利用率和农业的综合生产能力显著提升（张宝文，2004），中国的水稻产量每公顷能够达到6.4吨，中国能用世界上不足10%的耕地养活了超过20%的人口，粮食自给率达到了95%（Ali Zafar，2010）。

### 3、中国在非洲：聚焦农业

毛泽东在1950年代提出：“因为中国是一个具有960万平方公里土地和六万万人口的国

<sup>23</sup> 1958年12月10日，《中共中央关于一九五九年国民经济计划的决议》

家，中国应当对人类也有较大的贡献”（石林，1989：14-15），中国开始向非洲提供援助，援助农业，一方面是因为当时中国的发展仍然是以农业为主，当时，中国还仍然在接受前苏联的援助下建立工业经济体系，也在发展摸索的过程中，难以有可输出的发展经验，农业的发展经验则是相对完整和独立的；一方面也是为了适应当时非洲的发展需要。1970年代，中国开始将台湾问题列为了对外援助的范畴，由于台湾对非的援助以农业为主，非洲国家将接替台湾在非洲的农业援助项目作为和中国建立外交关系的条件，如塞内加尔、塞拉利昂、卢旺达、刚果（金）、尼日尔等，1971年，中国开始顶替台湾农耕队，将对非农业援助国家的范围到18个非洲国家<sup>24</sup>，至此，对非农业援助系统地演变成了中国对非援助的主要内容，中国希望采取建设大农场和试验站的援助方式，向非洲转移中国农业生产合作化、集体化以及“农业八字宪法”为核心的基本农业生产技术体系。后来到80年代和90年代，中国对非农业援助受到国家发展战略以及援外工作改革的影响，对非农业援助更多放在了对早期援助项目的可持续改造上。

进入新世纪以后，中国重新开始调整对非援助思路。虽然非洲农业长期发展不足有着深刻的历史根源和制度缺陷，但是在整体上“不干预内政”的援外基本原则下，中国更愿意将非洲农业发展不足归结于技术的不发达，而这一点也符合非洲农业发展的现实，撒哈拉以南非洲国家主要作物，如水稻、小麦、玉米、高粱、木薯、马铃薯，良种推广面积占各自播种面积的比例是世界上最底的（World Bank, 2007；转引自李小云，齐顾波，唐丽霞，等，2010年），撒哈拉以南非洲即使新品种推广较高的玉米和小麦也只达到40%以和60%左右，水稻、高粱、木薯和马铃薯等主要粮食作物的良种推广率仅分别为22%、17%、19%和15%；非洲90%的农业生产仍依靠使用简单的手工工具，农药、化肥也未被广泛使用，农业机械化、水利化水平很低（姚桂梅，2002）。因此技术水平落后导致的非洲粮食安全问题突出成为中国政府在新时期制定对非政策的重要出发点，在多个政策文件中，提及对非农业合作时，均强调了技术的重要性，明确中国对非农业援助的重点是技术合作，如《中国对非政策文件》明确指出“重点加强在土地开发、农业种植、养殖技术、粮食安全、农用机械、农副产品加工等领域的合作。加大农业技术合作力度，积极开展农业实用技术培训，在非洲建立农业技术试验示范项目。”在中国和 FAO 签订的南南合作意向书中提出“中国要通过委派3000名专家的方式向非洲提供包括投入、工具、设备等，以引进适合当地环境的技术，尽快提高小生产者的生产率”。如果我们把2006年、2009年和2012年三次中非合作论坛的后续行动中所提出的各种援助非洲农业方式均以“技术”为核心，以示范和推广中国农业技术为目标，包括派遣专家、建立农业技术示范中心、举办对非农业技术培训班以及在 FAO 的粮食安全行动框架下派遣农业南南合作技术专家等。至此，中国基本形成了以“农业技术”为核心的对非农业援助政策体系和框架，而这也正是中国国内农业发展的重要经验。

表 1 中非合作论坛后续行动计划中农业援助的方式

发布机制	发布时间	涉及到农业援助方面的具体内容
三中非合作论坛北京行动计划（2007-2009年）	2006年	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ 向非洲派遣 100 名高级农业技术专家</li> <li>✓ 在非洲建立 10 个有特色的农业技术示范中心。</li> <li>✓ 加强与非洲在农业实用技术和农业人力资源开发方面的合作。</li> <li>✓ 加强与非洲国家在联合国粮农组织“粮食安全特别计划”框架内的合作。</li> </ul>

<sup>24</sup> 重点国家是指 1960 年代就和中国建交的坦桑尼亚、赞比亚、几内亚和刚果（布），18 个国家包括塞拉利昂、卢旺达、加纳、多哥、贝宁、刚果（金）、塞内加尔、乍得、布基纳法索、加蓬、马达加斯加、尼日尔、毛里求斯等。

中非合作论坛—沙姆沙伊赫行动计划（2010至2012年）	2009年	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ 向非洲国家派遣 50 个农业技术组</li> <li>✓ 为非洲国家培训 2000 名农业技术人员。</li> <li>✓ 将为非洲国家援建的农业技术示范中心数量增至 20 个。</li> <li>✓ 继续办好已经建立的援非农业技术示范中心</li> <li>✓ 落实好向联合国粮农组织捐款 3000 万美元设立信托基金的工作，积极利用上述信托基金支持中国在联合国粮食及农业组织“粮食安全特别计划”框架下，与非洲国家开展南南合作。</li> </ul>
中非合作论坛北京行动计划(2013年至2015年)	2012年	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ 继续向非洲国家派遣农业技术组，加强非洲农业技术人员培训。</li> <li>✓ 向非洲国家派遣农业职业教育培训教师组，帮助非洲建立农业职教体系。</li> <li>✓ 增加援非农业技术示范中心，继续发挥援非农业技术示范中心的功能和作用，共同开展生产示范和技术推广。</li> <li>✓ 在粮食种植、储存、加工和流通领域，帮助非洲国家提高自主发展能力，并提供技术支持。</li> <li>✓ 积极支持联合国粮食及农业组织在非洲开展的农业发展项目，在联合国粮农组织“粮食安全特别计划”框架下与非洲国家和地区组织开展粮食安全相关合作。</li> </ul>

资料来源：根据 www.focac.org 网站资料整理

### 三、中国对非农业援助的路径：不同时期发展经验的平行分享

#### 1、大寨模式和农业八字宪法

从1950年代末到1970年代末期，受经典现代化发展路径的影响，中国迫切希望通过快速工业化实现国家发展，希望逐步推行农业合作化，改造传统农业，提高农业生产效率，通过农业原始积累提供工业发展资本，在这样的制度安排下，中国农业总产值指数在1952-1958年期间表现出连续上升的态势，如果以1952年为100，1958年的农业总产值指数为127.8，比基期上涨27.8%，人均粮食占有量也由1952年的576斤增加到1958年的612斤<sup>25</sup>。中国在农业上的快速发展吸引了刚刚获得民族独立的非洲国家的广泛关注，如1960年，几内亚的经济顾问高舒访华时明确表示农业合作化是中国可以帮助几内亚的最重要方面之一，希望中国帮助几内亚农民通过生产合作提高单位面积产量(张浚, 2010); 再如坦桑尼亚推行的“乌贾马”运动，坦桑尼亚《旗帜报》的一篇介绍“乌贾马”内涵的文章说：“.....事实上是以以色列的基布兹、中国的人民公社和俄国的集体农庄经验的融合”(张士智, 蔡临翔, 1981)。但是，过度的农业合作化很快呈现出制度性发展障碍，加上自然灾害，从1960年，中国粮食总产量从2亿吨下降到1.43亿吨，从1958年到1965年，中国农业总产值却由537亿元下降到415亿元，下降22.7% (武力, 1999)，在制度不变的情况下，中国试图通过依托农业技术来恢复农业生产，1958年，中国提出八项农业的增产技术（被称为农业八字宪法<sup>26</sup>），1964年，以劳动力投入替代资本投入的劳动力密集型“大寨农业模式”被确定为农业发展的替代性选择，中国农业生

<sup>25</sup>中华人民共和国农业部计划司编：《中国农村经济统计大全》(1949-1986)，农业出版社，第112、127页

<sup>26</sup>农业八字宪法是指“土（深耕、改良土壤、土壤普查和土地规划）、肥（合理施肥）、水（发展水利和合理用水）、种（推广良种）、密（合理密植）、保（植物保护，防治病虫害）、管（田间管理）、工（工具改革）”，这八个字构成了中国农业发展的基本经验。

产开始恢复。

这种模式很快影响到了中国对非洲的农业援助行动，大寨经验“是世界最好的，有普遍国际意义（陈伯达语，转引自蒋华杰，2013）”，1973年，周恩来专门安排马里国家元首穆萨特拉奥雷参观大寨。1972年，周恩来会见几内亚总理时，便建议对方尝试运用八字宪法来改革农业生产，并将其纳入到中国当时农业援非技术人员的培训中；华国锋明确要求对非农技专家要结合当地情况运用八字宪法（蒋华杰，2013），改进种子、农家肥、密植技术、改良小农具以及自流排灌等中国农业技术被推广到非洲，同时，大寨模式中的动员群众、自办公助的管理模式也被农技援非专家运用到非洲农业生产的组织和管理中，1973年，中国农技专家在扎伊尔（刚果金）的鲁济济垦区协助当地政府召开六次共两万人的动员大会，让农民使用中国提供的手工工具播种，完成了7000多公顷的棉花种植，比1972年的种植面积增加了2077公顷；在布基纳法索、多哥、卢旺达、塞内加尔等国，援非农技人员采用“依靠农民自力为主，公助为辅”方法开垦土地，降低农田建设成本，在布基纳法索，每亩土地的开垦成本从352元降低到101元，在塞内加尔开发稻田的成本每亩仅为48-80元，仅为世界银行的五分之一。

将中国内农业发展的模式直接应用到非洲的最主要的原因是中国对非洲的认知构建在中国和非洲发展基础相似的基本假设上：首先，中国和非洲的落后都来源于相似的殖民主义剥削的历史遭遇，正如周恩来在1974年会见塞内加尔桑格尔总统讲话中所强调的“中国和塞内加尔都是发展中国家，同属于第三世界，我们两国人民都长期遭受殖民主义、帝国主义的侵略、奴役、压迫和剥削，有着相同的历史遭遇”<sup>27</sup>；其次，中国和非洲都具有广阔的耕地资源，非洲应该也适合建设类似于中国的国营农场；第三，非洲国家大多采用了和中国相近的国有经济制度。第二个原因是对台湾对非农业援助的了解，当时，农林部和外经部发现一手包办、垄断技术、雇工经营、依赖国际市场和机械耕作等措施的台湾农业援助在非洲的效果不佳（蒋华杰，2013）。通过输出高度类似于大寨模式的农业生产模式，中国在14个非洲国家援助推广种植水稻面积达到了70万亩，总产量达到了7万多吨，但是这种尝试并没有使非洲各国走上自力更生发展农业生产的发展道路，随着农技专家的撤离，中国在非洲援建开发的农场很快陷入了“上马快、见效快，下坡下马也快”的困境（隗文聚，2000），非洲农民不适应中国专家带来的耕作方法，使技术传授的成效也大打折扣（唐晓阳，2013年），这种依靠社会主义制度特有的超常动员机制、依靠丰富的劳动力资源和改良的传统农作经验以及精耕细作的技术特征的农业发展模式对生存条件极为苛刻的要求是其不能被复制的主要因素。但是，大农场援建模式的失败实际上也是中国国内农业合作化模式失败的延伸，这一时期，中国国内农业合作化导致了严重的农业危机<sup>28</sup>：与1958年相比，1961年的农业总产值指数下降了33.7个百分点；粮食产量在1958年为2亿吨，1959年为1.7亿吨，到1961年进一步下降到了1.48亿吨；人均粮食占有量由1958年的303公斤，迅速下降到1959年的253公斤和1961年的224公斤。中国在此阶段对非洲农业援助实际上也是一种失败的发展范式的示范。

## 2、家庭联产承包责任制的推行

1970年代末期，农业生产高度合作化和集体化的制度障碍导致中国农业发展陷入困境，以调动个体积极性的承包责任制成为中国农业发展道路的新选择，农村地区的农民家庭联产承包责任制和国营农场的职工家庭承包制成为农业生产新的组织管理模式，并很快发挥巨大的制度效益：从1979年到1984年，中国国内农业总产值增长了355.4%，平均每年递增7.9%，

<sup>27</sup> 新华社1974年5月6日讯，周恩来总理在欢迎桑格尔总统宴会上的讲话。

<sup>28</sup> 资料来源同脚注1，人均口粮占有量根据第6页和第147页数据计算。



粮食产量由 1978 年前的 30477 万吨增加到 1984 年的 40731 万吨,平均每年增长 1709 万吨,增长率达 4.95%, 农民的人均收入增加了 176.2 元<sup>29</sup>, 这一时期, 中国农业增长的主要源泉是家庭联产承包责任制为核心的制度变迁, 其对农业增长的贡献率达到了 46.89% (Lin, 1982)。

承包制对于在中国国内农业生产的有效激励给中国政府改变对非农业援助方式提供了经验, 开始尝试改造前期在非洲建成的农业项目, 尝试采用承包制方式来改变非洲农业的生产组织, 1985 年, 中国选派农业专家帮助改造早先在布基纳法索援建的三个水稻垦区, 参照中国国内承包责任制的做法, 农田的所有权归国家, 经营权则分给农民, 采取“分田到户、个体经营、收获归己”的经营方式, 将农民的收益和农田的经营管理结合起来, 并由中国专家提供技术指导, 1987 年, 三个水稻产区生产稻谷 1.76 亿吨, 单位面积产量达到最高每公顷 10.5 吨 (双季稻), 垦区农户年纯收入为 1300-2600 美元 (张浚, 2013), 这种模式还先后被运用到中国在卢旺达鲁奔迪、卢瓦玛加纳垦区, 加纳的阿菲费垦区, 尼日尔的哥罗、塞白里垦区等, 这些垦区在中国农技专家离开后, 历经多年依然发展 (周进军, 王强, 1997)。唐晓阳 (2013) 对这种模式进行了总结: “由中国政府提供资金兴办水利设施, 购置机械农具; 当地政府协调管理, 组织农民承包租赁土地; 中国专家则提供种植示范和辅导, 传授农民产前、产中和产后服务相关技术。在这种模式下, 双边政府没有长期的经济负担, 农民自垦、自种、自收、自营, 有较强的责任心和积极性, 能有效保持项目的生命力”。

承包制在这些援非农业项目中的成功以及前期依托大农场和试验站建设的农业合作化和集体化发展模式输出的失败促使中国政府重新审视对非农业援助方式, 同时, 由于当时援助资金规模总量的减少, 中国政府减少了大规模的农场建设援助, 更多采用选派农技专家对前期项目进行经营方式改造上, 寻求改善对非农业援助工作效果的新方法, 其核心目标还是推动非洲国家的自主发展。但是, 承包制的改革并没有完全解决中国农业援非项目的可持续问题, 一些中国政府通过租赁经营、合作经营或承包经营改造的农业援助项目在中国专家撤出后重新荒废, 出现了“建设-移交-中断-再投入-再移交-再中断”的恶性循环 (李小云, 等, 2012), 如几内亚的金迪亚农场、坦桑尼亚姆巴拉利农场和马里糖厂。

### 3、市场化改革的扩张

进入1990年代, 市场逐渐取代政府对资源配置起基础性作用, 中国一方面进行市场经济体制改革, 对国有企业进行改革, 实行政企分开; 一方面通过独资、合资和合作经营三种途径吸收外商直接投资, 尤其是外商投资成为中国经济增长中的主要推动力量, 从1992年到1998年, 外商投资对中国经济增长的贡献率超过了15% (王新, 1999)。当时, 中国的市场化改革不仅仅局限于经济领域, 同时也扩散到公共服务领域, 尤其是农业科技推广领域, 从1980年代末开始, 中国实行对农技推广体系进行商业化和市场化改革, 允许农业科技研究和推广机构提供商业性的技术服务, 如销售良种、化肥和农业等 (Huang, Qiao, Zhang & Rozelle, 2001), 从而推动公共性的农业技术推广部门能够“自收自支” (self-supported by fee-based services, Mei, 2005), 市场化改革渗透到各个部门。

包括合资经营在内中国国内企业及农业科技推广服务体系的市场化改革被自然而然地运用到中国对非洲的农业援助项目中。从1984年起, 中国的中经对外公司一直对早期援建的马里糖厂提供合作管理技术支持, 但其经营状况始终难以改善, 1994年, 中经对外公司在1996年和马里签订了合股经营合同, 在中国援建的马里糖厂的基础上组建“上卡拉糖联”, 中国占股60%, 转制后的合资公司雇员达到了4500人, 高峰期达到了7000人 (周弘, 2013),

<sup>29</sup> 中共中央文献研究室综合研究室、党的文献编辑组,《三中全会以来的重大决策》,中央文献出版社, 1994年版

白糖的产量达到了33万吨，每年为马里上缴300多万欧元的税收（钟清，2004），类似案例还有中国农垦总公司在赞比亚的中赞友谊农场项目以及中国水产在非洲13个国家实施了23个渔业合作项目（阚文聚，2000）。1996年，农业部成立了非洲农业开发中心，以企业的身份与几内亚农业部农业工程局合资组建了中几农业合作开发公司，中方占80%股份，在几内亚开发建设了一个占地约2000公顷的农场，种植袁隆平的高产杂交水稻，每年可以收获两三千吨大米；并根据市场需要兴办了代种鸡场、鸡舍、小型饲料加工厂、塑料编织袋厂、大米加工厂、农机修配厂等；多年以后，这些企业依然正常运转，收益良好，而且也为几内亚提供了大量的农畜产品，在企业内培养了一批熟悉农业技术和机械操作的雇员，向企业外的农民则推广示范了科学种田的方法（唐晓阳，2013）。同时，很多非洲国家也认为吸引外资是比政府间的传统农耕援助方式更加有效的发展方式，希望获得更多的投资（周弘，2013），非洲国家期望、中国自身发展经验以及农业援助项目引入市场化机制产生的可持续效果让中国政府相信实行企业化经营管理模式对农业援助项目执行有着积极的作用，中国逐步形成了市场化的对非农业援助体制，将援助与市场相结合，通过企业运作来维持维护援助项目（唐晓阳，2013）。

市场化援助体制的形成客观上具有中国企业海外扩张的因素，一些承担农业援助项目执行的企业后来也成为中国农业海外投资的主力，同时，市场化援助体制的形成在客观上导致了市场力量追求经济效益与对外援助公共服务属性之间的矛盾，一些农业援助项目在企业化管理下改变了性质，基本演化成了完全的企业，原来具有公益性的试验站的技术示范功能则大多不存在，从而导致了对中国援外的商业性和中国企业缺乏社会责任的批评逐渐显现，中国对非援助也面临企业和国家、市场化和公益性的艰难平衡（张海冰，2012）。但是，国际社会据此来说明中国在非洲采取的援助市场化行动是为了实现海外扩张的观点则忽视了中国对非援助方式和国内发展路径之间的内在联系，忽视了中国对外援助政策实际上国内发展模式的向外延展，颠倒了援助和市场化之间的因果关系，忽略了对非农业援助市场化源于中国本身发展经验的事实，市场化机制是为援助服务的真实逻辑。1995年，中国政府组织的改革援外工作会议上就明确提出“鼓励中国企业与受援国企业以合资经营、合作经营的方式，或中国企业独资经营的方式实施中国对外援助项目”是为了“进一步将中国市场化改革的成功经验运用于对受援国的援助”，是为了“扩大援助资金来源和项目规模，提高援助效益”（王昶，2001）。

2000年之前很长一段时间，虽然在历史和政治上存在巨大差异，就经济社会发展主要指标而言，中非之间的差距并不大，客观上能够形成中国当时发展经验直接与非洲发展相结合的案例，无论是大寨模式和农业八字宪法的直接推广，还是对于中国对非农业援助项目经营方式的承包制改造和市场化改革等，中国在非洲的农业援助方式的转变和中国国内在不同阶段所采取的发展方式是一脉相承的，有着极强的逻辑关系，当然这些作法也遭遇到非洲不同社会、文化的冲击而未能成功。

#### 四、中国农业技术示范中心—技术路径的回归

2006年中非合作论坛公布了中国要在非洲建立10个农业技术示范中心的行动措施后，非洲国家需要向中国政府提出了建设示范中心的需求（Brautigam, 2012）。“当时承诺要建立10个，但是有14个国家提出了要求，都不好拒绝，所以就决定建立14个。”<sup>30</sup>后来，在2009年的第四次中非合作论坛上，中国将示范中心的数量增加到了20个，但实际现在完成建设和正在建设的一共有23个。受援国提出援建需求后，商务部和农业部共同组成的考察组首先对其进行可行性考察，和受援国一起初步选定示范中心的建设地址、受援国可以提

<sup>30</sup> 就此问题，笔者询问过商务部援外司的官员，均表示：在国家确定上是根据非洲国家提出的要求。

供的配套条件等，从而最终确定提供示范援助中心援助的国家。目前没有公开资料来说明中国选择这 23 个国家建设示范中心的直接因素，但从这些国家的基本情况不难发现：1) 援建国家的总体经济发展能力较低，有 16 个是重债穷国；2) 援建国家农业发展需求强，粮食不安全情况严重，有 10 个是粮食持续危机国家<sup>31</sup>。3) 援建国家和中国之间的农业合作非常密切，中国曾经多次对这些国家提供农业援助，有非常好的合作基础。

表 2 中国在非洲援建了农业示范中心情况

国家	类型	援建企业	中国对其农业援助
赞比亚	粮食安全不安全国家、重债穷国	吉林农业大学	早期援建棉纺厂、粮食加工厂
坦桑尼亚	粮食安全不安全国家、重债穷国	重庆农科院中一种业有限公司	早期有援建农场的项目、援建棉纺厂、糖厂
喀麦隆	重债穷国	陕西省农垦集团	派出农业专家技术组，赠送农机具
刚果(布)	重债穷国 粮食安全持续危机国家	中国热带农业科学院	早期有援建农场的项目、援建棉纺厂
卢旺达	重债穷国	福建农林科技大学	早期有替代台湾种植队、援建农场的项目、糖厂
贝宁	重债穷国	中国农业发展集团总公司	早期有替代台湾种植队、援建农场的项目
多哥	重债穷国	江西华昌基建有限公司	早期有替代台湾种植队、援建农场的项目、糖厂
利比里亚	重债穷国 粮食安全持续危机国家	隆平高科集团	早期有援建农场的项目、粮食安全行动框架下的派出专家
埃塞俄比亚	重债穷国 粮食安全持续危机国家	广西八桂农业科技有限公司	农业职教培训,粮农组织粮食安全行动框架下派农业专家
苏丹	粮食安全持续危机国家	山东对外经济技术合作集团公司	早期有援建农场的项目、援建棉纺厂
莫桑比克	重债穷国	湖北联丰海外农业开发有限公司	一直都有农业技术合作项目

<sup>31</sup> 根据 FAO 的监测，全球一共有 22 个粮食安全持续危机国家，其中有 17 个在非洲。

乌干达	重债穷国 粮食安全持续危机国家	四川华侨凤凰集团	早期有援建农场的项目、粮食安全行动框架下派农业专家
南非		中国农业发展集团总公司	中国-南非农业联合工作组机制
津巴布韦	粮食安全持续危机国家	中机美诺公司	多次提供粮食援助
马达加斯加	重债穷国	湖南省农科院	早期有替代台湾种植队、援建农场的项目、糖厂
刚果(金)	重债穷国 粮食安全持续危机国家	中兴能源	早期有替代台湾种植队、援建农场的项目、糖厂
安哥拉	粮食安全持续危机国家	新疆生产建设兵团	派出高级农业技术专家组、灌溉合作项目
马拉维	重债穷国	青岛瑞昌棉业	粮农粮食安全框架下信托基金项目
马里	重债穷国	江苏紫荆花纺织科技公司	早期有派出农业技术专家、援建农场的项目、水利工程项目、援建棉纺厂、糖厂、粮食加工厂，粮农组织粮食安全行动框架下派农业专家、粮农粮食安全框架下信托基金项目
毛里塔利亚	重债穷国	黑龙江燕林庄园科技有限公司	早期有援建农场的项目、水利工程项目，粮农组织粮食安全行动框架下派农业专家
中非	重债穷国 粮食安全持续危机国家	山西国际经济合作公司	派出农业专家技术组
赤道几内亚		江西赣粮实业公司	派出农业专家技术组
科特迪瓦	粮食安全持续危机国家	辽宁国际	派出农业专家技术组，赠送农业物资

资料来源：笔者根据各种网络资料和文献整理

中国政府在设计农业示范中心项目时有三个维度的考量：首先示范中心要有吸引力并

且能够示范的新技术，其次，示范中心要能够为当地农民提供培训，第三，示范中心要可持续（Brautigam & Tang,2009；唐晓阳，2013）。可持续是示范中心政策设计考虑的核心（Brautigam & Tang,2009），“各方达成了共识，要摆脱‘中国人在，项目运行良好，中国人撤回，项目就荒废’的怪圈，实现可持续发展”（徐继峰，秦路，2011），在选择企业的时候也将是否在海外有投资经验和投资意愿作为重要的参考指标，在参与农业示范中心的18家企业中，有10多家有在海外农业投资和合作的经验，如湖北联丰农业公司所属的湖北农垦从2005年就开始在莫桑比克投资建立农场；陕西农垦总公司2006年开始在喀麦隆进行农业投资；承建两个示范中心的中农发集团在坦桑尼亚和赞比亚都有投资的农场；负责援建马拉维示范中心的青岛瑞昌棉业公司已经在马拉维、莫桑比克、赞比亚、津巴布韦、坦桑尼亚和马里等非洲国家通过合同农业方式投资棉花种植产业；负责刚果（金）的中兴能源有限公司在苏丹和刚果（金）有农业试验园的合作项目。

中国农业发展的成功和其技术体系对非洲具有较强的适应性（李小云，2013），在示范中心的政策设计中，为了保证示范中心能够提供发挥示范中国农业技术的功能，在选择承办企业和机构时有明确的政策规定，通过选择和认定有资质的发展业绩良好，并且在非洲有一定的合作经验或者有到非洲发展的农业企业或农业科研机构作为建设单位作为保证来实现前面两个维度的考量，具体要求为：“应是国家或省级农业产业化龙头企业，有突出的主业，或知名的品牌和自主知识产权；具有较强的农业科研能力、现代农业生产技术和管理经验，有适应国际化运营的优秀人才队伍和现代管理手段，有自主开拓非洲农业市场的愿望及长期发展规划<sup>32</sup>”。因此，农业科学技术力量仍然是选择示范重心承建机构的重要考量指标。从目前被选定的22家承建机构来看，有18家机构属于涉农机构，其中，有2所省级农业大学，1所国家级农业科研机构，1所省级农业科研机构，8家国有农业企业，6家私营企业，其中有4家属于省部级农业龙头企业，2家已经在非洲多个国家投资农业的私营企业，这些机构具备农业示范的技术能力；有4家机构是非农企业，但这些企业有在非洲投资的经验，并且均和本省的农业科研机构或农业龙头企业建立了正式的合作关系，由这些农业科研机构或农业龙头企业提供技术支持，如承建苏丹示范中心的山东外经集团和山东省农科院合作，江西华昌国际经济技术公司和江西恒湖综合垦殖场合作。

虽然在一些官方话语中，示范中心承担着推动企业走出去的功能，“到海外进行农业投资的风险很大，投入高，回收周期长，因此，商务部和农业部设计出这样的机制，在项目前几年的建设期和技术合作期，由政府提供一定的资金，让项目承担单位去找有意愿、有实力、有经验走出去的企业，共同推动我国农业企业走出去，示范中心是我国农业走出去的桥头堡和窗口，为愿意走出国门的企业提供了机会<sup>33</sup>”。但是“示范中心必须有核心技术，国内的许多农业技术都是几十年甚至上千年固化形成的，国外对此也有需要，我们需要促进这种技术的推广，让示范中心以此为基础进行发展。缺乏核心技术的示范中心能否良好发展、实现商业化运作值得怀疑，一些示范中心和承担单位进行农产品贸易、农技销售甚至房地产开发等，这些只能作为示范中心经营的辅助<sup>34</sup>”。由此可见，在中国的政策框架中，虽然示范中心被委以推动企业走出去的功能，但是示范和推广中国农业技术仍然被定位为示范中心的核心功能。

在围绕示范中心协议签署、奠基、建成、移交和运营的各种仪式性活动上，中国政府的代表、中国驻非洲各国使馆以及非洲政府的代表在谈及示范中心时，对于示范中心在技术

---

<sup>32</sup> 关于促进援非农业技术示范中心项目可持续发展的指导意见

<sup>33</sup> 一位政府官员在示范中心可持续研讨会上的讲话

<sup>34</sup> 一位政府官员在示范中心可持续研讨会上的讲话

示范上功能已经达成了共识。在坦桑尼亚示范中心的揭牌仪式上，中国驻坦桑尼亚大使就表示“示范中心要把中国先进的农业生产技术和管理经验传授给坦桑人民”，而坦桑尼亚基奎特总统在评价示范中心的意义时，则表示“示范中心今后定能在坦提高农民技能，发展农业生产过程中发挥作用。”商务部前部长陈德铭在参观了中国援建津巴布韦农业示范中心时曾指出：“中心要适当发展养殖业，把中国的沼气技术引进来，我们也可以引进农户使用的小型沼气技术，因为这里的天气条件很好，非常适应沼气技术。我们也会考虑把中国的农业机械维修技术引进来，来维修津巴布韦的农业机械。”津巴布韦农业部部长在谈到示范中心的功能表示：“这是建立在农业机械基础上的示范中心，这非常好，让农民能够看到、接触到这些农业机械，然后学会使用它。我希望把这个中心建立成培训者培训基地，让全国的农业技术人员、大学的老师和学生来这里参加培训，然后他们再到各个地方去培训农户。中心在这里推广试验种植土豆，这对于津巴布韦来说是新的，当然不是说它是新品种，我们过去是将土豆作为主食的，土豆只能是重要的粮食作物，不能给农户带来收入；但是现在不同了，薯条和薯片很流行，土豆开始成为我们的经济作物了，示范中心推广土豆就可以让农民能够获得现金收入。我知道有一个离这 300 公里以外的农场主知道这里有种植土豆的机械，专门跑来参观学习过。我非常高兴中心能够推广一些种植土豆的机械。<sup>35</sup>”而另一位中国官员在考察时则非常明确指出虽然示范中心的可持续商业化运作非常重要，但是政府拿钱支持决不仅仅是为了把示范中心建设成“几个人的农场”，而是要真正发挥技术服务的公益性功能。这种对于示范中心示范和传播中国农业技术的功能定位还直接影响到决策层对利用示范中心这个平台进行三方合作的态度，在一次工作会议上，商务部官员明确表示“用别国的资金来在示范中心推广我国的技术是一件有益的事情，但需要坚持我方的主体地位，如果用我们的示范中心推广其它的技术，就违背了示范中心的原则”。将示范中心建设成能够“示范和推广中国农业技术”的平台已经成为基本共识。

目前已经有 14 个示范中心完成了第一期的基础设施建设，并进入了技术合作阶段，每个示范中心都建设有办公室、培训教室和宿舍楼等硬件设施，并且都拥有一块面积在 50-100 公顷不等的农场。多数农业中心都进行了种植业或者养殖业的试验、示范、推广，并举行了不同批次的培训，培训内容涵盖作物杂交生产技术、动植物保护技术、设施农业技术、农业机械化技术的使用等等（周海川，2012），由此可见，技术示范、培训和推广已经成为各个示范中心共同开展的活动。

表 3 农业技术示范中心的品种和技术示范

国家	双边协议要求示范品种	已经示范的品种、技术和服务
赞比亚	玉米、小麦	玉米、大豆试验种植，面积达到38 公顷；
坦桑尼亚	水稻	开展水稻、玉米、蔬菜的试验、示范和新品种、技术的推广；培训农业科研人员、推广人员50 余人次；普通农业生产者、农户120人次；建立农业中心网站；承担非洲水稻会议
喀麦隆	水稻	水稻、玉米、蔬菜、木薯等农业种植、繁育制种、生物能源深加工、鸵鸟养殖以及农机组装；在当地推广“公司+ 基地+ 农户”模式
刚果（布）	木薯、蔬菜、蛋鸡	蔬菜、木薯、玉米的试验种植和肉鸡、蛋鸡试验养殖；传授种植技术；向农民无偿赠送菜苗；举行热带农业技术短期培训班，培

<sup>35</sup> 笔者在津巴布韦示范中心调研时，正好碰上陈部长来中心视察，津巴布韦农业部部长在示范中心迎接。

		训27名学员;编写并翻译《热带农业“走出去”实用技术系列丛书》共16册;举办了“木薯新食品品尝会”
卢旺达	食用菌、水稻、桑蚕	实施水稻、蚕桑、菌草种植和技术推广示范,建立水土保持试验示范区;开展农产品冷藏保鲜、烘烤干燥、包装储存等技术展示;举行培训班11期,培训学员397人,推广1000户
贝宁	玉米、蔬菜	从事玉米、蔬菜种植、蛋鸡养殖;举办玉米技术培训班,共培训学员25人
多哥	水稻	对砂性土壤进行改良;水稻试验种植;培训46名学员,包括农技人员和农场主
利比里亚	水稻	水稻、蔬菜、玉米试验示范;筛选优良猪种;举行首期邦州农业科技骨干集训,培训23名学员;对利比亚职业院校BWI学生培训;对周边农场进行技术指导;对当地农民进行现场水稻生产培训
埃塞俄比亚	蔬菜	蔬菜种植、饲养家禽、喂养牛和羊等,并组织了一些培训班
苏丹	玉米、小麦、棉花、花生	从国内外引进小麦、玉米、棉花、花生和蔬菜品种用于试验,进行小麦、玉米、棉花栽培技术研究;举办“示范中心新技术新品种现场观摩会”
莫桑比克	玉米、水稻、养猪	粮食、蔬菜、试验示范;举办培训班7期,培训技术人员和农民200余人次
乌干达	水产养殖	开始饲料试加工、当地罗非鱼亲鱼采集和驯化培育、引进中国草、鲢、鳙;举行培训班5期,参训人员122人;组织国内专家进行大量培训教材撰写、翻译
南非	水产养殖	推广淡水养殖技术;培育适合南非当地的淡水养殖品种、培训南非当地用户
津巴布韦	马铃薯、玉米、农机	玉米、大豆、马铃薯试验示范;示范推广吸式精密播种机、圆形喷灌机、植保机械等地作业;举办马铃薯机械化培训班,培训25人,举办农业机械普及培训班,计150人次
马达加斯加	水稻	杂交水稻试验;共培训10名马国农业技术高级管理人员,和100名当地农业专家

资料来源:贾焰(2012)年和周海川(2012<sup>36</sup>)

除示范中心外,中国还通过派遣农业技术专家和组织农业援外培训班来示范和推广中国的农业技术。2006-2009年,中国共向非洲33个国家派出了104名高级农业技术专家,2009年到2012年中国向非洲派出了206名农业技术专家(王鹰,2012)。中国派出的农业技术专家从类型上分为高级农业专家和农业技术员,派出专家的数量和领域通常由受援国提出要求,中方按照其需求选派合适的专家。选派专家主要来自于高校、农业科研院所和各级农业技术部门,在服务领域上,以种植业和农产品加工为主,覆盖蔬菜、园艺、农机、养殖、水利、畜牧以及农业政策规划制定等各个方面,向非洲国家传授实用农业生产技术和管理经验,

<sup>36</sup> 周海川,援非农业技术示范中心可持续发展面临的问题和对策,《中国软科学》,2012年第9期

提高非洲国家农业宏观调控能力和自主发展能力；专家选拔通过网上公布和地方推荐等多种渠道进行，通常这些专家要在非洲国家工作一年以上，中国承担全部费用，包括往返国际旅费、医疗保险以及生活津贴和各种补助等。中国农业技术专家通常要参与到非洲国家的农业部门和相关机构，和对方的农业技术研究和推广人员一起工作（李小云，2010）。2001年，中国农业部与埃塞俄比亚农业部签订了“关于在农业职业技术教育培训和绿色证书领域进行合作的意向书”，中国开始帮助埃塞俄比亚建立农业职业教育体系。中国已与埃塞俄比亚政府合作实施了10期农业职业技术教育培训项目，每年选派农业技术专家和教师到埃塞任教，到2012年已经共选派324人次教师，在作物栽培、畜牧、兽医、农机、家政、自然资源开发等6个专业开设48门课程提供教学，共培训当地学生66000人（农业部国际交流服务中心，2012年）。此外，中国从1996年开始参加联合国粮农组织（FAO）倡导的“粮食安全特别行动框架”，在该框架下向发展中国家提供农业援助。当前，中国已经在FAO粮食安全行动计划框架下完成了16个农业援助项目，共向非洲、亚洲、南太平洋、加勒比海等地区的21个国家派遣了890名农业专家和技术员（王鹰，2012）。

**表 4 中国通过 FAO 平台派出农业技术专家的服务领域**

国家	农业技术推广和示范内容
埃塞俄比亚	在 Wenchi 县 4 个农民培训中心开展蚕豆、小麦、大麦、灌溉农作、蔬菜育苗等技术示范 实施小鸡孵化项目 推广了馒头、包子蒸制加工技术 推广面条加工机和手摇式磨粉机
尼日利亚	推广蛋鸡免疫接种技术 示范和推广淡水养鱼
塞内加尔	开展水稻示范、蔬菜示范、有机肥发酵制作示范等活动 微型灌溉技术 开展了花生、玉米、小米、蔬菜高产栽培技术指导
乌干达	中国杂交水稻、玉米示范 木制鸡笼的示范、秸秆氨化示范、饲料加工的示范 开展番茄、洋葱、甘蓝等蔬菜育苗技术示范 示范了柑橘树整形修剪技术
利比里亚	水稻旱育抛秧栽培技术现场示范 动物疫病防治
塞拉利昂	水稻种植、蔬菜/粮食生产、水产、家畜养殖、农林业、灌溉

资料来源：根据农业部外经中心网站的南南合作工作简报整理

## 五、结论和讨论

尽管中国对非农业援助的内容、方式以及管理模式在不断的调整 and 变化，但是，通过农业援助向非洲输出中国的发展经验，希望和中国有着相似发展阶段和历史的非洲国家能够在中国经验的支持下获得发展的初衷一直没有改变。一些学者也相信小农为基础的中国农业发展政策和技术体系能够为非洲的农业发展带来机遇（Li, et al, 2013；樊胜根，2010），一些非洲国家也认为中国的经验对其发展有利，肯尼亚副总统表示：“中国人多地少，却养活了自己；非洲地多人少，却面临着粮食危机，非洲应该能够从中国的发展经验中获得启示”（Alden, 2013），埃塞俄比亚正在复制中国的经济开发区的经验，尼日利亚则在努力学习中国农村综合扶贫计划。但是到目前为止，还没有看到任何一个学习中国经验的非洲国家获得



和中国一样的发展成就。假设只要复制中国的某些特定政策就能实现中国那样的成功也未免过于幼稚，中国改革的成功主要基于独特的中国环境，对于世界其他地方的政策制定缺乏借鉴意义（Martin， 2009）。马达加斯加总统拉瓦卢玛纳强调，非洲需要学习中国的发展经验，但非洲国家和中国的国情不同，非洲的发展不能照搬中国模式（陶文昭， 2009），而中国在向世界分享发展经验时也应该避免将中国自己的特色普世化和避免带着发展优越感进行交流分享（李小云， 2014）。

中国政府的动员能力、农业生产技术的历史、政府强有力补贴推动下的技术推广体系以及完善的农业投入的工业体系是中国农业新的农业技术能够快速扩散的重要前提，而这些都是非洲国家欠缺的。中国农业技术能否被非洲小农认可、接受和采纳，虽然当前还无法给予最终的判断，但是一些研究者已经发现非洲农民不适应中国专家带来的耕作方法。虽然中国的一些机构开始尝试推广中国农业种植技术，在确定的社区内发挥作用，但是这种技术采纳行为能否从项目推动发展成为自觉行为还有待观察。中国在农业援助领域只重技术的传播，缺乏对技术扩散的社会文化因素考量的援助方式也在一定程度上制约了中国技术的扩散。中国在 1980 年代之前也曾经在非洲进行过大规模的农业技术输出和转移，但最终皆以失败而告终，虽然中国农业技术示范中心在运行机制上采取了引入商业化的方式来促进其可持续发展，但是示范中心能否能够按照中国政府所设计的那样通过商业化的运作来取得农业技术试验、示范和推广的成功，目前还难以做出明确的判断。即便不考虑示范中心运行模式上的问题，仅从技术的适应性角度来看，谁又能知道中国当下希望输出的农业技术体系是否能够适应非洲的土壤呢？中国已经派出了近千名农业技术专家，为非洲培养了 6000 名农业技术人才，建成了 14 个农业技术示范中心，但除了一些零星中国农业技术被采纳的报道外，还并没有看到中国农业技术在非洲形成有效的发展推动力的典型案例。

#### 参考文献：

- Ali Zafar, 2010, Learning from the Chinese Miracle: Development Lessons for Sub-Saharan Africa, policy research working paper 5216, World Bank
- Huang, J., Qiao, F., Zhang, L., & Rozelle, S. (2001). Farm pesticides, rice production, and human health in China. Research Report 2001-RR3: International Development Research Centre (IDRC) (pp. 49-52)
- Justin, Yifu Lin, Rural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in China, the American Economic Review, 1992, Vol 82 No.1: 34-51
- Mei, L, A case study of Chinese agro-technical extension system, Acta agriculturae Slovenica, 85 - 2, November 2005:429-442
- Morton, Learning by Doing: China's Role in the Global Governance of Food Security, RCCPB Working Paper 30
- Shenggen Fan, Bella Nestorova and Tolulope Olofinbiyi, "China's Agricultural and Rural Development: Implications for Africa," Keynote Address at the China-DAC Study Group on Agriculture, Food Security and Rural Development, Bamako, April 27-28, 2010.
- 蔡玲明, 我国对非洲的农业援助, 《国际经济合作》, 1992 年第 2 期
- 陈学明, 论中国道路对发展中国家的示范效应, 教学与研究, 2014 年第 2 期
- 郭强, 任福兵, 朱姝, 中国模式具有一定普适性, 《学术界》, 2010 年第 4 期

胡凯,2013,我国农业科技进步贡献率测算与分析:1978-2010年,商业研究,2013(6)

李安山,中非关系研究中国际话语的演变,《世界经济与政治》,2014年第2期

李安山,中国的援非故事:一位美国学者的叙述,《外交评论》,2010年第5期

李小云,齐顾波,唐丽霞,等,小农为基础的农业发展:中国与非洲的比较分析,中国社会科学文献出版社,2009年

李小云,依靠科技进步是加速农业发展的根本措施,中国科技论坛,1989年第5期

李小云《分享中国经验莫陷入误区》  
1[http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion\\_china/2014-09/5149308.html](http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_china/2014-09/5149308.html), 2014年10月

龙刚,反思非洲殖民主义遗产,《世界经济与政治》,2013年第9期

陆文聪,余新平,中国农业科技进步与农民收入增长,浙江大学学报(社科版),2013年第7期

乔榛,中国农村经济制度变迁与农业增长:对1978-2004年中国农业增长的实证分析,《经济评论》,2006年第7期

秦宣,国际视野中的“中国模式”,《中国人民大学学报》,2008年第4期

唐晓阳,中国对非洲农业援助形式的演变及其效果,《世界经济与政治》,2013年第5期

陶文昭,中国模式的非洲效应,国际问题研究,2009年第1期

王昶:《中国高层谋略·外交卷》,陕西师范大学出版社,2001

王晨燕,对非洲农业援助新形式的探索,《国际经济合作》,2008年第4期

王胜文,中国援助非洲基础设施建设的经验与展望,《国际经济合作》,2012年第12期

王新,1999,外商直接投资对中国经济增长的贡献,外国经济与管理,1999(3):1-6

武力:《中华人民共和国经济史》上册,457页,中国经济出版社,1999年

郎文聚.从国际援助的发展看中国对非农业援助.西亚非洲,2000(2)

张海冰,中国对非援助的战略平衡问题,西亚非洲,2012(3)

张浚,2013,中国对非洲的援助,周弘主编《中国援外60年》:87-146,社会科学文献出版社

张浚,不附加条件的援助:中国对非援助政策的形成,《外交评论》,2010(5):20-34

张茂春,杨恕,非洲“向东看”:中国面临的机遇和挑战,《当代世界》,2008年第12期

张士智,蔡临翔,1981,坦桑尼亚的乌贾马运动,《西亚非洲》,1981(5):28-33

郑生权,《科教兴农战略的提出及其意义》  
[http://www.cfen.com.cn/web/meyw/2009-04/13/content\\_837833.htm](http://www.cfen.com.cn/web/meyw/2009-04/13/content_837833.htm) 2014年10月29日登陆。

郑永年,国际发展格局中的中国模式,《中国社会科学》,2009年第5期

钟清,2004,刺绣培训到非洲,《人民日报海外版》(2004年08月05日第八版)

周海川,援非农业技术示范中心可持续发展面临的问题和对策,《中国软科学》,2012年第9期

周弘,2013,中国对外援助的政策与机制,周弘主编《中国援外60年》:1-33,社会科学文献出版社

周弘,中国援外六十年的回顾与展望,《外交评论》,2010年第5期

周进军,王强,新形势下对非洲农业援助的探讨,《国际经济合作》,1997(3)

## Appendix 8: Modalities and Practice of Western Aid

### 西方发展援助的管理和实践评述<sup>37</sup>

唐丽霞 李小云

内容提要：西方发展援助在 60 多年的实践中已经形成了一套相对成熟和系统的体系，本文从战略和政策框架、援助的管理、援助的领域、援助的渠道以及西方援助国之间的合作等几个方面来讨论西方发展援助的管理和实践，西方发展援助战略的完整性、援助管理重视本土化以及援助实施中重视和当地机构的合作等方面的做法，都值得中国借鉴和参考。

关键词：发展援助，西方国家，援助管理

现代国际发展援助开始于 1947 年的美国为援助欧洲大陆重建和发展实施的马歇尔计划。从 1948 年到 1951 年底，美国向欧洲提供了 131.5 亿美元的援助，其中 88% 是无偿赠款；进入 1960 年代，在美国马歇尔计划支持下迅速发展的欧洲国家开始提供对外发展援助，从 1960 年到 1980 年，先后有比利时、法国、德国、意大利、荷兰、英国等 17 个欧洲国家成为援助国，在马歇尔计划时期行使有效管理职能和利用马歇尔计划援助资金的欧洲经济合作组织（OECE）完成了历史使命，在美国的倡议下，国际经济合作组织（简称经合组织，OECD）取代了欧洲经济合作组织，1960 年，经合组织成立了发展援助集团（DAG），1961 年，更名为发展委员会（DAC），目前该组织已经拥有了包括欧盟在内的 29 个成员国（机构），构成了国际发展援助的主体。虽然，以世界银行集团和联合国为首的国际多边机构、非政府机构、私营部门以及新兴经济体近年来在国际发展援助中越来越活跃，发展援助主体的不断扩充促进了国际发展援助主体的多元化和多层次性，发展援助成为全球国际合作重要工具，也成为全球不同发展主体相互竞争的重要领域，各种发展对话和论坛活动日益兴起，为不同援助主体的参与提供了平台和进入国际发展援助主体话语体系的机会，但是不能否认的是，西方发达国家在国际发展援助体系中仍然占据着主导地位。西方发展援助在 60 多年的实践中已经形成了一套相对成熟和系统的体系，其中很多做法都值得中国去借鉴和参考。

#### 一、西方发展援助的战略和政策框架

西方国家经过多年的发展形成了一整套的援助战略和政策文件，总体而言，西方国家的发展援助战略包括三个层面的文件：总体性的援助战略和法案、国别援助战略和部门援助方案。

总体性的援助战略或法案，是指一个国家在特定阶段对外援助总体政策框架，对一个国家的发展援助的范围、方式、机构和职能、资金保障等方面进行明确的规定。英国、美国和日本等国家都制定了本国的援助法案，援助法案对于一个国家的援助目标、重点区域和领域都会有比较明确的规定，如日本在其《对外援助大纲》中将东亚、南亚、非洲、中东、中南美洲等不同援助的重点区域的援助目标和援助方式进行了区分。美国在《USAID 政策框架 2011-2015》中则明确提出了美国援助的 7 大核心目标分别是：促进食物安全、促进全球公共卫生发展、降低气候变化影响和促进减排、促进可持续经济增长、促进民主治理、提供紧急人道主义援助和增强应对危机能力等，同时还提出了在不同战略目标下美国要重点援助的国家、人群以及规模等。有的国家虽然没有援助法案或者总体战略，但会用政策白皮书和文件的方式来总揽该国的对外援助，如德国。德国从 2009 年开始制定发展援助政策文件，到

<sup>37</sup> 本研究得到了英国国际发展部（DFID）资助的中国国际发展研究网络（CIDRN）研究课题系列、挪威研究委员会资助的“援助有效性”课题以及农业部 948 研究课题“国外农业援助项目管理、监测与评估技术引进”（项目编号：2015-C10）的支持。

2013年，德国政府发布了第14个发展援助政策文件（援助政策白皮书），从这份文件中，可以看到德国一共制定了17个不同主题的援助战略文件以及若干个德国政府和其他机构合作指导战略文件、区域发展政策文件等，如德国如何开展三方合作、德国如何和国际多边机构合作、如何和私营部门合作等，这些不同战略性政策文件构成了德国对外援助的基本指导原则和主要方式方法。

国别援助战略，指在援助国的援助政策框架下，援助国与主要受援国共同商议制定的具有国别针对性的阶段性发展援助战略，主要用于规划援助国在该受援国的发展援助行动，通常国别发展援助战略的周期为五年，其内容包括重点领域、合作伙伴、主要行动以及资金预算。当中国还是主要受援国的时候，像英国、澳大利亚等西方国家以及联合国开发计划署、亚洲开发银行等国际多边机构都会制定援华战略。在制定国别行动方案时，西方发达国家通常会结合受援国政府的相关发展战略和政策文件，来制定其在这个国家具体的支持领域、援助方式等。如美国和英国在制定对马拉维的农业援助战略时，主要参考了马拉维农业部制定的农业发展战略（ASWAP），从而确定其农业援助的重点领域和区域。德国则更多参考了马拉维工贸部的出口发展战略（Exporting Strategy），将其农业援助的重点作物锁定为花生、木薯和豆类等。国别援助战略的形成和西方国家在对外援助中将不同国家进行分类援住的传统是密切相关的。在西方发展援助战略体系中，通常会将援助国家进行分类，尤其是近年来，在国际发展援助体系中，全球合作伙伴关系逐渐替代“发展援助”成为主导的话语，同时，一些曾经接受援助的大国，如中国、印度等，转变成成为新型的发展援助国，传统的“欠发达”国家和“发展中国家”的提法已经难以区别西方国家和这些国家之间的战略关系，一些西方国家在援助战略中也会将援助国（合作国）进行分类，采取不同的援助战略和合作策略。

部门援助战略，一些国家还会针对其重要的援助领域制定特定领域的援助方案和计划，提供专门资金，如教育、卫生和农业等，美国2009年实施了“供养将来（Feed the Future）”行动计划来协调其在非洲的农业援助行动，该计划确定了19个国家为援助国家（13个在非洲），确定8个方面的行动计划来实现促进受援国农业增长和营养改良的目标。德国先后于2011年和2013年两次发布了农业援助战略文件，明确了德国农业援助的核心目标、基本原则、行动领域和农业项目的基本导向，在此基础上，德国还于2015年启动了“没有饥饿的世界（One World No Hungry）”特别行动计划，启动了在非洲12个国家的农业援助行动<sup>38</sup>。

不同层次的援助战略文件使得西方国家的对外发展援助呈现出明显的总体性、连续性和一致性等特点，这些方案使得西方发达国家在任何受援国的援助形成了一个整体性体系，有着共同的项目目标、项目框架和项目行动等，这些文件不仅有助于援助国按照既定的目标和行动计划进行援助资源的配置，同时也有助于受援国结合本国发展的特点和需求，根据各个国家提出的援助重点和领域，来协调与各个援助国之间的援助行为，向不同援助国提出有兑现潜力的援助要求和需求。但通常来说，不同类型的援助战略的制订都是一个时间周期长投入大的技术过程，因此，一般都会有相对较长的有效期，通常为五年，一旦形成，尤其是形成援住项目和行动框架以及预算，很难调整，就很难根据非洲国家出现的新的发展困境和需求及时调整发展援助行动，从而降低发展援助的灵活性、针对性和有效性。

## 二、西方发展援助的管理

上个世纪60年代，西方发展援助国开始设立专门的援外机构来促进对外援助的专门化、制度化和规范化，1960年，加拿大设立了援外办公室，1968年，更名为加拿大国际发展署

---

<sup>38</sup>这12个非洲国家是贝宁、布基纳法索、喀麦隆、埃塞俄比亚、加纳、肯尼亚、马拉维、马里、尼日利亚、多哥、突尼斯和赞比亚

(CIDA); 1961年,法国成立合作部,主要负责对独立的发展中国家(主要是非洲国家)提供援助,即法国发展署(AFD)的前身;1961年,美国颁布援外法案(Foreign Assistance Act),并在此基础上成立了美国国际发展署(USAID)<sup>39</sup>,由专门独立的援外机构来统一协调和管理本国的援助事务,曾经是西方发达国家在援外管理上的一大特色,如英国的国际发展部(DFID)和德国的经济合作部(BMZ)。不过,近年来,西方国家在援外管理上也开始进行改革,一些国家取消了专门的援外机构,将援外事务统一归到外交部门管理,如加拿大的发展署(CIDA)和澳大利亚国际发展署(AusAid)都并入到了外交部,挪威的发展署虽然仍然在发挥作用,但是也归口到外交部的统一管理了,当谈及原因时,挪威驻马拉维大使馆的发展参赞表示“援外事务和外交之间的联系十分紧密,过去两个部门分别管理,造成了很多部门间的冲突和信息不对称”<sup>40</sup>。从这些改革来看,西方发达国家援外管理事务的独立性在逐渐减弱,和本国的外交、经贸联系更加紧密。独立的发展机构的撤销,也影响到了一个国家的援助总额,加拿大对外援助额从2012年的5.65亿美元减少到4.95亿美元,占GNI的比重从0.32%下降到0.27%,澳大利亚从5.4亿美元减少到4.8亿美元,占GNI的比重从0.36%降到0.33%。另一个值得注意的趋势是,随着国际发展合作范畴的扩大,西方国家的一些其他政府部门开始关注和重视发展援助事务,发展援助已经不是各国发展部或者开发署的“专属”,以德国为例,虽然当前仍然是经济和合作部提供了最主要的发展援助资金,但是其环保部、教育和科学部以及农业部都在各自领域内开展了援助事务,德国农业部过去只关注德国和欧盟以及美国、加拿大等发达国家之间的农业合作,但是,现在德国农业部开始拓展农业国际合作的范围,和中国、巴西、埃塞俄比亚等国开展农业合作,并对一些发展中国家提供农业援助等。

西方发展援助在管理上的另一个显著的特点是非常重视在受援国的协调和管理工作。西方国家在受援国的管理有几种不同的方式:1)有单独援外部门的国家一般都会在受援国设立代表处和办事处,来统一协调和管理援外事务,如美国、英国和日本。以马拉维为例,美国USAID在马拉维的办公室大约有员工90人,仅“供养将来”一个农业项目大约有10-15人。英国国际发展部在马拉维的办公室大约有40多位工作人员。2)援助隶属于外交部门的援助事务由使馆统一协调,大使馆设立发展参赞,如挪威。仍以马拉维为例,马拉维是挪威的重点援助国家,挪威驻马拉维的发展参赞同时也是副大使,在使馆的级别非常高。3)由能够代表政府的技术咨询公司来统一协调,如德国。德国经济和合作部的技术援助(赠款)主要由德国国际合作公司(GIZ)来负责执行,德国经济和合作部并没有在海外设立办事处或者代表处,德国在受援国的援助项目主要是由德国国际合作公司进行实施和管理。德国国际合作公司会根据德国在这个国家援助项目的多少来决定在该国设立国家办公室还是项目办公室,通常来说,设立国家办公室的国家都是德国援助的重点国家。除了这些常规性管理机构设置外,对于一些重要的或者资金规模比较大的项目,尤其是和受援国的政府部门和机构合作时,西方援助国还会考虑派遣专门的工作人员进入到受援国的政府部门和机构工作,如日本援助马拉维工贸部的“一村一品”项目时,日本国际协力机构(JICA)派遣了一个协调员和财务官到马拉维工贸部执行该项目的下设机构来参与该项目的管理,德国复兴开发银行在马拉维实施的教育基础设施援建项目,也派遣了相关管理人员在马拉维的教育部工作,来负责协助管理援助项目,尤其是项目的财务管理。

西方发展援助在受援国的管理比较重视援助管理的本地化,越来越多地聘用当地人参与援助的管理中,在马拉维,英国国际发展部办公室的40人中,只有11人来自英国本部,英国本部工作人员通常是有固定任期,大部分是3年,其余都是马拉维本土员工,本土员工的

<sup>39</sup> 李小云,王伊欢,唐丽霞等,《发达国家的对外援助》,第5页,世界知识出版社,2013年5月

<sup>40</sup> 笔者在2016年年初曾到马拉维进行调研,专门和挪威驻马拉维使馆的发展参赞讨论了这个问题。

工作时间更为长久；挪威使馆的发展部一共有 10 名工作人员，其中有 5 名来自马拉维，德国复兴开发银行在马拉维办事处一共有 3 名员工，都是马拉维本地人。在这些机构工作的本地人大部分都是来自于当地的精英阶层，接受过良好的教育，一些工作人员还直接来自于受援国的政府部门，有着良好的社会和政治资本，如德国复兴银行驻马拉维办事处的负责人曾经是马拉维财政部的一名重要官员。本地化的管理使得西方发展援助管理机构能够更快更及时地了解马拉维当地的发展情况、政策调整以及更容易和马拉维的政府部门或者其他机构进行沟通和交流；同时，从援助国外派出来的员工受到任期的限制，人员的流动性比较强，本地员工则能够长期持续在这些机构工作，保证机构的稳定性和工作的延续性。西方发展援助管理上的另一个显著特点是活跃着大量的协助援助管理和执行的咨询公司和咨询专家，这些咨询公司和专家为西方的发展援助提供管理、政策研究、技术建议、监测和评估等专业性服务，这些专业性的服务使得西方发展援助呈现出技术化和职业化的特点，并且能够成为援助方和受援国之间的“中间人（broker）”，避免援助方和受援国之间直接冲突和矛盾，起到一个缓冲的作用。

### 三、西方发展援助的重点领域

通常来说，西方发展援助比较重视对社会发展领域内的支持，如教育、健康、人口和公共卫生、供水以及治理能力（包括政府和非政府组织）的提高等，从 OECD-DAC 的统计数据来看，每年有超过 1/3 的援助资金流向这些社会发展领域；在生产领域，大部分的援助都是流向农业、林业和渔业等和农业发展相关部门，西方发展援助通常很少支持欠发达国家的公共基础设施建设和工业发展，如港口、道路以及楼堂馆所等大型基础设施，这也是西方发展援助和中国援助的显著区别，近年来，一些西方国家也开始调整援助战略，开始关注基础设施对于发展的作用，如日本在第五次非洲开发会议（TICAD）上就明确提出“战略基本计划”，有计划地援助 10 国推进基础设施建设，美国也先后在 60 多个国家援助了能源、道路、电力和通讯等领域的基础设施建设。笔者在马拉维调研期间也发现，虽然西方国家很少支持大型的基础设施建设，但是部分国家会支持小型的社会公共服务基础设施建设，如德国的复兴开发银行（KfW）援助了当地很多小学的操场建设。

表 1 OECD-DAC 成员国发展援助的投向（单位：亿美元）

		2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
社会发展领域	金额	452.85	431.89	461.69	445.62	419.91	428.08
	%	43.10%	37.84%	40.65%	41.26%	37.23%	37.27%
经济基础设施和服务	金额	153.49	194.88	169.98	179.74	208.34	221.49
	%	14.61%	17.07%	14.97%	16.64%	18.47%	19.28%
生产领域	金额	67.13	81.79	83.90	78.29	75.98	79.53
	%	6.39%	7.17%	7.39%	7.25%	6.74%	6.92%
跨部门	金额	92.07	143.66	114.41	104.66	103.39	110.14
	%	8.76%	12.59%	10.07%	9.69%	9.17%	9.59%
物资援助和方案援助	金额	51.91	40.55	38.97	34.90	53.59	24.21
	%	4.94%	3.55%	3.43%	3.23%	4.75%	2.11%

债务减免相关	金额	27.13	41.81	43.91	30.68	35.55	6.43
	%	2.58%	3.66%	3.87%	2.84%	3.15%	0.56%
人道主义援助	金额	91.56	100.68	95.80	88.49	107.47	139.87
	%	8.71%	8.82%	8.44%	8.19%	9.53%	12.18%
其他	金额	114.60	106.06	127.01	117.72	123.63	138.83
	%	10.91%	9.29%	11.18%	10.90%	10.96%	12.09%
合计	金额	1050.74	1141.32	1135.68	1080.12	1127.87	1148.60

资料来源：OECD-DAC 统计数据

西方发展援助从领域上涉及到很多方面，从援助本身来看，通常以提供软件能力建设为主，比较重视能力建设活动。以援助马拉维的农业发展为例，西方国家都比较重视支持马拉维的农业发展，美国、英国、德国、挪威、日本等国在马拉维都有专门的农业发展项目，这些农业项目大部分都是以价值链（Value Chain）为指导思想，希望促进当地农产品的加工和市场销售活动，在援助措施上，很少采取直接提供农业生产资料援助的方式，更多采用的援助方式是支持合作社、地方性非政府机构以及农民组织，支持的方式以各种培训为主，其目的是为了倡导农民的市场意识。在马拉维的宾馆里，经常会发现西方国家支持的各种研讨会和培训班，笔者在 2015 年 10 月在马拉维调研期间，美国 USAID 和国际粮食研究所（IFPRI）就联合组织了题为“促进马拉维玉米粮食市场”的会议，来专门研究马拉维的玉米市场问题。此外，西方的发展援助通常会考虑到合作机构的能力，为合作机构提供必要的项目执行条件，如车辆、人员费用、燃料补贴、培训费用等，以国际机构在马拉维援建的打井项目为例，西方援助的项目会给马拉维不同地区水办公室提供预算总额 15%-20%的管理费，让其开展后续的维修以及培训工作。

#### 四、西方发展援助的援助渠道

从援助资金渠道上来看，西方国家不仅仅通过双边援助的方式向受援国提供发展援助，同时也还比较重视使用多边机制，近年来，西方国家越来越多地倚重国际多边机构提供发展援助，根据 OECD-DAC 的统计，2008-2009 年，西方发达国家的国际发展援助通过多边机构的渠道的比重为 37%，到 2012-2013 年度，这一比重上升到了 39%；并且值得注意的是，除了向多边机构捐助非指定性的财政援助之外，西方国家也在越来越多地考虑向多边机构购买服务，提供指定用途的项目援助，从统计数据来看，这种指定用途的援助从 2007-08 年度的 11%上升到 2012-13 年度的 13%。从实践来看，在马拉维，英国、挪威、德国等国共同在世界银行建立了多边机构信托基金（Multi-donor Trust Fund），由世界银行来执行援助项目。

和私人部门合作，尤其是非政府组织合作，来向发展中国家提供发展援助也是西方发展援助的一个重要特点。根据经合组织的统计，1975 年，经合组织成员国的官方援助资金只有 0.7%流向非政府组织，1985 年，这一比例上升到 3.6%，1994 年上升到 5%；2009 年上升到了 13%，资金总额为 155 亿美元；<sup>41</sup> 2011 年，这一比例上升到了 21%，资金总额达到了 200 亿美元，目前，这一趋势仍然在上升。<sup>42</sup> OECD 的一项调查数据显示，爱尔兰、荷兰、

<sup>41</sup> OECD, "How DAC Members Work With Civil Society Organizations: An Overview", [http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/Final\\_How\\_DAC\\_members\\_work\\_with\\_CSOS%20ENGLISH.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/Final_How_DAC_members_work_with_CSOS%20ENGLISH.pdf).

<sup>42</sup> OECD-DAC, "Development Co-operation Report 2014: Mobilising Resources for Sustainable



挪威、卢森堡、瑞士、瑞典等国家和非政府组织的合作程度比较高，通过非政府组织的使用官方发展援助资金的比重均超过了 25%，最高的为爱尔兰，达到了 37%；法国、韩国、日本、希腊和葡萄牙五个国家和非政府组织合作程度较低，其通过非政府组织实施官方发展援助资金的比例仅都维持在 1%到 3%左右。<sup>43</sup>总体来看，一些官方援助规模比较大的国家，如美国、英国和德国等国家都比较倾向于和国际非政府组织合作；北欧等面积较小的国家也更倾向于和非政府组织合作。

西方发达国家官方发展援助合作的非政府组织有三种类型：国际性非政府组织，本国的非政府组织以及发展中国家的非政府组织，按照 OECD 的统计，24 个发展委员会成员国都和本国的非政府组织合作国，有 22 个成员国和国际非政府组织合作国，有 22 个成员国和发展中国家的非政府组织合作过；从资金流向规模来看，大部分国家都会选择本国的非政府组织，2009 年，选择本国非政府组织来实施官方发展援助的资金额度是国际性非政府组织和受援国非政府组织的 5 倍。<sup>44</sup>不过，现在越来越多的国家在选择非政府组织的时候并不将该组织所属的国家作为主要因素，如英国在马拉维的两个农业领域内的发展项目，一个委托的是一家美国的非政府组织，一个委托的是爱尔兰的非政府组织；挪威在马拉维的一个农业援助项目则是委托一家瑞典的非政府组织来进行。

利用受援国本土的非政府机构来开展援助活动成为近年来西方发展援助实施的一个新特点。这些机构包括本地的非政府组织、农业企业、研究机构和农民协会组织等作为发展项目的合作者或者是参与者，通过支持这些机构，来保证更多的人群受益。这种做法是非常普遍的，一些国际性的非政府机构在得到西方官方发展援助的支持在受援国执行援助项目时，也会通过分包合同或者是合作的方式和一些本土的机构合作，尤其是社会发展领域内的项目，如教育、卫生、农业等项目，这些项目通常都要在社区层次开展，本土性的非政府机构在社区工作有优势，能够节约项目的执行成本。如瑞典的非政府机构执行的挪威政府的支持的保护性农业项目，在马拉维的南部的一个地区，则是由一家马拉维本土的非政府机构负责实施，这个机构负责派遣农业技术员去项目村庄发放农业生产物资、开展农业技术培训以及进行农产品的收购等方面的服务。一些西方国家也会直接支持本土的非政府组织，如挪威和美国都支持了马拉维小农户协会（NASFAM），为这个小农户协会的发展部门提供资金，支持其开展农业发展项目。不同性质的机构参与到发展援助的执行中，能够形成一种相互竞争和创新的局面，各个机构都十分注重自己的项目质量，并且由于不同机构的参与，还能有助于援助方法的创新和节约援助成本。此外，不同的机构在发展中国家都有自己不同的发展合作伙伴，这样也使得更多发展中国家的机构能够受益于西方援助项目。

和政府机构之外的机构合作，也是西方发展援助应对援助的条件性的一个重要策略。西方国家援助的一个特点是有条件的援助，条件很多时候是受援国的治理能力和政治制度，当一个国家的治理能力和政治安排不符合西方援助标准时，并不意味着西方国家会停止对这个国家的援助，而只是停止和受援国政府部门的合作。马拉维的“现金门事件”发生后<sup>45</sup>，英国停止了对马拉维政府的预算援助以及和政府部门的合作，但是英国国际发展部的工作人员表

---

Development".2014.

<sup>43</sup> OECD, "How DAC Members Work With Civil Society Organizations: An Overview", [http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/Final\\_How\\_DAC\\_members\\_work\\_with\\_CSOS%20ENGLISH.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/Final_How_DAC_members_work_with_CSOS%20ENGLISH.pdf).

<sup>44</sup> OECD, "How DAC Members Work With Civil Society Organizations: An Overview", [http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/Final\\_How\\_DAC\\_members\\_work\\_with\\_CSOS%20ENGLISH.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/Final_How_DAC_members_work_with_CSOS%20ENGLISH.pdf).

<sup>45</sup> 马拉维政府财政采用了网上报账系统，但该系统有很大的漏洞，官员可以将公共财政资金转到自己的私人账户，并且还能够从系统中将记录抹平，很长时间都没有发现，直到 2013 年，财政部的一个司长被人枪击，由此曝光了丑闻，英国审计公司介入调查，发现一年就流失了 920 亿夸查的资金，从而西方国家开始对马拉维的公共财政体系不信任，停止对其提供预算援助和方案援助。

示“英国并没有减少对马拉维的援助，我们只是改变了援助方式，不再提供预算援助，也不再和马拉维政府部门合作”，英国对马拉维的援助主要通过多边发展机构、国际非政府组织和本土非政府组织等机构来开展。美国对马拉维的援助也基本上不和政府部门合作，主要通过国际非政府组织来实施，如关怀国际、国际计划等等；这种情况不仅仅出现在马拉维，笔者曾经在津巴布韦调研，和农业部的官员谈及西方国家对其援助时，该官员表示：“他们都在援助津巴布韦，只不过他们没有和我们政府合作，他们都在农村地区直接提供帮助，他们也会支持当地的一些非政府机构。”

西方发展援助的捆绑性曾经受到很多的质疑，一项研究发现，美国在发展中国家的项目有 80% 的资金要用来购买美国公司和非政府机构的服务；90% 的意大利援助项目是由意大利公司和专家受益的，加拿大援助的 60-65% 要流向于加拿大的公司，德国、日本、法国也同样<sup>46</sup>。近年来，西方发展援助开始逐渐减少捆绑援助，着手让更多的本地公司能够参与到援助项目的实施中。以马拉维为例，西方国家开始将项目的招标工作交由马拉维合作方来进行，如果是政府间合作，就由马拉维相应的政府部门在马拉维进行招标，如果是通过国际非政府组织，该国际非政府组织则直接在马拉维进行招标，通常来说，招标方案由援助机构和马拉维的合作机构共同商定。为了让马拉维一些实力不强的公司能够竞标到国际发展援助项目，马拉维合作方会将一些大型的发展援助建设项目拆分成不同的小项目，这样能够让当地公司也受益于发展援助项目。

## 五、西方主要援助国之间的合作和协调

自 2000 年以来，国际社会开始反思援助的效果，Birdsall (2004) 从援助国的角度总结了影响援助效果的 7 个方面的错误做法，包括：缺乏制度建设的耐心、不能也不愿从不成功的项目和国家撤离、失败的项目评估、认为参与就是自主权(ownership)、同一受援国内不同的援助国之间缺乏协作、转移支付不足而且不可靠以及对当地的公共投资不足等<sup>47</sup>。因此，从 2002 年的《蒙特雷共识》开始，一直到 2011 年《釜山宣言》，如何改善发展援助有效性成为国际发展会议讨论的焦点，尤其是 2005 年的《巴黎宣言》提出了要从五个方面来审视和提高发展援助的有效性，包括受援国的自主权、受援国与援助国之间的协调、援助国之间的合作、管理援助效果和相互问责。《巴黎宣言》对于后来国际发展援助整体格局影响深远，尤其是促进了援助国之间的援助合作。这种合作，首先体现在 OECD-DAC 委员会职责和功能上的加强，为了促进援助国之间的援助合作，发展委员会 (OECD-DAC) 成立发展援助有效性工作组，监测《巴黎宣言》各项基本原则的进展情况，同时启动了发展援助的同行评议，每年会对 4 至 5 个成员国的发展政策、战略和活动进行评议，每个成员国每 4 年被评估一次，评议的内容包括成员国对发展援助委员会及其下属工作组提出的政策建议的落实情况、履行国际和国内承诺的情况。评议的目的是提高被评议国家发展战略、政策、机制和具体项目的水平，并分享关于发展的良好实践，发展委员会先后出版了《管理援助：发展援助委员会成员国的实践》和《有效援助管理：来自发展援助委员会同行评议的 12 条经验》两个有代表性的成果<sup>48</sup>。

在受援国，西方援助国加强了彼此间的合作和交流，在很多国家，西方援助国都有定期

---

<sup>46</sup> Sautman, B. and Yan, H. (2008), 'Friends and Interests: China's Distinctive Links with Africa', in: G.G. Dorothy and F. Manji (eds), *China's New Role in Africa and the South. A Search for New Perspective* (Cape Town, Nairobi and Oxford: Fahamu), p. 104

<sup>47</sup> 汪淳玉，王伊欢，国际发展援助效果研究综述，《中国农业大学学报（社科版）》，2010年第3期，第102-116页

<sup>48</sup> 李小云，王伊欢，唐丽霞等，《发达国家的对外援助》，世界知识出版社，第15页，2013年5月

和不定期的交流讨论会，在这些会议上，各个国家会交流本国在该受援国的主要援助项目。以坦桑尼亚为例，西方发展援助机构成立了坦桑尼亚发展伙伴集团（Development Partners Group, DPG），该集团致力于提高援助的质量，提升伙伴关系，通过实现从信息共享到积极协商，来寻求和谐的援助制度、重点的援助领域，巩固援助的伙伴关系，提高发展合作的有效性。发展伙伴集团成立以来，已经有效地促进了机构间的合作。任何在坦桑尼亚实施多边或双边援助的机构都可以参与到发展伙伴集团中来，目前已经有 16 个双边机构和 5 个多边机构（整个联合国系统算作 1 个）加入了发展伙伴集团。发展伙伴集团每月要举行例会，来讨论和协调援助资源管理，例会主要由联合国开发计划署和一个轮值的双边机构共同主持。发展伙伴集团同时还设立不同的子机构来分别专门处理和协调不同领域内的国际援助。除了交流外，西方援助国之间还经常共同出资支持某一个领域的发展援助，如英国、挪威和爱尔兰等国共同出资在马拉维援助了“促进社区应对能力（Enhancing Community Resilience）”项目以及美国、英国、德国等国家在世界银行共同建立了“多边援助信托基金”项目来支持马拉维的农业发展。西方发展援助的合作还有一个特点就是遵循相似的发展理念和价值观，自从价值链（Value Chain）的概念在国际农业发展中开始采用以来，如果仔细去看西方国家在马拉维的农业援助时，基本上都是在“价值链”的框架下进行的，并且都重视的是农产品的加工和市场这端链条，几乎都不涉及农产品的产前和生产环节，美国、英国、挪威、日本和德国在马拉维的农业援助项目大部分都是在促进和发育农产品商品化的能力、公共意识和环境。国际发展主要议程，包括千年发展目标、应对气候变化以及可持续发展议程等都在影响着西方国家的发展援助政策和体系。

## 六、西方发展援助的管理和实践对中国的启示

2000 年以来，中国政府在中非合作论坛以及联合国高级别会议上多次宣布加大对外援助的力度和范围，从 2010 年到 2012 年，对外援助总量达到了 893.4 亿元<sup>49</sup>，作为经济持续保持高速增长的新兴经济体，中国从全球最主要的受援国之一转变成为发展援助资源的重要提供国；与此同时，中国发布的系列文件，如对非政策文件、中非经贸合作白皮书以及中国对外援助白皮书等都仍然称自己为全球最大的发展中国家，一直坚持在南南合作框架下开展对外援助工作，这种定位，使得中国在已经长期被西方支配的发展合作体系中能够找到自己的政策空间<sup>50</sup>，也能够采取一种有别于传统强国全新的援助方式。由于中国和西方在发展援助体系中的角色以及基本原则上的不同，从而在援助的技术层面也存在着显著的差异。但是，西方发展援助在管理和实践上的一些做法值得中国参考和借鉴。

西方发展援助讲究战略和框架先行，宏观层面有整体援助战略、部门援助战略和国别援助战略，微观层面具体到每个项目和特别行动，都有比较明确的目标、行动安排和预算投入，甚至到管理的每个环节需要提交的文档资料，这一方面能够让援助更加系统化和连续性，另一方面也便于援助进程的监测和效果的评价，同时也能够让受援国比较清晰地了解到对于本国的支持情况，有助于援助双方的沟通和协商。中国对外援助虽然近年来也开始注重制度建设，尤其是中非合作，基本上已经形成了在中非合作论坛机制下开展活动，但需要注意的是，中非合作论坛的后续行动文件和对非政策文件都是综合性的中非合作指导战略，对外援助只是两个文件中的部分内容，并且是针对整个非洲大陆而言，没有区域和国别上的有针对性的安排。另外，援助战略目标都是整体性的，对于每一项行动缺乏直接的具体的目标设置，不利于援助效果的监测和评估。因此，可以考虑借鉴西方发展援助战略和框架体系，来构建中

<sup>49</sup> 商务部，2014 年中国对外援助白皮书，

[http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-07/10/c\\_1111546676.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-07/10/c_1111546676.htm)，2016 年 4 月 2 日登陆

<sup>50</sup> Sven Grimm (2014) China–Africa Cooperation: promises, practice and prospects, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 23:90, 993-1011

国的对外援助战略框架。西方发展援助非常重视受援国的管理，积极和受援国的不同部门合作，包括政府机构、非政府组织、科研单位以及社区发展机构等；在管理安排上，也非常重视管理人员的本地化。中方发展援助的管理大部分职能还是在中国国内进行，在受援国的管理主要依托驻外使馆以及援外项目承建机构自身，援助管理人员本土化程度相对较低。随着中国对外援助规模的增大和项目类型的多元化，中国需要加强在受援国的援助项目管理，加强和受援国不同部门的沟通和交流，在适当情况下，应该聘用本地人加入援助管理的队伍，另外，中国对外援助可以考虑扩大合作范围，加强和受援国非政府部门的合作。西方发展援助开始让更多援助国当地的公司和机构加入，这一点也值得中国对外援助借鉴和参考。

## Appendix 9: IDT short Essay

Heterogeneity of Western Aid ---Field work from Malawi

Homogenization of Western Aid—Field work from Malawi

Why International aid can not promote agricultural development in Malawi

### ● 西方发展援助是铁打一块吗？

唐丽霞

当前对于很多国际发展援助的讨论，总是将西方发达国家作为一种传统和经典的范式来讨论，将他们的援助看成是一种模式，尤其是《巴黎援助有效性宣言》发布以后，西方国家在对外援助上开始遵循共同的原则，采取共同的方式，在很多发展援助比较的文章中，也多是西方传统发达国家视为一个整体，如都采取的有条件的援助、都会干预受援国国内的政治等，但是，如果深入去考察西方传统发达国家在受援国的援助行动，会发现，这些国家的之间的差异是非常明显的。

马拉维是全球最贫困的国家之一，是国际发展援助的重点国家，在“现金门”事件之前，该国能够获得来自于英国的预算援助和部门方案援助，国家财政预算对国际援助的依赖度达到40%左右。虽然预算援助和部门方案援助是西方发达援助国家认为克服项目援助的周期性、短期性和受援国无用有感和责任感的有效方式，但是并非所有西方发达国家都采取这种方式，美国和日本等国就没有对马拉维采取过预算援助。“现金门”事件之后，英国也停止了对马拉维的预算援助和方案援助，目前，英国对马拉维的援助，主要通过国际非政府组织进行，主要有 CARE、Christian Aid、Concerning Universal、Saved Children 和 HER Foundation 等，这些非政府组织都是来自于不同的发达国家，英国的援助基本上没有和马拉维本地的非政府机构直接合作。除此之外，英国还会通过多边机构对马拉维提供发展援助，在世界银行建立了“Multi-donor Trust Fund”，由世界银行来执行援助项目；英国还会和其他发达国家合作，如和挪威以及爱尔兰共同支持了“Enhancing Community Resilience”项目，但该项目则由 Christian Aid 和 Concerning Universal 两个国际性非政府组织来执行。

美国对于马拉维的援助，以项目援助为主，从未提供预算援助和方案援助，不会直接向马拉维政府提供任何资金。美国的援助主要通过国际非政府组织来实施，如 CARE 等；美国也会直接和马拉维的非政府机构或者农民组织合作，如美国曾经支持马拉维的 NASFAM，一个农民协会提供了长达六年的援助，由于项目期结束，USAID 停止了对 NASFAM 的援助；目前挪威向 NASFAM 提供一些援助和支持。马拉维是挪威的重点援助国，挪威的援助和美国、英国相比，则方式更为灵活，既通过国际非政府机构提供援助，如其 Green Agricultural Project 由瑞典的一家非政府机构来执行，支持马拉维大学的项目则由奥斯陆大学来执行，NASFAM 也是挪威援助的执行机构。

日本援助和美国、英国和挪威等国则更不同，日本只和马拉维政府合作，但只提供技术支持，并不提供任何现汇给马拉维政府，通常是支持马拉维国家自己的一个项目，为马拉维政府项目提供技术专家、培训机会以及管理支持等，马拉维工贸部有一个“一村一品”的项目，日本为这个项目提供支持，JICA 派了两个人在这个项目总部工作，在项目费用上，日本直接支付其承担的活动。德国政府在马拉维农业领域内也开展了一些项目，最新的项目是其 Agriculture Innovation Center，但德国的技术援助项目主要是通过 GIZ 来执行，其在马拉维的

农业创新中心项目也是由 GIZ 来执行的，通常 GIZ 会在受援国设立国家主任来协调德国在此的所有项目，每一个单独项目会有独立的项目经理来负责具体的执行和管理。

这些西方国家在援助管理机构的设置上也是有差异的，USAID 和 DFID 由于援助规模比较大，在这边都设有规模相当庞大的分支机构，USAID 的工作人员大约为 90 人，仅 Feed the Future 农业项目大约有 10-15 人，并且大部分是美国雇员。DFID 大约有 40 多位工作人员，但是本地员工为主，只有 11 人来自英国本部，并且英国本部工作人员通常是有固定任期，大部分是 3 年，本地员工则更为长久。“我们本地员工可以代表 DFID，我不代表马拉维，这是英国和美国不一样的地方。”大部分援助国因为援助规模或者因为本国机构设置本身的问题，在受援国派驻的援外管理人员数量都很少，如日本 JICA 只有几个工作人员，但是会派协调员到合作的马拉维政府部门直接工作，在“一村一品”项目办公室，JICA 就派了一个协调员和财务官。挪威虽然对马拉维提供援助比较多，但是都是通过国际组织和当地机构来执行项目，并没有专人来管理和协调不同的项目。

## ● 西方发展援助的一致性

唐丽霞

在马拉维的调研中，一方面可以发现西方发展援助的差异性，另一方面也感受到了西方发展援助的一致性。

除日本外，大部分西方发达国家都很少和马拉维政府部门合作，尤其是现金门之后，预算援助和部门方案援助停止以后，主要国家的发展援助基本上依托国际非政府组织、本土非政府机构以及私人部门，如本土的农业公司、科研机构等实施具体的发展援助项目。西方发展援助基本上不会支持基础设施建设，援助活动以能力建设为主，这种能力建设涉及到方方面面。和多个西方援助机构的官员讨论发现，即便是在农业领域，虽然都希望能够促进马拉维的农业发展，但是在措施上很少采取直接提供农业生产资料援助的方式，即便是希望促进粮食产品的加工和市场销售，但更多采用的援助方式是支持合作社、地方性非政府机构以及农民组织，支持的方式以各种培训为主，其目的是为了倡导农民的市场意识。西方发展援助的另一种方式是支持各种研讨会的召开，笔者在马拉维一家宾馆入住期间，就看见了不同机构资助的各种发展合作领域的会议，如 USAID 和 IFPRI 在 10 月 1 日组织召开了“促进马拉维玉米粮食市场”的会议，来专门讨论马拉维的玉米市场问题。

近年来，西方发展援助都比较重视农业援助，并且基本上都会有一个非常明确的农业援助计划或战略，如美国有 Feed the Future；德国有 One World without Hungry Special Initiative。这些方案使得西方发达国家在任何受援国的援助形成了一个整体性体系，有着共同的项目目标、项目框架和项目行动等，发展援助呈现出整体性的特点。在这样整体的特定领域援助方案下，再去制定针对每一个国家的三年或者五年的援助方案，如美国制定了“美国援助马拉维五年计划”等。另外，虽然西方发展援助很少和马拉维政府部门合作，但是在制定国别行动方案时，西方发达国家通常会结合马拉维政府的相关政策文件，来制定其在这个国家具体的支持领域，如美国和英国更多参考得是马拉维农业部制定的 ASWAp，来确定农业援助的重点领域和区域。德国则更多参考的马拉维工贸部的 Exporting Strategy，从而将其农业援助的重点作物锁定为花生、木薯、豆类等。

西方发展援助还有一个共同的特点是遵循相似的发展理念和价值观，自从 Value Chain 的概念在国际农业发展中开始采用以来，如果仔细去看西方国家在马拉维的农业援助时，基本上都是在 Value Chain 的框架下进行的，并且都重视的是农产品的加工和市场这端链条，几乎都不涉及农产品的产前和生产环节，美国、英国、挪威、日本和德国在这边的农业援助项目大部分都是在促进和发育 Agribusiness 的能力、公共意识和环境，只是采取的方式和方法上有所不同，但基本的模式基本上是“公司+农户”、“合作社+农户”和“合作社+公司+农户”的方式，采取合同种植基本模式，来增加农产品的附加值。虽然也有一部分资金用来支持生产，如小型灌溉项目等，但覆盖范围是非常有限的。

## ● 持续不断的农业援助为什么不能促进马拉维的农业发展

唐丽霞

马拉维是世界上最贫困的国家之一，人均 GDP 仅 255 美元。马拉维的农业是该国的经济基础，贡献了 40% 的 GDP，75% 的出口，也是 84% 的人口的收入来源。马拉维的农业生产以小农为主，和非洲其他国家相比，马拉维的户均耕地面积较小，55% 的小农拥有的土地面积不超过 1 公顷，25% 的小农只拥有 0.25 公顷土地，农业生产也雨养农业为主，除了极少数的蔬菜种植农户和中大型的烟叶种植农场外，基本上没有灌溉设施，主要粮食作物是玉米，也有部分地区种植水稻和木薯，主要经济作物包括烟叶、花生、棉花、鸽子豆和大豆等。由于是靠天吃饭，农户缺乏优良品种，也没有能力投入化肥等基本农业投入，农业生产产量都比较低，正常年景下，大部分农户一英亩的土地上只能收获 5 袋子玉米，大约 250 公斤。近两年，受到厄尔尼诺现象影响，农业减产十分严重，粮食安全突出问题，加上马拉维货币贬值，市场上玉米的价格上涨很快。

近年来，国际发展援助领域开始重视对马拉维农业发展的支持，美国、英国、挪威、德国、日本等国都纷纷对马拉维提供农业援助，一些国际非政府组织，如国际计划和关怀国际等，均在农业领域内有援助项目。尤其是在随着这些年国际社会比较提倡“aid for trade”以及“value Chain”，欧洲一些国家开始将农业援助和本国农产品市场需求结合起来，如挪威希望能够和当地的小农户协会合作，能够支持农户种植当地的香米，提高品质，出口到挪威；德国则希望通过农业创新中心项目，改善花生的种植品种和质量，希望能够从马拉维进口 3000 吨花生。

在这边调研的一个很直观的感受，就是很多援助都在通过提供农资、技术培训、农产品定向收购和加工等方式来帮助当地的小农户，但是当地的农业生产状况并没有多大的改变，依然靠天吃饭，大部分农户基本上处于极端贫困的状态。导致这种情况的出现，主要的原因有：

第一，缺乏农业生产技术采纳的客观条件，马拉维基本上没有农资公司，品种、化肥、饲料、甚至一些农业机械，基本上在市场上都很少有供应，一些公司和组织都是通过到周边国家采购品种来提供给农户，由于供应不足，少量的供应价格是非常高的，没有农民能够买得起。无论是和当地的农民，还是和农业政策制定者甚至一些项目实践者，在问及为什么不采纳新技术，很多人表示根本就买不到或者是根本就买不起。

第二，政府支持农业的能力太弱，虽然如果看马拉维的农业政策，会有各种农业补贴计划，但是能够真正做到的很少，我们在国内经常会说一些贫困地区是吃饭的财政，政府工作的经费主要靠上级财政转移支付，马拉维整个国家都是吃饭的财政，从中央到地方，政府能够及

时支付足月工资都很困难，政府部门需要做事情基本依靠国际援助或者政府贷款，去过几个地区，和地区负责人聊天，问地区的财政收入，基本没有，主要是靠收一些在营业税，马拉维的城市小商贩的水平和国内农村的赶集差不多，能收到的收入很小，马拉维是个财政高度中央集权的国家，大部分的机构都属于中央部委直属的，一个地区级的机构，工资是中央政府单独支付的，每个月能够获得行政办公经费非常有限，一个地区级渔业站，有 40 个工作人员，每月只有 100 万夸查，有的时候只有 50 万夸查，按照现在的汇率，也就是 600-1300 美元之间。马拉维有地区级的农业技术推广人员，但是基本上这些工作人员只有工资收入，没有任何的工作经费。因此，如果你需要农业技术推广人员和你一起工作，你必须给他支付交通和午餐补贴。因为，政府能力太弱，任何一个援助项目结束后，都不会有任何后续的行动。即便是一些机构捐赠的一些农机设备，一旦坏了，基本上就没有任何能力去修护和再利用。

第三，援助项目有我们在国内经常提到的一些扶贫项目“撒胡椒面”的方式，追求短期产出。援助机构之间存在的绩效上的竞争，各个机构都喜欢自己单打独斗，选一个社区，做一个项目，等项目结束了，再选一个社区，再做一个项目，将项目 **targeting** 的人口数量作为一个最为关键的效果评价指标，每个机构都在不同的地区、不同的农产品上做文章，你在南部，我就在中部，你做棉花，我就做花生，你做大米，我就做鸽子豆，虽然巴黎援助有效性会议之后，强调援助国之间的合作，但是这些合作大部分停留在全球治理层面，有共同的纲领共同的目标，如 **SDG**，应对 **climate change**。但是在援助的实践层面，行动的一致性和协调性基本上是很难看到的。分散的援助资源并没有在任何区域或者农产品上形成足以推动当地发生变化的力量，援助带来的新的理念、新的技术和资源并没有有效转化成当地发展的内生动力。所以，这也是我在这边行走时，常常会感到一种无力感。

第四，援助项目所提供的支持并不是这边农户真正需要的，并没有直接指向制约这边农业发展的真正问题和困难。通过和这边小农户的交流，农业生产最直接的困难是灌溉和化肥，很多农户表示如果能够有化肥，一英亩的产量就能从 5 袋提高到 20 袋，但是目前并没有太多的援助力量来投入灌溉和化肥生产等。大部分的农业援助项目过于强调农产品加工增值和收获后的管理，为当地的非政府组织、农民协会等提供小型的农产品加工设备，帮助其进行农产品经营和销售方面的能力建设等，直接改善农业生产环节的援助相对较少。



● **Proposals on Development of China's Foreign Aid (Chinese and English)**

Li Xiaoyun Xu Xiuli Tang Lixia

Since its founding in 1949, China has experienced roughly three different stages in terms of international status. At the earliest stage from early 1950s to 1980s, China was relatively independent and self-reliant for most of the time, except a short-lived honeymoon with the former Socialist camp. At first, China focused its international strategy on ensuring its own security and supporting other socialist brothers. Later, however, it shifted the focus onto breaking the blockades and expanding international presence by lending extensive support to developing countries. Therefore, China, though staggering along itself, provided an appreciable amount of foreign aid to developing countries. At this stage, China's foreign aid yielded no immediate payback, on the contrary, the aid was unilateral, altruistic and even hardly affordable most of the time. At the second stage since China's reform and opening-up in early 1980s till early 2000s, China embraced a comfortable surrounding as various sanctions were lifted. Particularly when China launched all-sided cooperation with western countries, the geopolitical factors that used to block China off were diminishing. By availing of the favorable situation, China has grown its own economy. Thus China readjusted its foreign aid policies towards mutual benefit and compliance with economic goals, geopolitical factors and other considerations. Since the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, great changes have taken place to international settings. As China has gained a higher international status, the rise of China arouses concerns from the western world. Among emerging geopolitical factors, economic globalization is particularly favorable to China. China is forging and consolidating interdependence with both developed and developing countries. While working together, China is also competing and even confronting, conflicting with partners here and there. Since China is becoming a new leading force in the world, current foreign aid policies should be adjusted once more subject to the new situation.

We hereinafter put forward the following proposals, contributing our thoughts to the impending adjustment.

First, China should redefine foreign aid as international public property and lift its strategic status. Amidst a new global landscape, China should view foreign aid as a means to gain its leadership in the world, rather than a means to widen survival margin. With the role as a global leader, China should undertake international obligations and support or even dominate the production of global public goods, which means China should prioritize global public interest while ensuring its own in foreign aid. Therefore, China's foreign aid should enjoy the same strategic importance as political diplomacy, economic cooperation and military presence. Only a nation running on such four-wheeled vehicle can effectively safeguard international justice, world peace and its own legitimate interests. China has shaped up a foreign aid system with unique features and risen up as a new type of aid

provider. However, except for some key international issues, China rarely engages itself in discussions over international development assistance due to limited organizational resources and other factors. The consequences are obvious that China lacks influence or say in the global foreign aid decision-making process and also lacks a clear-cut strategic positioning in providing foreign aid as international public goods.

It is thus proposed that China, apart from actively taking part in UN's and G20's international development agenda, should engage more in activities initiated by OECD Development Assistance Committee, Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, various multilateral development organizations, various countries, etc. Particularly activities initiated by the first two organizations are decisive to the UN's development agenda and climate change discussions and also influential on development and cooperation policy makers from developing countries. In view of the huge workload in international development affairs and current organizational settings, it is proposed that China designate a full-time minister-level chief representative for international development agendas. The chief representative can have full engagement in various international development aid discussions and decision-making process, and interact with foreign aid counterparts from other countries.

Second, China should mend up the fragmented foreign aid system, making it adaptive to the changing situation. With increasing strategic importance, scale and geographic coverage, China's foreign aid policies should be adjusted urgently and fundamentally. It is ideal for China to have a political regime than can ensure the task of streamlining and centralizing foreign aid bodies and resources, but the reality is that different types of resources are held by different government bodies. Though they all excel at their own foreign aid projects, for example Chinese medical teams in Africa, they spare limited financial and human resources for foreign aid due to heavy workload at home. Meanwhile, as more participators join in, and they each represent their own sectoral interest, the cost of coordination is inevitably growing. In fact, a fragmented foreign aid system is detrimental to optimizing the outcomes foreign aid. Besides, the existing foreign aid organizational setup fails to match up with China's global goals due to the low administrative ranking and insufficient staffing level. Therefore, it is an urgent task for China to integrate current fragments into a relatively centralized system.

It is proposed that China should integrate existing administrative resources, while maintaining the practice that foreign aid projects are implemented by different entities. At the macro level, China should establish a regulatory mechanism including foreign aid legislation, policy making, project planning and management, internal and external publicity, etc.

Third, China should do more studies and form research fruits into a theoretical system combined with China's own experience. Foreign aid in western countries has always been followed up by systematic production of development-related

knowledge. This is why western countries can sustain such aid and dominate development-related issues internationally. The establishment of a foreign aid knowledge system involves multiple disciplines especially economics, sociology, anthropology and politics. With more than 60 years of experience, China has all the necessary theoretical elements for establishing such a system, but the system is yet to take its full shape.

It is proposed that universities or research institutes should be encouraged and supported to set up their own think tanks to concentrate on international development researches. It is also proposed that prestigious international research institutes should be invited to view China's foreign aid practices from international perspectives.

Fourth, China should establish a scientific foreign aid assessment and monitoring system. As China keeps increasing the scale and expanding the coverage of its foreign aid, it is necessary to have a such system in place, in order to respond to concerns or queries from international societies or to explain to Chinese citizens. Furthermore, systematic assessment itself requires a scientific system that can evaluate and monitor the whole process from planning, implementation till completion. At present, only implementation is monitored and evaluated at a very preliminary level, whilst scientific assessment on outcomes and influences is lacking. China has received aid from international development organizations for more than 30 years. During these years China has ushered in monitoring and evaluation technologies and trained local specialists in this profession. It is thus proposed that China should absorb nutrients from years of practices and make a full use of the existing human resource accumulation. On the other hand, technical and institutional obstacles that hamper these professionals should be removed.

Fifth, China should learn from western countries who have built up international development aid systems, in which co-exist multiple patterns of bilateral, multilateral and NGO involved. From open-minded interactions, China can draw experience from western countries in terms of providing non-reimbursable assistance, concessional loans and other types of foreign aid. China should particularly value experiences and practices on aid effectiveness evaluation, most important of which is project planning, monitoring till post evaluation. While learning from western countries, China should forego their malpractice of imposing political criteria and overcome their shortcomings such as big administrative cost and small economic yielding, etc

- **中国对外援助的发展：若干建议**

李小云 徐秀丽 唐丽霞

中国在国际上的地位大致经历了三个不同的阶段。第一个阶段是 20 世纪 50-80 年代。这个阶段中除了有一段时间与前社会主义阵营的密切关系以外，大部分时间处在独立自主和自力更生的发展阶段。前期，中国国际战略的基本立足点在于自身安全和支持其他社会主义

兄弟国家的发展，后期，主要通过对发展中国家的广泛支持打破封锁，开拓国际生存空间。对外援助所呈现的自利和功利不明显，相反援助几乎是单向性的和利他性的，即使中国当时处于经济困难的时期，仍然为发展中国家提供了可观的对外援助。第二个阶段是改革开放以后到本世纪初，中国的国际生存环境有了根本的改变，各种封锁极大缓解，尤其是与西方的合作全面展开，对中国地缘政治的约束因素减少。中国的战略转向如何利用相对开放的国际空间发展自身的经济，对外援助的战略转向服从经济建设大局，同时兼顾地缘政治利益等，对外援助具有较强的经济上的互惠互利性。新世纪以来，国际格局发生了很大的变化，中国的国际地位迅速提高，中国的成长也引起了西方社会的担忧，新的地缘政治因素开始出现，中国受益于全球化的有利因素开始发生变化。中国与发达国家，与发展中国家之间相互依存的新型结构关系开始形成并在不断深化，在合作的同时出现了竞争，甚至局部的对抗和冲突。中国对外援助应该要服务于构建一个成长中的新型全球领导力量，服务于中国引领国际话语体系的发展目标。当前中国的援外工作格局显然难以实现这样的发展目标，中国对外援助体系需要进行改革。

**第一，提升对外援助的战略地位，增强对外援助的国际公共属性。**在新的全球格局下，中国的国际战略已不再是过去集中于“生存空间”的开拓和如何服务于国内经济的发展，而是集中在如何支持中国成为全球新型领导力量方面。作为全球领导角色就必须承担全球性义务以及支持或主导全球公共产品的生产。这意味着对外援助在基于确保若干自身核心利益的同时，应该优先考虑服务于全球公共利益。中国对外援助需要具备与政治外交、经济合作和必要的战略性军事力量的存在同等重要的战略地位。一个国家只有具备了这个四轮驱动的国际战略体系，才有可能有效地践行国际正义，维护世界和平，并同时维护国家合法利益。中国已经形成了有中国特色的援助体系，成为了国际发展体系中新型的援助力量。但是，中国除了参与一些大的国际发展事务的讨论外，由于机构资源约束等方面的原因，很少参与各种国际发展援助的议程活动，在这个体系的政策制定中实际影响力和话语权很少。同时，中国对外援助作为国际公共产品的战略地位也不清晰。建议除了积极参加联合国和 20 国集团国际发展议程以外，应积极参与经合组织发展援助委员会，全球发展有效性伙伴计划，多边发展组织和其他有各个国家发起的有关国际发展的活动。特别是经合组织发展援助委员会的议程和全球发展有效性伙伴计划。因为这些活动实际上左右着联合国的发展议程以及有关气候变化的讨论，同时也影响着发展中国家的发展合作政策。由于国际发展事务很多，基于目前机构设置的实际情况，建议设立专职性的部长级的中国国际发展议程首席代表，这一方面可以专职参与各种国际发展援助的讨论和规则的制定，同时也可以与其他国家的负责发展援助的部门对等交流。

**第二，改变当前对外援助的碎片化状态，建立适应新的国际格局的大援外体系。**随着对外援助战略地位的提升，规模和援助范围的扩大，现有对外援助管理体系迫切需要进行调整。首先，中国的政治体制在宏观上可以确保对外援助在战略层面的集中统筹。但是目前的格局是不同部门掌握着不同类型的援外资源。虽然，不同部门执行的对外援助项目效益都很明显，如援非医疗队项目。但是，现阶段援外资金有限，不同部门都有繁重的国内发展的任务，而且，参与机构越多，由于部门利益而出现的弊端就越大，用于协调的成本也就越大。实际上，对外援助的碎片化状态不利于援助资源整体性效益的放大。其次，现有援外机构设置不论从行政的级别还是人员的数量等方面都难于很好地承担援外作为国家重大战略工具的重任。因此，改变目前援外的碎片化状态，建立相对统一的大援外管理体制局迫在眉睫。建议通过整合现有援外行政资源，设立一个统一援外法规政策，援外规划和管理，各种对外，对内和对外宣传合作的体制，援外的执行仍可采用多主体的形式。

**第三，加强对外援助研究和人才培养，形成基于中国经验的援外理论和知识体系。**西方发展援助的演化一直基于系统的发展知识的生产，这也是西方发展援助持续发展并主导国际发展体系的重要原因。援助知识体系具有多学科的特点，特别需要经济学、社会学、人类学、政治学以及其他专业学科的参与。中国对外援助经过 60 多年的实践，已经形成了很多具备理论化的知识要素，但是，由于长期缺乏对援外理论的系统研究，一方面造成了援外缺乏理论框架，另一方面则造成了由于理论框架的缺失而无法很好地总结援外的经验的局面。研究的薄弱与援外专业人才的缺乏有关。中国除了中国农业大学之外，并没有系统的培养发展学人才基地。建议支持大学或研究机构展开针对援外的理论研究，支持建立中国国际发展研究会，形成研究和交流的系统性制度。同时，建议通过一定的形式委托国际知名的研究机构对中国对外援助展开研究，提供对中国对外援助的国际视角。建议在综合性、专业性大学建设若干个国家级援外人才培养基地。

**第四，建立科学系统的对外援助评估监测体系。**随着中国对外援助规模的不断扩大和援助领域的不断拓展，无论从回应国际社会的关切和质疑，还是向中国大众说明中国对外援助的效果，都需要对中国对外援助进行系统的评价。而系统的评价又取决于能否建立一个从援助的计划到执行整个过程的科学的评估和监测体系的建立。目前，中国对外援助的监测评估还停留在初级的项目执行情况的监测方面，基本缺乏科学的规范的产出监测和影响评价。国际发展组织为中国提供了三十多年的援助，在中国也系统地引入了发展援助的监测评价技术，而且也培养了一大批中国的监测评价专家。因此，建议很好地吸取这些实践的经验，并充分利用已有的专家队伍，对发展援助项目展开第三方独立评价。

**第五，合理吸收西方国家发展援助的经验和教训。**西方国际发展援助体系形成了双边、多边和 NGO 参与的完整的体系，并具备了在无偿援助、优惠贷款等不同形态援助的长期的经验。中国可以通过与多边、双边以及 NGO 的开放性合作，学习和吸取西方发展援助的经验，特别应关注发展援助的有效性方面的管理的经验和措施，尤其是西方发展援助体系在制定国别援助战略、部门援助方案、援助项目的周期管理、援助宣传、绩效评估以及监测评价方面都已经形成了非常成熟的管理流程和基本做法，这些方式和方法有助于我们提高援助项目管理的有效性。建议中国通过和西方发达国家或者国际多边组织开展援助管理方面的能力建设合作，选派中国援外管理人员到主要发达国家和多边的援助管理机构进行短期或者长期的交流学习，编写国外援助管理经验和技术培训手册，组织援外管理培训班，吸收西方国家发展援助的经验。当然中国在学习西方发展援助经验的同时，也要注意吸取西方发展援助政治化、管理成本高昂、对经济发展影响弱等方面的弊端。

## How to Improve International Agricultural Training in China (Chinese)

### ● 中国援外培训工作的主要问题和几点建议

唐丽霞 周明川

我国的援外培训最早源于 1953 年开始实施的人力资源开发合作项目，20 世纪 50 年代至 70 年代，中国接收了大量来自朝鲜、越南、阿尔巴尼亚、古巴、埃及等国的实习生来华学习，涉及农林、水利、轻工、纺织、交通、卫生等 20 多个行业。自 1981 年起，中国同联合国开发计划署合作，为发展中国家在华举办了多个领域的实用技术培训班。自 1998 年起，中国政府开始举办援外官员研修班和援外培训班，之后，中国政府在多次国际发展会议和中非合作论坛上宣布加强对发展中国家人员的培训，促进人力资源合作。2015 年 9 月，在联合国发展峰会上，中国政府再次宣布为发展中国家培训提供 12 万个培训名额，援外培训已经成为中国对外援助的主要方式之一。

第一，中国目前援外培训内容多，覆盖面广，但缺乏整体的援外培训战略，援外培训的战略性目标不明确。从商务部国际商务官员研修院网站公布的培训项目简介中可以看到，中国对外援助培训涉及农业、减贫、特区建设、基础设施发展、科技、教育、卫生等方面，在一个领域内，又涉及到政策、技术、实施、管理等不同层次和环节，以农业援外培训为例，其培训班的内容就涉及到种植、畜牧、兽医、农机、水产、农村能源、环保、经济管理、农村政策等不同方面。内容广泛的培训班虽然能够让中国不同的发展经验得以推广，让发展中国家的学员能够更全面地了解中国的发展，但是这也导致了培训总体目标的分散和不集中。当前培训课程的设计主要基于培训机构自身的知识、能力和师资储备，忽略了全球不同区域、不同国家发展问题的差异性，当前中国开展援外培训工作已经有近 20 年的历史，**建议对过去 20 年的培训工作做一次系统的总结，开始研究全球不同区域、不同国家的有差异性的发展问题和发展需求，制定系统性、综合性、全局性同时又有一定针对性的中国援外培训战略，明确援外培训宏观战略性目标，识别中国向外输出的核心发展经验和技能，甄别援外培训的重点领域、重点区域和重点国家。**

第二，中国目前援外培训形式多样，参与机构多，但缺乏整体统一的对外宣传和介绍，援外培训未能形成良好的国际培训品牌。目前，中国为发展中国家提供的培训形式从资金来源上可以分为：第一，中国援外预算资金支付的官员研修班和技术人员培训班，这类培训班由商务部援外司培训处统一管理，由商务部国际商务官员研修学院负责具体协调，全国被商务部认定有援外培训资质的 122 家机构负责实施培训项目，每年的培训规模在 1000 期左右。第二，中国各部门国际合作专项经费支付的援外培训班，教育部、农业部、科技部等职能部门在自己本级部门预算中也会安排一部分援外培训资金，以科技部为例，科技部举办的发展中国家技术培训班在全国大约有 35 个专门培训机构。第三，一些国际机构委托中国相关部门举办的援外培训班，如联合国粮农组织、世界粮食计划署、世界银行、世界卫生组织等多边机构委托中国相关部门举办援外培训班，还如中国在粮农组织建立的信托基金，该信托基金也在中国支持了 6 个国际农业参考中心开展国际农业培训等。虽然中国援外培训管理制度上对于一些培训课程的结构、通识培训内容有统一的规定，但大部分培训班仍然以各个培训机构自身的培训设计为主，这虽然能够充分发挥各个培训机构的特长和优势，但是，由于缺乏总体性的培训框架、培训指南、培训阅读文件的设计，中国援外培训未能形成有效的国际培训品牌，援外培训的国际认知程度不高。中国援外培训机构大部分缺乏内容完整丰富的英文网站，也缺乏对培训课程的系统介绍，培训宣传几乎没有。**建议中国要建立中国援外培训的统一标识、培训简介、指南等培训技术性资料体系；对于通识性的培训课程，要组织专家进行系统的专门性的教材和阅读材料开发，建立英文、法语等主要国际通用语言的中国援外培训网站，并且向外宣传网站链接；编制中国援外宣传手册，通过中国驻海外使馆、孔子学院、公司等机构发放，扩大中国援外培训的国际认知程度和影响力。**

第三，中国援外培训重视在华培训阶段工作，对于培训前的需求评估、培训后的跟踪评估以及对学员提供的后续支持不足。通过多年的援外培训工作，中国已经建立起相对比较完善的援外培训组织和管理体系、接待体系和讲课体系，根据笔者针对来华参加农业国际培训的近 200 份调查问卷统计发现，绝大部分学员对在华期间的培训组织、参观考察、教室和教学设施、住宿条件、接待服务、餐饮以及培训工作人员的服务态度都非常满意。但是，对于学员的培训需求评估和培训后的跟踪评估几乎没有，这一方面受制于当前我国援外培训的招生途径，大部分都通过使馆经商处进行，培训机构本身参与程度低，使馆经商处受到人员数量和工作性质等方面的限制，无力开展系统的需求评估，缺乏需求评估，也缺乏对学员的前期了解，从而导致培训内容和学员需求的匹配程度不高；学员回国以后，大部分培训机

构难以再继续保持和学员之间的联系，也很少对学员进行跟踪评估，更无从谈起对学员提供后续支持，笔者的调研发现有 60%的学员表示回国后在实际应用培训内容和技術中存在困难，希望得到中国提供相应的资金支持和技术支持，而支持学员的后续行动也是德国等发达国家开展国际培训的一项主要活动。建议中国援外培训中增加培训机构开展学员前期需求评估和后续跟踪评估、服务的费用，增强培训机构和学员之间的联系，并且给优秀学员提供一定的后续技术扩散和推广的经费，使得学员回国之后能够利用所学内容。建议前方使馆经商部门定期组织来华学员联谊交流会，听取学员对来华培训的反馈，并加强和学员之间的联系，使得学员感受到中国政府在持续关注他们的发展。建议援外培训管理机构和当地的相关部门，尤其是咨询服务部门，建立联系，扩大招生途径和方式，并依托当地部门了解和掌握培训需求等。

第四，中国援外培训学员以政府官员和工作人员为主，其次以科研机构和教育机构的人员为主，培训人员构成相对封闭。学员中以管理人员为主，真正的技术和业务人员相对较少，从而影响了培训成果的转化。调查发现，来华参加培训的学员中，政府官员和工作人员占到 65.57%，科研机构和教育机构占到 20%，来自于当地大的企业和公司的学员占到 6.67%，几乎没有来自发展中国家非政府部门和民间机构的学员，也就是说，我们培训的学员基本上是政府财政供养人员，但实际上在很多发展中国家，非政府机构、民间团体、公司和企业也是这些国家发展的重要推动力量，中国在海外很多受到批评和抵制的行为也往往来源于这些领域，而这些领域的人很大一部分不了解中国。建议中国对外援助培训机构在招生时应该考虑通过一定的渠道、途径和方法招收来自于非政府部门的学员，扩大中国援外培训对象的覆盖面，让发展中国家更多的发展力量来华参加培训，增强他们对中国的理解。

第五，中国目前援外培训仍然以多边为主，同期学员来自多个国家和地区，对培训的需求和预期差异性大，培训机构提供的培训难以满足差异性的需求；中国援外培训和其他援外方式的结合程度有限，不能有效利用中国援外资源；另外，援外培训以来华培训为主，缺乏和当地培训机构的合作，培训成本高，培训效果也有限。中国很多培训班都是同时招收不同区域、不同国家和地区的学员，但是不同区域、国家和地区在发展上面临的问题是不一样的，学员来华学习的需求也是有差异的，在同一个培训班中，一些学员对培训内容满意程度高，一些学员则对培训内容满意程度非常低，建议中国加大双边培训的规模，针对同一个国家或者是发展情况相似的国家开展针对性强的培训，提高培训内容的有效性。中国政府的援外培训工作组织和管理以及实施都是相对独立的体系，这与当前中国政府其他援助方式之间的结合程度十分有限，如中国派遣援外专家、农业技术示范中心、抗疟中心、援外医疗队等，此外，中国还计划要在发展中国家援建 100 所学校和职业培训中心，这些都可以承担起援外培训的工作。建议中国援外培训考虑更多和这些多种援外方式结合，向这些援助行动的承担者提供部分培训经费，整合中国的援外资源。另外，中国援外培训工作仍然是以中方机构为主，以引进来培训为主，这种培训方式非常重要，需要继续加大投入，但是这种培训成本高，有时培训效果也不明显，培训的影响范围有限，建议中国考虑向其他发达国家学习，支持其他发展中国家自身培训机构的能力建设，以及和这些机构共同开发传播中国发展经验和技术的培训课程，支持举办中国发展经验的培训班，这样可以扩大中国援外培训的覆盖面和影响力。